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 FOREWORD: MY STORY 
I was born in one of the wealthiest and greenest countries in the world – a world 
otherwise stricken by environmental crisis, social inequalities, needs and greed.   
Brundtland and Blekkulf told me their stories, and placed the misery of the world 
on my shoulders. “Sustainable development” became our mantra, that we should 
all think globally while acting locally. I felt a great responsibility, being one of 
the luckiest children on earth: I wanted to save the world. And as I grew older, I 
also wanted to understand this complex reality. Our common future seemed still 
challenged, but all the while Norway continued to prosper. And then came the 
story of climate change. What a story! What a story? 
My motivation for writing this thesis has been driven by my “world-saving 
agenda”, facing the current warnings about global warming. I believe climate 
change is an environmental challenge that especially makes us, oil-wealthy 
Norwegians, responsible for transforming our own society into a more nature 
friendly one, in addition to saving the “world out there”. While writing this thesis 
and exploring the myriad of claims about climate change and our environmental 
future, I have understood even more that reality is complex and contingent.     
The stories of climate change are embedded in moral, cultural and political 
conditions – it is a jungle out there!  
Many people have helped me to navigate the chaotic terrain of climate change 
communication and led me to inspiring perceptions while writing this thesis, not 
to mention all the good people connected to SUM and my inventive businessman 
at home. I would most of all like to thank my supervisor, Nina Witoszek, for 
being such a creative, critical and conscious guide.  
Marte von Krogh 
Oslo, September 2009 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of 
increases in global average air and oceans temperatures, widespread melting of snow and 
ice and rising global average sea level […] Most of the observed increase in global 
average temperature since the mid-20
th 
Century is very likely due to the observed increase 
in anthropogenic [greenhouse gases] concentrations (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 
2007). 
1.1 STORIES ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 
“Climate change”, “global warming”, “the greenhouse effect”: These 
designations are the most common ones for discussing the environment today. 
Whatever the phenomenon is called, climate change is often portrayed to be the 
biggest environmental challenge of our time – of all time. According to a host of 
scientific reports, policy documents and public news articles, the earth is getting 
warmer and we are facing a global crisis. The diverse stories of climate change 
constitute different aspects of the complex grand story of our time, defining and 
describing changes happening to the whole world as we know it. 
This emerging plurality of global climate change narratives involves abstract and 
probabilistic science, labyrinthine laws and regulations, grandstanding 
politicians, speculative economics and the complex interplay of individuals, 
societies and our natural surroundings (Hannigan, 2006). Hence, the stories of 
global warming constitute one of the most complicated and pressing challenges 
of interpretation of our time. Although the quote from the UN‟s 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report represents a so-called 
scientific consensus on the “credible explanation” of the processes of global 
warming, climate change is in no way treated as a merely scientific phenomenon 
– at least in the real world. The stories of climate change are fundamentally about 
the effects arising from human use of carbon energy and therefore about 
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atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG).
1
 But these stories are 
not only dealing with GHG levels “out there in nature” per se, separated from 
human existence. Rather, these are stories about the immense challenges facing 
humanity; climate change is seen in relation to problems of poverty, development 
and resource management – both in the developed countries and the developing 
countries.
2
 The stories of climate change are talking about speculative issues, 
taking into account unpredictable social and natural systems. 
The scientific modeling of the future of climate change is fraught with 
uncertainties and the challenge of addressing these complex issues is both 
daunting and pressing. Global warming has become an issue of general concern, 
where human energy use is the main menace. But still there is considerable 
disagreement over how to respond to this challenge. Many scientists point to the 
potential of carbon reduction and the need for social change, though there are a 
variety of envisioned strategies – be it through emphasizing changes in 
technology, policy, business or cultural values. Some argue that technological 
reforms are a sufficient response to our global environmental challenge, and 
speak the language of science and economics. Others claim that there is a 
fundamental discrepancy between continued economic growth and the 
preservation of the environment and understand global warming to represent a 
cultural challenge to the industrialized world. They believe that the cumulative 
effects of unlimited growth in population and increasing per capita consumption 
have accelerated the already severe damage to ecological systems and argue that 
we, in the affluent Western countries, must contemplate the destructive excesses 
of our current lifestyles and, by extension, our technological and economic 
activities. Thus, such voices advance more radical responses to the challenge of 
                                              
1  I use the terms GHG-, CO2- and carbon- emissions in a “non-technical way” as representing the same problem: human  
use of fossil fuel, which contributes to climate change.  
2  I use these terms – however academically problematic – to describe different states of human affairs, where the 
developed countries represent our Western world and the developing countries represent the rest of the world! I will write this thesis 
from a “Western” perspective, focusing on climate change stories evolving in the industrialized North – mainly in West-Europe and 
the U.S. – manifested in the Norwegian context. 
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climate change and see the need for a fundamental awakening in the human 
consciousness, in order to change the perspectives of our role as humans on 
earth. As a result, the case of climate change has given rise to different 
environmental discourses both on what might constitute social progress and on 
our perspectives of, - and relationship to, the natural world (Dryzek, 2005). 
These discourses stimulate distinct forms of environmental awareness and can be 
seen as connected to value-laden stories – stories that inform us about how to live 
our lives and relate not only to nature, but to the world as such. Many stories of 
climate change talk on behalf of – and try to appeal to – humanity and the global 
environment. But at the same time, these attempts to address the entire world 
ultimately lead to a local manifestation and appreciation.  
In December 2007, the Norwegian Nobel Peace Committee dedicated that year‟s 
Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC. This nomination was seen as an effort to 
put global warming on the international program, linking the climate issue to 
humanitarian duty. Al Gore was shown as a hero of our time, daring to raise the 
debate about global warming up to a moral level. Backed by the scientific 
consensus from the IPCC, climate change was no longer presented as a scientific 
dispute, but rather seen as a human-made challenge which called for action. 
Norway, a small and oil-rich country, was the right place to highlight this 
renewed global agenda for our time. We Norwegians – said to be living in one of 
the wealthiest countries of the world, and constructing our identity around 
beautiful nature, environmentally friendly attitudes and global responsibility – 
should surely relate to the challenges of global warming. However, the fact 
remains that Norway is one of the world‟s largest exporters of fossil fuel and has 
one of the highest levels of CO2-emissions per capita.
3
 So what does climate 
change mean for us Norwegians? Given that Norwegian wealth and lifestyles are 
intimately connected to the problems of global warming, which stories about 
                                              
3  See i.e. Statistics Norway (SSB, 2009a): http://www.ssb.no/olje_gass_en/, and Carbon Footprints of Nations: 
http://www.carbonfootprintofnations.com/content/ranking/79/. 
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climate change stimulate our awareness of this challenge? Is climate change 
presented in a way which relates it to our way of living? What are the Norwegian 
stories of climate change; is this global environmental threat communicated 
towards the general Norwegian public in a way that fosters civil engagement and 
social change? 
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES 
My intention is neither to tell or analyze the whole story about climate change – 
which would be literally impossible – nor to construct one big story.4 Rather, I 
will in this thesis characterize and interpret the various stories about climate 
change which are formed in and inform the public sphere (Ryghaug, 2006). My 
aim is to focus on how scientific knowledge of climate change is mediated, or the 
ways in which this information is interpreted and passed on to the general public. 
I am concerned with the Norwegian context and the ways in which the 
Norwegian public are exposed to the climate challenge. I therefore want to 
explore the ways in which climate change narratives are constructed, translated 
and multiplied in a common, communicative dialogue in the Norwegian press. 
Naturally, the debate over global warming has an international aspect, with 
arguments arising from a “global dialogue” on the issue. Thus, the stories of 
climate change are circulating around the world. To put the global warming issue 
in an international context, I will first bring attention to some influential stories 
about climate change that are competing on the global stage. I will focus on four 
different “storytellers”, each with a different worldview, language and moral 
message: the IPCC, Al Gore, Bjørn Lomborg and James Lovelock. These 
speakers are focusing on different problems and presenting different solutions to 
our global challenge, and hence constructing different kinds of crises, different 
ideas about nature and different cultural values. My first objective is to explore 
                                              
4  I take as a presupposition that anthropogenic climate change is, in fact, happening and that the various scientific 
evidences are strong enough to argue this. 
5 
 
the underlying meanings and moral values of these climate stories. And because 
climate change is translated into an issue of public concern and accordingly 
discussed on different levels – from the worldwide web to the neighboring neb – 
I will explore how these global stories are manifested locally. The next step of 
my analysis will therefore focus on how these global stories are absorbed into the 
Norwegian climate change discourse, and to what extent. The Norwegian climate 
change discourse is investigated by conducting a qualitative media analysis on 
the climate issue, with the main part of my thesis analyzing how three influential 
Norwegian newspapers are communicating and debating global warming. In my 
media analysis, I will also discuss how the texts on climate change reflect the 
Norwegian cultural context. By analyzing how the challenge of climate change is 
adopted into a Norwegian reality, I aim to discover which underlying values are 
present in the Norwegian media coverage on the climate issue. Through this 
approach, I will elaborate on what kinds of environmental awareness are 
expressed in the media samples and accordingly transmitted to the Norwegian 
public. Media are seen as a crucial aspect of public discourse and social change – 
spreading stories, ideas and ethics of the climate issue. My primary objective is 
to explore to what extent the Norwegian press provides a stimulating and 
mobilizing story of climate change. 
With my above stated objectives, I have certain presuppositions implicit in the 
focus of my theses, which should be disclosed: I will argue that environmental 
awareness, like that of climate change, should neither be reduced to a subject in 
only technological or governmental affairs, nor to an issue for the private 
individual. In other words, the solution also lies in a revival of public 
engagement (Skorstad, 2005). The appeal of environmental messages is 
becoming significant in both electioneering and marketing (Mülhaüser, 2006). 
Public discussion about climate change might engage the values that underpin 
our decisions as social beings – citizens, voters, producers and consumers. In 
turn, the public must be sufficiently informed to understand the state of science, 
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and engaged enough in civic life to make sound judgments about policies that 
address the risks identified by science (Schneider, 2005).  
I am most interested in to what extent the Norwegian media might stimulate a 
green public sphere – which is understood as distinctive in its questioning of 
industrialist presuppositions, a challenge at a cultural level that serves to 
reconstitute our concept of what is reasonable (Torgerson, 1999:130). I am thus 
influenced by the idealistic concept of “ecological democracy” (Dryzek, 2005), 
which represents renewed democratic politics that engage the public and promote 
ecological values.
5
 I am also inspired by the analysis which states that Norwegian 
environmental politics are depoliticized, in which environmental problems are 
discursively relocated from industry as the site of production to the individual as 
site of consumption (Straume, 2005: 192). In addition, I am aware of the analysis 
of Norway as a country which lacks powerful, green movements (Dryzek et al., 
2003). Hence, I will focus on to what extent climate change is presented as a 
challenge to the reality of Norwegian life, and whether this environmental threat 
fosters ecological consciousness among Norwegian citizens. Through my media 
analysis, I will try to get a better understanding of the cultural and political 
processes through which the claims of environmental science are formed and 
transformed in the Norwegian context. I aim to discover some of the discursive 
processes of communication, norms and forms of “moral entrepreneurship” by 
which our concerns around climate change, get constructed and are contested. 
For privileged people, like most Norwegians, environmental problems such as 
climate change seem increasingly distant in both time and space. Norway is 
known as an excellent performer in cross-environmental comparisons and 
internationally we market ourselves as environmentally progressive. But 
simultaneously as our government sets ambitious targets for CO2-reductions at 
                                              
5  I am aware of the many claims, especially by political scientists, that the environmental crisis is too serious a matter to be 
left to democratic procedures - such as voting (Straume, 2005: 202). See i.e. Wyller, 1999. 
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home and around the world, our domestic CO2-emissions, our national petroleum 
wealth and our consumption practices are climbing to higher and higher levels 
(SSB, 2009b). In this national picture, it looks like there is something missing in 
our methods of constructing environmental awareness. The general stories of 
climate change can fairly be understood as representing an opposition to the 
reality of Norwegian life – with the foundation of our welfare society resting 
upon revenues from fossil fuels. The challenges global warming presents need 
not only be understood in relation to the Norwegian economy and politics; the 
climate issues can also be seen as a cultural challenge.
6
 This relates to how we 
construct meaning in our lives, in which our national memory and collective way 
of apprehending the world contribute to stories about the “Norwegian reality”. 
These national narratives can in turn be seen as produced within and attuned to 
specific political economic relations – although such narratives are understood as 
encompassing politics as well (Norgaard, 2006). In other words, the general 
representations of climate change might challenge our very idea of being 
Norwegians – of who we are, how we live, and how we relate to nature and the 
world as such.  
In the context of Norwegian media, an important focus is how the global climate 
change stories merge and diverge with pre-established Norwegian narratives. 
Within this perspective, it is interesting to see not only which aspects of the 
global stories are communicated, but also which messages are being silenced as a 
result of preconceived ways of understanding the world. I therefore want to 
inquire to what extent the various stories of climate change circulating in the 
Norwegian media confront our “Norwegian reality”. I will thus try to place my 
Norwegian analysis in a more challenging – as well as a more interpretative – 
                                              
6  Culture are to be understood as “a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge 
about and attitudes towards life” (Geertz 1973:89). Culture is often used intermittingly with society/the social, and should be seen 
as dynamic and changing – while building on past systems of significant codification. I will focus on a national level and 
concentrate on the “Norwegian culture”. The Norwegian culture can also be treated as the implicit systems of meaning and frames 
of references that underpin the various practices through which we communicate environmental issues and politics (Fisher and 
Hajer, 1999). 
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framework, as I focus on factors that have to do with the production of 
knowledge and ideology. I am interested in the various symbolic ways in which 
climate change is presented as a “meaning-making story”, although a more 
“materialistic” approach to the issue also exists. Climate change as a 
phenomenon challenges scientific, political and moral questions as much as it 
unites different professions and sciences, and connects academic discourses to 
actual scientific problems and material structures in every day life.  
1.3 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Related to my stated objectives in this thesis, I have several central research 
questions which will guide me in my analyses: At the global level, I ask how 
some of the significant global storytellers of climate change portray this 
environmental concern – how do they formulate the problem, what kind of 
solutions do they suggest, and what is the value dimension inherent in their 
respective climate change stories? At the Norwegian level, I ask how the 
Norwegian media present the chosen global climate change stories. On the same 
level, I ask how the media reflect some Norwegian narratives – how do the given 
global “climate realities” merge with the assumed “Norwegian reality”? In this 
context, I also ask what the normative dimensions of the stories circulating in the 
press are – to what extent do these representations confront our culture and 
politics. Are they challenging our conventional ways of thinking? Last but not 
least within this context, I ask to what extent the dominant stories circulating in 
the press foster public deliberation on the climate issue – is global warming 
presented as an issue that has the potential to mobilize the Norwegian public? 
 
My central research questions in this thesis are thus addressing two levels of 
climate change stories: the global climate change stories and the Norwegian 
climate change stories. Within the Norwegian context, I am also focusing on two 
types of stories: the climate change stories and the Norwegian cultural narratives. 
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I aim to connect these levels and types of stories and in this way be able to say 
something about the possible moral implications and mobilizing potentials 
provided by texts on climate change in the Norwegian media. 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
In the next chapter – chapter 2 – I will present my theoretical and methodological 
inspirations. I am most influenced by the theories of narrative and intertextuality; 
and also by the concept of discourse analysis and environmental discourses. In 
chapter 3, I establish the international framework of my Norwegian media 
analysis, as I elaborate each of the four global stories on climate change in 
separate terms. In chapter 4, I turn to the Norwegian media context and show 
how the four global stories are reflected in national media coverage on climate 
change. In chapter 5, I aim to link the media stories on climate change to the 
cultural context of Norway. I will therefore first present two notable Norwegian 
cultural narratives which form the national framework of my media analysis. In 
the next part of chapter 5, I continue my Norwegian media analysis and elaborate 
how these two cultural stories are reflected in the media texts on climate change. 
In the last part of chapter 5, I provide my overall interpretation of the major 
stories on climate change in the Norwegian media – understood as the 
intertextual merging between the presented and elaborated global stories and 
Norwegian cultural narratives. In chapter 6, I turn my attention to the political 
voices in the media sample and focus on how the four different global climate 
stories as well as the two Norwegian cultural narratives are reflected in the 
publicized political agendas. I will in this chapter give an account of what the 
hegemonic political stories of climate change communicated in the press are, and 
I will also provide critical remarks about the mobilizing potential of these 
hegemonic climate stories. In the last chapter – chapter 7 – I sum up the findings, 
and point to some problems and potentials in what I have analyzed as the 
dominant Norwegian climate stories.  
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2. THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF STORIES -           
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL INSPIRATIONS                          
This thesis is written from a combined social science and humanities perspective. 
Sociology, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology and other disciplines now 
address the question of how environmental concerns come into being. The focus 
on climate change awareness in the public sphere involves too many component 
parts to be understandable if one were to limit oneself to only one of the many 
established academic disciplines. Therefore, I see the need for an 
interdisciplinary and pluralistic approach when focusing on a complex issue such 
as the communication of climate change.  
As there is neither one superior theory, nor one coherent concept nor an 
exhaustive introduction to the contextualization of the issue of climate change, I 
shall use only one of many possible approaches – which will be presented to help 
the reader to understand my choice and use of theoretical concepts and 
methodological tools later in my thesis.  
2.1 NARRATIVE THEORIES 
The idea of the narrative has been applied with immense theoretical variety and 
the term is currently very fashionable in academic texts, but the concept is often 
used inaccurately (Svarstad, 2002:75). I will nevertheless use the term in a broad 
manner – inspired by the theories of Jerome Bruner – and treat narratives as 
collective meaning-making stories.
7
 I see narratives as “mental forms” inherent 
in our acquisition of knowledge which structure our experiences of the world and 
function as one potent way of finding meaning in an overwhelmingly complex 
reality. In effect, we are dealing not only with a mode of representation, but also 
                                              
7  Some theories distinguish between a ”story” and a ”narrative”, where story refers to an individual expression, while 
narrative represents a collective manifestation (Svarstad, 2002). I will treat both categories as reality-constructions that are common 
among a group of people – as cultural meaning systems. 
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with a mode of constructing and constituting reality (Bruner, 1991). Narratives 
can hence at a general level be considered as a cultural tool used more or less 
unconsciously when communicating with other people, one which has the power 
to influence our perception – and construction – of the world we live in, both 
individually and collectively (Bruner, 2006). I thereby treat narratives as the 
structural level through which we humans order our expressions and experiences, 
and try to understand them. This approach will be further elaborated in chapter 5 
on the Norwegian cultural context, where I analyze two Norwegian cultural 
narratives – the environmental story and the humanitarian story (see 5.1).    
Generally speaking, it is through stories that one‟s situation in the cultural and 
political landscape is defined. It is through stories that we acquire identity and 
make sense of what is happening around us, what has happened and what can 
happen in the future (Bruner, 2006). A narrative can further be understood as a 
recounting of human plans gone off track, as a way to domesticate human error 
and surprise (Bruner, 2003:31). We do, in other words, live through stories and 
minor violations of presumed norms by rendering these breaches into a familiar, 
acceptable form. The accounts of climate change accordingly represent both a 
potent violation of some ordinary national stories, while also being influential 
stories in themselves. These climate change stories can hence be seen as a public 
antagonist. One of the ways such a public antagonist is confronted and 
accomplished is by storytelling‟s inherent particularity. Even stories with a 
presumed “universal” appeal – like the global climate change stories – require 
local particularity to achieve authenticity. We never experience “the big picture”, 
but manage to navigate in and make meaning of the world through our collective 
– though particular – stories. Culture does, after all, prescribe our notions of 
ordinariness, where domestication is a major method of maintaining a culture‟s 
coherence (Bruner, 2003).    
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When focusing on the Norwegian context, I understand the clashing stories of 
climate change as communicated in relation to an underlying cultural-political 
web of national narratives. I am hence not very concerned with how narratives as 
text are constructed, that is with a specific structure, actors and plot. I will rather 
use the concept as a sociomental category (Zerubavel, 2000) – as an instrument 
of the “collective mind” in the construction of reality. A national narrative 
implies the symbolic representation of a collective identity, shaped by history 
and culture. The vitality of such national narratives lies in their potential to come 
to terms with contending views and clashing stories (Bruner, 2003). At the same 
time, these constitutions are open to transformations; any national narrative has 
to be sustained and legitimized – which connects such cultural meaning systems 
to the fields of politics and power. Significant national narratives are hence 
understood as dominant representations of some collective “reality”. These 
representations can thus be seen as related to ideology – understood as a concept 
that characterizes a fairly broad, coherent, and relatively durable set of beliefs 
that affects one‟s orientation not only to politics but to everyday life in general 
(Benford and Snow, 2000:613). Such dominant stories can moreover be 
conceptualized as myths:  
Myth is depoliticized speech. One must naturally understand political in its deeper 
meaning, as describing the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, in 
their power of making the world […] myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its 
function is to talk about them […] it gives them a clarity which is not that of an 
explanation but that of a statement of fact (Barthes and Sontag, 1983:131-132).  
Ideological myths refer thus to fairly pervasive and integrated set of beliefs and 
values that have considerable staying power. Dominant stories provide 
legitimated knowledge about the world, and this dissemination of knowledge is 
understood as a political activity based on cultural conditions (Quinn, 2009). In  
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contrast, clashing stories function as innovative amplifications and extensions of 
– or antidotes to – existing ideologies and their basic components (Benford and 
Snow, 2000).  
Different stories of climate change represent and provide knowledge about the 
environmental crisis. The issues of climate change involve highly elusive, 
scientific and technical insights, and I will focus on the democratization of this 
knowledge. Although I do not intend to discuss actual perceptions of climate 
change in this thesis, I am concerned with public discourse on the matter and will 
thus share some of my thoughts on the public understanding of climate change. 
As I have already argued, the hope of overcoming the challenges of global 
warming lies not only in science, technology and policy interventions. One 
objective of this thesis is to focus on the potential of different climate change 
stories to empower citizens to become full participants in these crucial public 
policy debates. We are said to be living in a global “risk society” (Beck, 1992), 
but the hazards facing us are not seen or felt – at least here in the rich Western 
world; the presence of these risks is knowledge-based. To involve aspects of 
learning and knowledge in a study of environmental communication is quite 
important, but also very demanding. Knowledge can be seen as a rather 
intangible category. I will in my thesis relate the notion to the theories of 
“narrative knowledge”, and thus see environmental knowledge as a form of 
understanding which is neither based on practical experience, technological skills 
nor established scientific truthfulness (Fisher, 1987; Skorstad, 2005). “Reality” is 
understood to be mediated through some representational practice. And 
knowledge of this reality must be transmitted between people. It must be 
explained, defended, and spread through language, argument, and appeal (Heath 
et al., 2007:41). Accordingly, a narrative construction of the “environmental 
reality” is not necessarily correct in a scientifically valid way, but understood as 
real by those who operate inside of it. 
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Both the national narratives of Norway and the climate change stories circulating 
around can be considered subject to mythical processes, as both genres of stories 
try to represent some kind of “reality”. Neither a national identity nor 
explanations of an environmental future can be realistically verified. It is, rather, 
impossible to draw a strict line between where the production of knowledge ends 
and the execution of power starts in these narrative productions – simply because 
these two dimensions are part of the same narrative processes (Fisher, 1987).  
2.1.1 Intertextuality and communication  
As I am interested in exploring the interactions between the four chosen global 
stories of climate change and the powerful narrative knowledge in the Norwegian 
context, I will use the concept of intertextuality. Intertextuality indicates that 
various dialogues and conciliations are going on between different texts and 
storytellers, within and between genres, and between different systems of 
representation and narratives (Agger, 1992). The concept is often used in 
analyses of a linguistic, philological or literary form – building on theories from 
Mikhali Bakthin and Julia Kristeva (ibid.). I am inspired by their theories, but 
will most of all use the concept as a “philosophical asset” in my focus on climate 
change communication.  
In general, different stories of climate change are presented in the global 
marketplace of ideas and are contested through communication and negotiation. 
As I approach climate change as socially represented stories, these stories have a 
social history and can thereby be seen as based upon and negotiating with already 
established or entrenched modes of representation. At the same time, this global 
marketplace of meaning can consolidate certain representations and hence bring 
new awarenesses into being. Concurrently, narratives that are accepted through 
such dialogues can be integrated into the identity of a society. This dialogical 
approach – constituted through text and language – can be understood as a part of 
human condition, and even as a prerequisite for thinking:  
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The idea begins to live, that is, to take shape, to develop, to find and renew its verbal 
expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when it enters into genuine dialogic 
relationships with other ideas, with the idea of others (Bakhtin, in Neumann, 2003:137).  
I see my different climate change stories as “talking to” each other – although not 
necessarily through conscious influence or intentional allusion. The intertextual 
concept pays tribute to the more subtle ways in which human communication and 
consciousness are based on otherness, both in text and thought. As various links 
exist between different climate change stories or discourse events, different 
storytellers are thus faced with choosing from an assortment of narratives, idioms 
and viewpoints. In their “subtle” ways, different global climate change stories 
can merge with one another and possibly create a new agenda: climate change 
awareness. Accordingly, the Norwegian awareness of climate change can be 
understood as connected to the global dialogue on the issue. This evolving 
awareness necessarily adapts to the Norwegian context and its politico-cultural 
reality. Thus, the kinds of knowledge that are negotiated and integrated into the 
Norwegian society depend on power, where insights are communicated to create, 
maintain, and continue the interpretations needed for stabilizing political 
supremacy. At the same time, such dialogues can be seen as intertwined with the 
current narrative knowledge within Norway. This approach to intertextuality 
stresses the workings of culture and highlights the question of national identity 
that is apparently crucial in the context of contemporary societies (Agger, 1992). 
In a seemingly globalized and insecure world – especially with respect to 
environmental threats – aspects of social boundaries are of increasing 
importance. This is not only seen in actual international politics where global 
treaties are running slow, trying to combat national protectionism and embedded 
socioeconomic interests. The same workings can also be found at the cultural, 
sociomental level – where we all are telling our particular, yet collective, stories 
so as to understand who we are and what we are doing in these complex, 
changing times.   
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As already stated, our knowledge about the world is dependent upon 
communication. Communication is in this thesis understood as the production of 
meaning in the interaction between human beings as it occurs in specific social, 
cultural and historical contexts (Harré et al., 1999). Climate change is seen to 
represent a major change to the world as we know it, and many of the scientific 
claims are accordingly about finding suitable responses to this presented 
upheaval. Communication of these issues can thus be understood as  
a continuous and dynamic process unfolding among people that facilitates an exchange 
of ideas, feelings, and information as well as the forming of a mutual understanding and 
common visions of a desirable future [ – in a particular context] (Moser, 2007:15).  
This definition includes pre-established aspects of credibility, authority and 
meaning, but also incorporates the plurality of promising viewpoints, so as to 
counter propaganda and open the possibility of new meanings and needs. An 
open, stimulating dialogue is seen as a prerequisite in any context of participatory 
democracy. 
As there is growing awareness that the dominant ways of describing the 
“environment” influence social deliberation and responses to warning signs from 
the environment, communication of such matters plays a pivotal role in how 
societies and governments face global warming and the changes it might cause 
(ibid; Cox, 2007). Climate change is a matter of scientific inquiry, but it is also a 
subject of disputed concerns in the field of social understanding and meaning: 
The intricacy of science, the politicizing of claims of knowledge, and the 
encroachment of the “technical sphere” on public sphere deliberations, are all 
seen to threaten our capacity to engage intelligently and creatively with the 
increasing signs of environmental distress and deterioration (Cox, 2007). Many 
scientists and academics argue that better communication is seen as essential if 
we are to respond sufficiently to the challenge of climate change. The problems 
behind this environmental threat are surely embedded in powerful socioeconomic 
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structures and value systems. Communication of climate change is hence a 
matter of legitimate concerns – of collective approval of the issues at stake. 
Moreover, expression of these issues and concerns is highly contingent on 
changing global and national circumstances, where different storytellers are 
relating what the climate challenge is about. 
2.2 REALITY, THE ENVIRONMENT AND DISCOURSES 
In this thesis I approach “reality” as it is constituted through stories, and such 
stories can be captured through discourse. The idea of “discourse” has been 
highly influential within the socially-based environmental studies and has been 
utilized in a variety of ways. Some define discourse in relation to linguistics; 
others relate the concept to everyday speech. The most common approach by 
social scientists restricts the concept to mean a specific delimitation of the shared 
meaning of a phenomenon (Svarstad, 2002:67). There are thus many discursive 
approaches and many corresponding levels of inquiry, which all turn attention to 
the role of language as the site of realization of meaning. In all their different 
outlooks, the wide-ranging use of this concept can be seen in relation to the 
origins of discourse in linguistic and social theory, highly influenced by the 
theories of Michel Foucault.  
I will in this thesis use discourse analysis as a methodological tool to interpret 
and establish meaning in my selected texts. As discourses can be found 
anywhere, I will first specify and delimit their analytical usage – with regard to 
both their scope and their temporal dimension. With regard to the scope, I will on 
the one hand focus on environmental discourses, restricted to the discourse 
typology of John S. Dryzek (2005). On the other hand, I will distinguish between 
so called global discourses and the more specific Norwegian ones. This 
distinction is mainly an analytical tool, as the idea of “global discourses” remains 
problematic and, indeed, many have come to the conclusion that national identity 
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defines discourse communities (Mülhaüser, 2006). In the Norwegian cultural 
context, I will describe some specific “Norwegian discourses” which express the 
Norwegian identity (see 5.1).  
With regard to the temporal dimension of my study, I will, in the global context, 
restrict my analysis to the most recent publications from the IPCC, Gore, 
Lovelock and Lomborg. These four “storytellers” all published and promoted 
significant texts during 2006-2007: The Fourth Assessment Report, The 
Inconvenient Truth, The Revenge of Gaia and Cool It, respectively. In the 
Norwegian context, I restrict my analysis to a period of 10 months of news 
publication, from September 2007 to June 2008. My study of Norwegian media 
will represent a qualitative content analysis of three newspapers: Aftenposten 
Morgen (AF), Verdens Gang (VG) and Dagens Næringsliv (DN) (see 2.3). 
2.2.1 Environmental discourse 
Over the years, the structural properties of environmental discourses have 
developed into a distinct discourse category, comprised of the linguistic devices 
that articulate arguments about the relationship between humans and the natural 
environment (Mülhaüser, 2006). This more specific approach involves science, 
economics and ethics – but is neither a scientific nor an economic nor a moral 
discourse, though these are often its tropes (Harré et al., 1999). The primary 
focus is on the endangerment of nature and the human species in a global 
context. Environmental discourses are seen as attempts to make sense of the 
global, environmental changes that are currently affecting the world.  
Implicit in my study is the claim that language and discourse have a central role 
in our understanding of climate change. Language is, of course, not the only 
vehicle through which global environmental concerns take shape. However, 
language is seen as having a prime role in how such issues are discussed, 
negotiated and used for various social and political interests (ibid.:4). Language 
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 is a major instrument through which we can create, sustain or change attitudes 
towards the environment (ibid.). I will in my thesis apply the concept of 
environmental discourse as it is used by Dryzek, who offers a politically charged 
discourse typology. His typology allows the discovery, separation and 
organization of the myriad of environmental claims expressed in my text 
material. Dryzek sees discourse in relation to a socially constructed meaning 
system, and defines it as  
a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who 
subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them into coherent stories or 
accounts. Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgments, and contentions that provide 
the basic term for analysis, debates, arguments, and disagreements (Dryzek, 2005:9). 
Environmental discourses can thus be viewed as broader sets of linguistic 
practices which are embedded in networks of social relations and tied to 
narratives about the construction and state of the world – both the natural and the 
social. The discursive order in which we weave together the world can in other 
words be understood as the workings of the narrative process itself, where 
language is the dominant tool in human meaning making (Harré et al., 1999). 
This implies the recognition of a certain stability of specific meaning systems. 
But at the same time, environmental issues do not place themselves in well-
defined discursive boxes; they are contested and interconnected in many ways. A 
“meaning” cannot be settled once and for all (Svarstad, 2002), and the 
environmental reality is also subject to “meaning work” – in which the struggle 
over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings 
take place (Benford and Snow, 2000:613). In the same way, Dryzek argues that 
the more complex an environmental problem is, the larger the possible 
perspectives of it (Dryzek, 2005). In this way, discourses on climate change 
become manifold and intertwined.   
One major point of Dryzek‟s typology (which I find interesting) is given to what 
extent different environmental discourses frame ecological concerns as 
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representing an anomaly to the existing industrial order, or if such challenges are 
defined within the “culture of progress” (Fisher and Hajer, 1999). The case of 
climate change can accordingly be framed as manageable within the already 
existing institutions of science, technology and society; or it can represent a 
deeper cultural critique of modern societies themselves. Dryzek mainly focuses 
on political aspects in his analysis, where the core idea is that the way we think 
and talk about basic concepts concerning the environment has consequences for 
the politics and policies that occur in the environmental field (Dryzek, 2005). 
Thus, discourses on climate change are, on one level, representing power and 
politics, featuring debates and disputes about environmental policy choices – 
both internationally and locally. Within this perspective, discourses in themselves 
embody power in the sense that they condition the perceptions and values of 
those subject to it. At the same time, discourses are intertwined with certain 
material political realities (ibid: 9). On a more fundamental level, the discourses 
and stories about the fate of our global environment also contain arguments about 
appropriate ethical positions to apply on environmental affairs. These issues are 
intertwined with a variety of moral and aesthetic questions about human 
livelihood, public attitudes, and our proper relation to other entities on the planet 
(ibid.). Within this perspective, environmental discourses are seen as culturally 
significant. The global character of current environmental issues and rhetorical 
claims about globalization has somehow resulted in an exaggerated emphasis on 
integration and interdependence – also in the discourse communities. But I will 
in my analysis stress the persistence of national cultural forces, as the knowledge 
from environmental discourses merges with other meaning systems, which are 
related to national identity and other cultural phenomena.  
On this level, I will distinguish “cultural critique” from “cultural politics”. The 
political dimension refers to how environmental discourse in itself is a cultural 
force, related to dominant perceptions and values. The critical dimension is left 
to the various assertions within environmental discourse that problematize 
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existing arrangements and suggest alternative ways of living with nature (Fisher 
and Hajer, 1999:7). As I am concerned with the rise of a green public sphere, I 
am accordingly concerned with cultural critique. Since the radical voice of 
Rachel Carson‟s Silent Spring in the 1960s, cultural critique has always 
accompanied modern environmental discourse. But with the recent 
mainstreaming of environmental issues and the uptake of environmental 
discourse in established spheres of institutional politics, the dimension of cultural 
critique has lost much of its impact (Dryzek, 2005). 
Through looking at the history as well as the content of environmental 
discourses, Dryzek depicts how four major discourses have developed and what 
effect they have had on different industrialized societies.
8
 Since Dryzek sees 
environmental concerns as stemming from the industrial society, environmental 
discourses cannot simply take the condition of industrialism as given. Rather, 
such discourses have to be positioned in relation to the long-dominant discourse 
of industrial society
9
 and then depart from those terms (ibid: 13). This outlook 
fits well with my choice of climate change stories, as they all stem from – and 
more or less address – highly industrialized countries, including Norway.                         
Dryzek‟s proposed point of departure involves two dimensions: The first is either 
“reformist” or “radical”, while the other is either “prosaic” or “imaginative”.10 
Seen in combination, this leads to four environmental discourses, which 
represent different approaches to nature and society: survivalism, environmental 
problem solving, sustainability and green radicalism. Survivalism describes the 
                                              
8  I will briefly present these four environmental discourses, although I draw on Dryzek‟s typology throughout my thesis. 
For more on these specific typologies, see Dryzek 2005. 
9  “Industrialism” is characterized as an overarching commitment to economic growth. Though industrial societies have 
featured different ideological forces (i.e. liberalism and socialism), they all share a similarity by giving no commitment to preserve 
nature as such or question the growth-ethos. For more on industrialism, see Dryzek 2005. 
10  The reformist way represents the modest manner both in describing environmental problems and defining sufficient 
solutions; whereas the radical approach poses the imagery of apocalypse and urges for big changes. The prosaic dimension takes 
the political-economic chessboard set by industrial society as a given and sees environmental issues as an economic challenge; 
while the imaginative way wants to redefine this chessboard, treating environmental concerns not in opposition to economic ones, 
but potentially in harmony (Dryzek, 2005: 14). 
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earth as a limited stock of resources and prescribes drastic multidimensional 
action to prevent global disaster; environmental problem solving recognizes the 
existence of ecological problems but views them as tractable within the basic 
framework of industrial society; sustainability attempts to creatively resolve the 
conflicts between environmental and economic values; and green radicalism 
rejects the basic structure of industrial society and the way the environment is 
conceptualized in order to promote the transformation of human consciousness, 
economics, and politics (ibid: blurb). Dryzek also defines a fifth discourse 
category: the Promethean industrial discourse. Such an idiom does of course not 
figure as a pro-environmental discourse, as it provides neither calls for 
socioeconomic changes nor a recognition of natural limits.  
The history of environmental affairs is hence the history of environmental 
discourses, which merge with other related meaning systems. Ecological 
awareness and the “crisis of our time” are hence seen as discursive phenomena. 
This comes about through a shift in our ways of seeing and assessing what we 
see – made possible by the adoption into our discourses of new vocabularies, 
new judgmental categories, new metaphors and analogies that have promoted 
awareness of much that was formerly unnoticed. As already argued, the cultural 
critique accompanying environmental concerns has recently lost its significance. 
This is mainly seen in relation to the concept of “sustainable development”, 
introduced as an important, international discourse in the early 1980s. 
Sustainable development has become vital as an integrating discourse covering 
environmental issues from the local to the global, as well as a host of economic 
and development concerns (ibid: 143). In addition, this discourse refuses the idea 
of absolute natural limits – and thusly replaced the apocalyptic postulate of 
survivalism which characterized the environmental agendas of the 1970s. And 
now sustainability discourse has promoted a set of hegemonic, institutional 
practices through which a particular interpretation of sustainability is produced, 
reproduced and transformed (Lash et al., 1996). Along these lines, the 
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environmental problématique is seen as predetermined in an ongoing 
conversation between powerful actors who have produced a discourse of 
sustainable development that refers as much to the maintenance of modern 
techno-industrial arrangements as it does to our basic socio-cultural relationship 
with the natural environment (Fisher and Hajer, 1999:4). This version of 
sustainability is especially prevalent in the Western, industrialized world and is 
also referred to as “techno-corporatist ecological modernization” (Dryzek, 
2005:172). Within this discourse, ecological problems are left to scientists, 
politicians and business leaders; no human, cultural challenge is recognized as 
integral to the environmental predicaments (Lash et al., 1996:19).                                         
Given the current warnings about climate change and our environmental future, it 
seems like the manifested idea of sustainability has been an insufficient 
discourse, which has not produced the sort of social changes that appear to be 
necessary. The challenges of global warming are, moreover, often described 
through images of apocalypse – the natural world appears again as having limits! 
I believe we need a new agenda which engages the broader public in these 
ecological challenges, and I thus treat the discourse of green radicalism as a 
necessary corrective measure to the hegemonic discourse of sustainability. I 
therefore want to focus on the extent to which the chosen climate change stories 
circulating on a global scale constitute a chance for a more multi-layered debate 
of the environmental problems, which can renew environmental awareness at the 
local level. 
2.3 SOURCES UNDER SCRUTINY 
Both the global climate stories and the Norwegian media texts will be analyzed 
as interpretative narratives, representing different environmental discourses, 
informing what climate change responses can mean in practice. I will argue that 
our primary source of knowledge and our best chance of grasping the “reality” of 
24 
 
climate change is contained in these stories and texts that people share and 
debate. I will thus focus on the different inherent moral, cultural and political 
implications in these texts, navigating between individual statements and their 
broader contexts. At the same time, this largely sociomental approach is 
connected to real-life politics and power, where such collective stories and ideas 
have a reciprocal influence on actual events. A discourse analysis can seldom be 
totally separated from concrete material interests or institutional processes at 
work (Lindseth, 2006). I will thus pay attention to the political reality of Norway 
as an attempt to “contextualize” the Norwegian climate change stories 
(Neumann, 2001). Even more essential in this thesis is the understanding of how 
the phenomenon of climate change firstly is constructed by different social 
realities on a global level, and secondly adapted and adjusted to specific 
Norwegian discourse communities. 
2.3.1 The global stories 
The global climate change stories I have chosen, whose authors are the IPCC, 
Gore, Lovelock and Lomborg, will form the starting point of my analysis. I will 
elaborate their recently published texts, The Fourth Assessment Report, An 
Inconvenient Truth, The Revenge of Gaia and Cool It, respectively, which were 
all distributed during 2006-2007.                                                                                                              
As there is a great variety between these four authors and their texts, I will pay 
attention to the writers‟ position and authority, as well as their dissimilar 
communicative strategies. There are, of course, significant differences between 
the “scientific body” of the IPCC and the three other individual voices. I will, 
nevertheless, not distinguish between individual and collective speakers. I find it 
more important to try to grasp the diverse worldviews implied by their stories, 
and investigate what kind of environmental awareness these different stories 
might stimulate. I will thus focus on the different tones and warnings in these 
assorted climate change stories, and analyze what kind of corresponding 
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problems, solutions and values the climate challenge entails. As all my global 
stories speak in support of “scientific facts”, I will try to understand their 
discursive devices and rhetoric with respect to how these “truths” implicate the 
broader public. My global stories will then form the basis for my analysis of the 
Norwegian media coverage on the issue of climate change.  
2.3.2 The Norwegian stories 
In the Norwegian context, I will use Norwegian media as primary storytellers and 
interpret Norwegian newspapers as a stage of cultural and political meaning. 
Although the media landscape has changed considerably over the past two 
decades and the weight of the electronic media is steadily increasing, the printed 
newspapers can still be considered an essential site of public exchange – which 
draw on, relate to and compete with other media of communication. 
My Norwegian media study will be based on a qualitative content analysis of 
three newspapers: Aftenposten Morgen (AF), Verdens Gang (VG) and Dagens 
Næringsliv (DN). These papers were chosen because of their relevance and 
availability. They are all edited in Oslo and read by a substantial part of the 
Norwegian population – especially by the inhabitants in the densely populated 
Greater Oslo Region. There are several noteworthy differences between these 
papers including their focuses, political affiliations and quality of content. But 
together these three papers can be seen as a site for national discourse, 
representing different strata of the Norwegian society. In addition, these papers 
have an important similarity, as they all presented a distinctive “climate focus” 
during the chosen time frame from 01/09/07 to 01/06/08. The Peace Prize, the 
Bali-conference and the national Klimaforliket, part of the variety of global 
publications on the climate change issue, made global warming into a hot topic 
(literally) during this period
11
; the newspapers maintained, respectively, Het 
                                              
11  See Appendix C for statistical overview. 
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Klode (AF), Klimapanelet (VG) and Klode i Krise (DN) as up-to-date profiles. 
My study gives only a snapshot of the Norwegian stories around climate change. 
In spite of its limited scope, I believe it allows us to see in which way these 
newspapers have attempted to bring climate change to the forefront of public life. 
In short, they may be seen as instructive and representative for mainstream 
culture and politics in Norway.  
My texts were collected through a search engine called Atekst, which is the most 
extensive Norwegian database for print media available online. All editions of 
the three selected newspapers during the topical ten months were subject to 
different levels of content analysis. The first step was a search for the key words 
“klima* AND endring*” (“climate and change”), “global* AND oppvarming*” 
(“global and warming”) and “klima* AND miljø*” (“climate and environment”). 
With these three search criteria, I got a large number of hits. I also did a more 
specific search for the different climate profiles and “climate journalists” in the 
respective newspapers, so as to get a more concentrated selection of relevant 
texts. Next I “scanned” through the various articles before identifying a sample 
of articles that were relevant to my research. Finally, the selected articles were 
analyzed in depth to ascertain the dominant styles of stories about the climate 
change issue.  
The collected data for my analysis consist of 171 texts from the three papers in 
total, which is a typical and manageable sample for a qualitative media analysis 
(Gould, 2004).
12
 Most of the texts can be described as news reports and features, 
though I also include genres such as comments and letters to and from the editor. 
Although genre is seen as an important aspect of media‟s representational 
resources, my analysis only include a systematic differentiation between texts 
produced by journalists and other associated columnists in the papers and texts 
                                              
12  See Appendix A for overview of selected articles.  
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from independent contributors.
13
 This is done to present some of the internal 
dynamics and dialogues going on between the different Norwegian storytellers of 
climate change.  
Newspapers in general have a disputed role: Do they work as a watchdog, an 
educator, a co-producer of common consciousness or are they merely propaganda 
for the dominant power structures? Contest as they role may be, I will consider 
these newspapers to be crucial sites for definition and re-definition of the 
meanings associated with climate change, and thus as a vital aspect of public 
communication and social change. Media coverage of climate change issues is, 
of course, constrained and shaped by the same production restrictions that govern 
news work in general, and my analysis accounts for both internal norms and 
external pressure (Hannigan, 1995). I treat the newspapers as a powerful vehicle 
passing on information, ideas, stories and values about our environmental 
challenge. Norwegians top the list of the world‟s most avid newspaper readers 
(Norgaard, 2006) and the Norwegian press is seen as a key player in establishing 
political agendas.
14
 Hence, the Norwegian media provide valuable and relatively 
independent insights regarding public interest, awareness, concern and action on 
the climate change issue.   
As I attempt to contextualize the analysis of Norwegian media within the larger 
global framework, I will explore to what extent the Norwegian texts are 
indifferent towards the four chosen global stories, or oppose or support them in 
various ways. I will also relate my analysis to the more archetypical narratives 
that already exist within Norwegian culture as they are understood through other 
analyses. I will, in other words, treat the selected newspaper articles and global 
                                              
13  See Chapter 5 for more on the different storytellers in the chosen Norwegian media texts. 
14  Norway has a remarkable number of newspapers and magazines. The media are economically stimulated by a state 
subsidy scheme for daily newspapers and three groups of owners have a dominant position in the newspaper market. However, the 
Norwegian media industry is still considered to be rather autonomous.  See i.e. http://www.journalisten.no/story/57367 or Makt – og 
demokratiutredningen 1998-2003. 
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narratives on climate change as intertextually related. This is how I will 
determine whether the Norwegian media articulate pre-established cultural and 
political conventions or attempt to radically challenge status quo and bring in 
new insights. A basic assertion in my thesis is that discourses simultaneously 
enable and restrict environmental awareness in the public sphere.  
I will most of all pay attention to the shared discursive tendencies in the selected 
media coverage, and focus on the general framework of the discourse of climate 
change. I aim to investigate the normative parameters of the Norwegian 
production and interpretation of the reality of climate change. The purpose of my 
discourse analysis of Norwegian media is thus to assess not so much the impact 
of particular elements in the media, but the impact, as a whole, of the implicitly 
transmitted ideology as it relates to the dynamic processes in which social reality 
is constructed.
15
 I am, in other words, concerned with the general cultural and 
political aspects of production of climate change knowledge. However,  media 
texts do not directly mirror Norwegian public opinion, or the Norwegian culture 
per se. I will use my sample as a prism for refracting and representing the 
mechanisms of culture at work. Because media have a central place in the 
formation, construction and restraint of public opinion, studying their texts can 
reveal how they operate on a sociomental level (Perse, 2001).  
2.3.3 Limitations 
As I approach the underlying meanings of different Norwegian climate change 
stories, I will work on three main levels: with reference to the elaborated global 
stories, analysis of the assorted press articles, and presentation of cultural and 
political embeddedness. My research represents only a limited portion of 
                                              
15  To support the interpretations of my findings, I will draw on insights from supplementary sources – such as other 
relevant studies, texts and documents. 
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literature pertaining to the climate change, and there are surely other storytellers 
in addition to those that I have chosen.  
I also face personal limitations; I am aware of biases from my own perspective. I 
believe that we, as rich, privileged Norwegians, have to question our cultural 
values, which are based on industry and economic growth, and accept 
responsibility for our part of the challenges of climate change. I see a 
transformation of lifestyle and cultural values – especially in Norway – as lying 
at the heart of the struggle to address climate challenge in a sufficient, 
meaningful way. To use Dryzek‟s terms, I see the need for a great transition: one 
which would unveil a radical and imaginative story.  
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3. THE GLOBAL STORIES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
The IPCC, as a “scientific body”, is a prominent speaker in the discussion on 
climate change. When its Fourth Assessment Report was launched in 2007, the 
world got a decisive warning call about our bleak environmental situation, and 
the report‟s future scenarios have been discussed in many international fora. At 
the same time, there are other actors on the global stage, adding their versions 
and visions of the climate change agenda to the public debate. Most of these 
significant speakers support their outlooks with so-called “scientific evidence”, 
although with a different premise. Some of the stories are told with the rhetoric 
of morality more than rationality, and some speakers communicate controversial 
claims. In this enormous body of climate change information, there are several 
charismatic storytellers who have managed to popularize their own 
interpretations of scientific data, and use language that excites the general public. 
Al Gore, James Lovelock and Bjørn Lomborg are among these speakers – who 
all have been engaged for some time in the environmental debate and attained 
international attention for their recent publications on the climate challenge.  
I will in this chapter present the four selected global stories about climate change 
authored by the IPCC, Al Gore, James Lovelock and Bjørn Lomborg. I call their 
stories, respectively, the “scientific” story, the “wake-up” story, the 
“doomsday” story and the “skeptical” story. These stories espouse different 
perspectives on the problems of and solutions to climate change, and are hence 
reflecting different underlying value systems. Global warming is often presented 
as a scientific problem with political solutions. But this account is actually rather 
ambiguous when discussing climate change, and I will therefore give a short 
introduction to the complex field of “environmental science” before I portray the 
four mentioned stories:  
Knowledge of environmental risks – like climate change – is always mediated in 
and through competing discourses, with the goal of promoting certain claims of 
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truth while opposing competing interpretations. This capacity to define potential 
risks and hazards is broadly aligned with the distribution of power among 
credible, authorative and legitimate definers of reality. Global warming is first 
and foremost portrayed as a social problem but acquires legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public mainly from scientific activities – in contrast to other moral issues in 
society (Hannigan, 2006). However, the complex field of “environmental 
science” is also blurred with a moral dimension, as there is a growing awareness 
that environmental problems are caused by cultural and political processes 
(ibid.). The supposedly “objective” base of science is an illusion, at least when 
talking about the prospects of climate change (Schneider, 2005). The traditional 
boundaries between facts and values are being transcended (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1993). Accordingly, there is a growing awareness that there is no value 
free position that allows anybody – including scientists – to maintain an objective 
perspective on interaction between natural systems and human societies (Paavola 
and Lowe, 2005). At the same time, the issue of climate change is primarily 
presented in terms of possible responses to this challenge – which again entail 
human values. A complex issue such as climate change is thus fraught with 
uncertainties, including values themselves. All in all, this poses a challenge for 
the design of scientific investigation, which incorporates implicit value 
judgments about what should be investigated.   
Results from the research on climate change – originating from the scientific 
community – are hence influenced by the different environmental discourses in 
which they appear. And although there is a tendency to treat these environmental 
controversies as simple factual disputes, they represent much more. These 
environmental discourses also raise fundamental questions about what we value: 
about the kind of beings we are; about the kinds of lives we should live, about 
our place in nature, and about the kind of world in which we might prosper 
(DesJardins, 1993).  
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3.1 THE “SCIENTIFIC” STORY 
3.1.1 The author 
The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has established itself 
as an arbiter in all debates related to climate change. The IPCC was founded in 
1988 as an intergovernmental UN body, and is generally treated as the 
preeminent authority in the scientific community when defining and dealing with 
climate change issues. The IPCC states that its aim is to “assess on a 
comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical 
and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of 
risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for 
adaptation and mitigation.”16 
The IPCC produces reports on these topics by examining peer-reviewed technical 
literature; the IPCC itself is not conducting research. The reports are written and 
agreed upon by various researchers with temporary contracts, and representatives 
of the authorities from the different UN countries also help to write the reports 
that specifically address policymakers.
17
 Since 1988, the IPCC has produced a 
large number of reports and documents, and in 2007 the four-volume Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) was published. The most recent report, the Synthesis 
report (SYR), summarizes the findings of the three Working Group Reports
18
 and 
provides a synthesis that specifically addresses the issues that concern 
policymakers in the domain of climate change. The SYR also includes a 
Summary for Policymakers (SPM).  
The SYR can be seen as a very important part of the AR4 – integral to the work  
                                              
16   http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm 
17  http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2007/februar/1170339853.65 
18  The first report is about the state of the climate, the second report is about what consequences global warming might 
result in, while the third report is about what measures are necessary to combat climate change. 
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of the IPCC – being the report which tries to communicate outside the scientific 
community and stimulate public dialogue. The release of this report in November 
2007 contributed strongly to putting the climate change issue on the international 
agenda, and the IPCC‟s work drew an extraordinary amount of attention in the 
media of the Western world. I will thus concentrate on the SYR and its 
accompanying SPM in this analysis. 
3.1.2 Formulation of the problem 
The SYR has three parts: it confirms that climate change is occurring “very 
likely” because of human induced GHG emissions; it illustrates the impacts and 
potentials for adaptation; and finally it presents an analysis of costs, policies and 
technologies for curbing the effects of climate change.  
Although SYR can be understood as a piece of difficult science, with rigid 
language and complex measurements, it has been prepared in “a non-technical 
style while ensuring that scientific and technical facts are recorded correctly” 
(IPCC, 2007: v). The SYR claims in its preface that it is designed to assist 
governments and other decision makers in the public and private sector in 
formulating and implementing appropriate responses to the threat of human-
induced climate change. This representation of climate change claims to be 
“objective”, fulfilling the important principle of the IPCC to be policy relevant, 
but not policy prescriptive. In this way, the IPCC offers different scenarios of 
projected consequences, based on their “scientific probability”. Scientists are by 
their nature reluctant to express results with absolute certainty, and future 
projections based on climate models always include some uncertainties. In fact, 
“pure objectivity” is a myth in science (Schneider, 2005). This is highly 
important and relevant when discussing climate change, as measurements of the 
climate also deal with future events. Such measurements have of course no 
empirical data and are hence entailing subjective judgments (ibid.). Uncertainty 
is an accepted – and disputed – issue in the scientific community. In an attempt 
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to make this clearer to policymakers and the general public, the IPCC adopts, for 
the SYR, seven verbal expressions of certainty.   
But, although the climatic challenges, vulnerabilities and risks are presented as 
more or less certain scientific facts, these alleged “facts” also need some kind of 
“value” to be relevant and stimulate a response. Value judgment is necessary to 
determine which facts are important. The IPCC seems aware of this concern 
when it states the role of science in our thinking about what to do about global 
warming:  
Determining what constitutes dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system […] involves value judgments. Science can support informed decisions on this 
issue (ibid: 18). 
3.1.3 Suggested solutions 
The SYR presents numerous projected challenges, probabilities of impacts and 
risks, and probability scenarios – both in the short- and the long-term. But still 
the crisis seems manageable, according to scientific and economic reasoning 
throughout the report. The magic words in this story are “adaptation” and 
“mitigation”, which together will reduce or prevent the risk of climate change. 
These action-options should be seen as Siamese twins, as “there is high 
confidence that neither adaptation nor mitigation alone can avoid all climate 
change impacts; however they can complement each other and together can 
significantly reduce the risk of climate change” (ibid: 19). At the same time there 
are some possible barriers to the viability of both solutions. The realm of 
adaptation seems challenging, as “financial, technological, cognitive, behavioral, 
political, social, institutional and cultural constraints limit both the 
implementation and effectiveness of adaptation measures” (ibid: 56). 
Accordingly, mitigation action is treated as a complex field, as “no single 
technology can provide all of the mitigation potential in any sector” (ibid: 58). 
Mitigation measures are also related to the aspects of human behavior, as “there 
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is high agreement and medium evidence that change in lifestyle and behavior 
patterns can contribute to climate change mitigation across all sectors” (ibid: 
59). This is a strong claim with questionable impact, as the SYR presents no 
clear strategies or examples of how to change ways of life. The report only 
makes vague suggestions, such as “changes in consumption patterns, education 
and training” (ibid.).  
The stories of adaptation and mitigation are mainly told in the language of 
economics, not ecology. When dealing with short-term issues, the report bears 
resemblance to the discourse of environmental problem solving (Dryzek, 2005). 
Climate change does not give rise to any heroic struggle for a new world order. 
Rather, the coming ecological problems can be addressed within the existing 
structures of the political economy of industrial society. SYR points to a “variety 
of national policies and instruments available to governments to create the 
incentives for action” (IPCC, 2007: 61). Such actions are related to both market 
mechanisms and expert bodies, where risk- and cost-benefit analyses take 
precedence in the stabilization of GHG emissions. At the same time, “there is 
high agreement and much evidence that all stabilization levels assessed can be 
achieved by deployment of a portfolio of technologies [...]” (ibid: 68); 
technological fixes seem to go hand in hand with institutional solutions.  
In the long-time perspective, SYR presents the discourse of sustainable 
development as an efficient paradigm within which to operate: “Sustainable 
development can reduce vulnerability to climate change, and climate change 
could impede nations‟ abilities to achieve sustainable development pathways” 
(ibid: 70). But “sustainable development” is – as I have argued earlier – a 
problematic notion, which provides by no means a clear plan of action (Dryzek, 
2005). It is a kind of “will have it all” concept which combines ecological 
protection, economic growth, social justice and intergenerational justice – not 
only locally and immediately, but globally and in perpetuity (ibid.). Sustainable 
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development somehow tries to fuse environmental and economic concerns in an 
imaginative way. But at the end of the day – in its hegemonic manifestation and 
reassuring quest for progress – actual ecological commitment often gives way to 
economic concerns.  
The scientific story of the IPCC can thus be placed within a progress-friendly, 
reformist discourse. The story deals most of all with risk management, and states 
that “responding to climate change involves an iterative risk management 
process that includes both adaptation and mitigation and takes into account 
climate change damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity and attitudes to risk” 
(IPCC, 2007: 64). Again, such future-oriented action works to defend the current 
economic situation, rather than visualize an alternative future, as “choices about 
the scale and timing of GHG-mitigation involve balancing the economic costs of 
more rapid emission reductions now against the corresponding medium-term and 
long-term climate risks of delay” (ibid: 69). The values at work are definitely 
about economics; how else can you balance economic costs of today with future 
risks?  
3.1.4 The underlying value dimension 
The IPCC admits that decisions on what constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” also are value judgments determined 
through socio-political processes, taking into account considerations such as 
development, equity and sustainability, as well as uncertainties and risks (IPCC, 
2001). And although science can contribute to “informed decisions” on these 
value opinions, this scientific story attempts to articulate such value judgments in 
a “value-free manner”. SYR – and therefore the IPCC – describes climate change 
on a global scale, dealing with global averages and probabilities. Climate change 
is portrayed as a human induced challenge which we have to combat. But the 
allegedly objective and neutral way in which the predicted challenge is described 
leaves vast room for interpretation and manipulation. The worldview and 
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language at work are rather diplomatic and uncontroversial, as this story in itself 
is legitimized by the so-called “global scientific consensus”. There are no clear 
voices and no clear positions; only a complex, coherent world where the 
responsibility of confronting the coming crisis is diffused. Morality is made 
impersonal by expanding it to everyone, everywhere. The consistent use of the 
passive voice avoids the individual responsibility, and the story thereby contains 
no obviously addressed calls for action.  
3.2 THE “WAKE-UP” STORY 
3.2.1 The author 
In 2006 Al Gore captivated the world with the launch of the film An Inconvenient 
Truth and its accompanying book. Gore is seen by his supporters as a “pioneer” 
in dealing with climate change issues in the U.S. Gore‟s authority lies in many 
years of experience in U.S. politics, including being the former United States 
Vice President and the Democratic nominee for president in the 2000 presidential 
election, as well as his long-standing interest in environmental problems. He 
dealt with environmental issues as a member of the Congress and now continues 
that work as an energetic storyteller. In recent years, Gore‟s strategy has been to 
travel around the world with his “Inconvenient slide show”, presenting his 
dramatic perspective on what he calls our "planetary emergency" to ordinary 
people before it is too late. He has also managed to market and distribute his 
accompanying book to a broad audience. His message is in many ways the well-
directed Hollywood version of climate change. 
Gore presents his “wake-up” story with very clear language, speaking like a real 
politician – even a prophet! As his motivation is to spread “the word” about 
climate change, Gore‟s story is a mix of facts and values situated within an 
apocalyptic vision of the future. But he is, nevertheless, not condemning the fate 
of the earth and ourselves therein. Gore is rather presenting a new version of “the 
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American dream”, where we – you and me – can make a better future come true. 
All we need is to fully counteract the challenge of global warming and its horrific 
scenarios (Gore, 2006). This involves waking up and mobilizing the power of the 
human spirit to transform our precarious circumstances into a brighter future. 
Gore tries, most of all, to make climate change a relevant issue for people in the 
wealthy, industrialized world. 
3.2.2 Formulation of the problem 
Gore‟s story starts by presenting the scientific basis of climate change in simple 
terms to confirm the position of the IPCC. His story then moves on to portray the 
impending consequences, such as melting mountain glaciers, distressed polar 
bears, severe hurricanes, extreme weather and melting poles. Gore describes in 
emotional ways the devastating changes that nature is undergoing. The earth is 
presented as a finite and fragile system, seen from outer space as a blue, living 
entity. But Gore uses an anthropocentric language, where the environmental 
damages from climate change are valued disproportionately with regard to their 
consequences for human civilization. The processes of climate change will bring 
about altered and challenging conditions for humans, with unbalanced 
ecosystems, spreading diseases and flooding water. His story tells us that 
humanity is sitting on a ticking time bomb, and that we have only ten years to 
prevent a major catastrophe that could send our entire planet into a tail-spin of 
epic destruction.
19
 Climate change puts us in the situation of choosing between 
the life and death of civilization; “and that is what is at stake. Our ability to live 
on planet Earth – to have a future as a civilization” (ibid: 298). 
3.2.3 Suggested solutions 
Gore addresses three driving factors behind the climate challenge: Our level of 
population, our level of technology, and our level of ignorance – he is primarily 
                                              
19  http://www.climatecrisis.net/aboutthefilm/ 
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attacking the last one. Gore wants us to wake up to what he sees as “the coming 
Deluge”. However, his story has an optimistic message, since it tells us that we 
can handle climate change if we change our mentality – and thereby our actions. 
“We have everything we need to begin solving this crisis, with the possible 
exception of the will to act” (ibid: x). Gore believes in a moral awakening – 
especially in the rich, western world. His story is very much addressing the 
archetypical, self-made Americans. To these ends, Gore understands the potential 
to disturb or upset his privileged audience, as “the climate crisis presents us with 
an inconvenient truth. It means we are going to change the way we live our lives 
[...] but we all must take action so that our democracy creates laws to protect 
our planet, because we simply can‟t afford not to act” (Gore, 2007:179).  
The optimistic tone of Gore‟s climate story lies in his focus on future 
possibilities, in addition to the foreboding problems. For example, he draws 
inspiration from the Chinese writing for the word “crisis”, which consists of two 
constituent characters, which individually mean “danger” and “opportunity”. 
Gore manages to offer an imaginative, motivating story, as he says “we must 
choose to make the 21
st
 Century a time of renewal. By seizing the opportunity 
that is bound up in this crisis, we can unleash the creativity, innovation, and 
inspiration that are just as much a part of our human birthright as our 
vulnerability to greed and pettiness. The choice is ours. The responsibility is 
ours” (Gore, 2006:296). 
The wake-up story of Gore is to some extent talking in the discursive fields of 
sustainable development as ecological modernization (Dryzek, 2005): Gore 
argues that the future possibilities of climate change will create new jobs and 
new incomes, where economic and environmental interests go hand in hand. He 
focuses on the potentials in energy and technology, and describes how we will 
start building clean motors, utilize the potentials of wind- and sun power, and 
stop wasting energy. Within this framework, Gore addresses the Western nations, 
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and argues that “the most technologically advanced countries have the greatest 
obligation to use technology wisely and treat the planet responsibly” (Gore, 
2007:156). But most of all Gore addresses the Western citizens. His wake-up 
story puts high confidence in democracies and the effects of public discussion of 
environmental affairs: 
Now it is up to us to use our democracy and our God-given ability to reason with one 
another about our future and make moral choices to change the policies and behaviors 
that would, if continued, leave a degraded, diminished, and hostile planet for our 
children and grandchildren – and for humankind (Gore, 2006:296). 
To some extent, Gore‟s story can be classified under the discursive fields of 
green radicalism and environmental problem solving, taking as the point of 
departure democratic pragmatism (Dryzek, 2005). Gore leaves the resolution of 
the climate crisis up to the people and wants to cultivate “Homo civicus” (ibid.). 
His story evokes confidence in new environmental policy instruments, where 
networks of public-private partnerships and collaborative relationships across 
regulators, communities and businesses agree to address common concerns. Such 
an approach to politics – and especially environmental politics – is, of course, 
rather idealistic, as it poses no conflicts of interest or redistribution of power 
among the various stakeholders. But Gore sees it from a very different angle; he 
believes that the climate crisis first of all is a challenge that should transcend 
individual interests and party-political dividing lines.  
3.2.4 The underlying value dimension 
As Gore depicts it, climate change is most of all about our unique opportunity as 
a generation to come together and unite around a compelling moral goal. The 
moral of the “wake-up” story is hence that climate change is actually a question 
of morality:  
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My hope is that those who read the book and see the film will begin to feel, as I have for 
a long time, that global warming is not just about science and that is it not just a 
political issue. It is really a moral issue (Gore, 2006:10). 
The wake-up story is in other words trying to communicate how global warming 
affects us at a deeper, existential level. While Gore seems to understand 
“politics” as representing a social system made by humans, he portrays our 
“morality” as a basic, intrinsic aspect of the human being. In other words, we 
have to awaken our own, natural instincts to experience a fundamental “wake-
up”. In Gore‟s story, the climate challenge is not only an issue of CO2 and 
technology. For him, climate challenge is also the need to change how we see 
and sense, so that we can return to our environmental foundations. 
3.3 THE “DOOMSDAY” STORY 
3.3.1 The author 
James Lovelock published The Revenge of Gaia in 2006, as a revised and 
updated report of the state of “the Gaia earth”. Lovelock‟s point of departure is 
that of an independent scientist, working outside the established scientific 
community, both in England and abroad. He speaks as a “planetary physician” 
with more than forty years of experience in dealing with environmental issues on 
a global scale (Lovelock, 2006). Lovelock has a doctorate in chemistry; but he is 
not affiliated with a university, research institute or student body. On the other 
hand, Lovelock has an almost unparalleled influence in environmental science 
based on his particular approach to science. Lovelock is best known for his “Gaia 
theory”, which he introduced in the 1970s. The Gaia theory presents the earth as 
a self-regulating living organism, and Lovelock is a pioneering dissident of the 
Western scientific mindset and its reductionist paradigm.  
To some extent, Lovelock has made it his life project to talk outside the 
established scientific power structures so as to challenge orthodox scientific 
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reasoning. His Gaia perspective has met a lot of criticism, and has been treated as 
“non-science” (or nonsense) associated with the work of myths and storytelling. 
But, as Lovelock himself argues, the Gaia theory should be understood not as a 
scientific fact to be proven or refuted, but as an alternative way of human 
scientific understanding. Rather than a mythical story, symbolizing a “romantic” 
vision of “nature”, the Gaia theory represents more of a holistic approach to 
natural sciences and the world as such.  
3.3.2 Formulation of the problem 
In The Revenge of Gaia, Lovelock draws a dark picture of the human situation. 
We have passed a threshold with regards to our involvement with the rest of the 
environment, and there are few emergency exits. In rather sober, simple terms 
Lovelock presents his biography of Gaia and the negative effects of steadily 
increasing industrial growth. He then presents possible forecasts for the 21
st
 
Century, drawing on other scientific research, including his own. According to 
Lovelock, neither air temperature nor sea levels will rise “smoothly”, as per the 
IPCC predictions. Lovelock expects sudden and unpredictable discontinuities 
(ibid: 50).  
Lovelock believes global warming is now irreversible, and that nothing can 
prevent large parts of the planet from becoming too hot to inhabit or submerging 
under water. This would result in mass migrations, famine and epidemics. He 
explains there is no time left for “sustainable development”, only for “sustainable 
retreat” (ibid.). Lovelock‟s story describes an “earth that is fighting back”, with 
humanity at war with the environment. But despite sketching such brutal 
scenarios, Lovelock tries to encourage love for Gaia. He wants to motivate the 
innermost primitive feelings of human minds to reconnect us to our natural 
surroundings. This dramatic call for action can, in Lovelock‟s perspective, be 
told in the language of science: of his science. Lovelock rejects climate change 
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rhetoric based on emotional appeals. Rather, he claims, we must work toward a 
more “sensitive science”.   
3.3.3 Suggested solutions 
The solutions Lovelock first draws upon are based on energy, as humanity needs 
energy to survive. This preliminary survival strategy is maybe more provocative 
than his Gaia theory, as Lovelock argues for the use of nuclear energy. He sees 
nuclear energy as the safest, large-scale energy solution, compared to other 
renewable solutions. Lovelock argues further that our fear of nuclear power is 
somehow irrational and culturally constructed, and he tries to dismantle this fear 
through scientific reasoning.  
Lovelock puts high confidence in technology as he argues for nuclear energy, 
synthetic food production and more experimental geo-engineering projects. But 
these efforts are nevertheless seen as efficient, preliminary responses which will 
give humanity some extra time to do what Lovelock sees as necessary, that is, 
change our lifestyle and, most of all, our worldview. Lovelock claims, moreover, 
that we have to put the concerns of Gaia first and forget about “Homo 
economicus”, or even Homo sapiens, if we are to survive. In his doomsday story, 
the climate challenge represents a crisis of civilization, and not a crisis of nature. 
He believes Gaia will survive, but that the human race is at risk.  
The doomsday story addresses human population levels explicitly. Lovelock 
means we have to contain our expansion, and states that “if we can overcome the 
self-generated threat of deadly climate change, caused by our massive 
destruction of ecosystems and global pollution, our next task will be to ensure 
that our numbers are always commensurate with Gaia‟s capacity to nourish 
them” (ibid: 141). Lovelock is in this way talking in the apocalyptic discourses of 
survivalism, where there are natural and definite limits (Dryzek, 2005). But he is 
a survivalist with a twist, as Lovelock puts the interests of Gaia – not the human 
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race – first. Within this perspective, Lovelock has been accused of providing an 
authoritarian and somewhat anti-human vision, as he leaves little room for 
individual freedom and liberal rights.
20
 
At the same time, Lovelock seems concerned with humanity. His doomsday story 
also bears resemblance to the discourses of green radicalism, focusing on 
changing people‟s attitudes (Dryzek, 2005).  Lovelock speaks to the general 
public, and points to the need for everyone to change worldviews, values and 
lifestyles. The human race has to position itself within the “mother earth”, and 
start loving nature, as Lovelock puts it. His strongest postulate is hence to 
cultivate an alternative, ecological subjectivity, whereby agency is given not only 
to all humans, but also to nature. Nature is seen as a living entity, with meaning 
and purpose. And this view of life on earth should accordingly be treated as fact.  
Although Lovelock tries to speak of “facts”, his scientific view seems to appeal 
as much to feelings as to rationality. Lovelock presumes that we humans have to 
deal with nature passionately, as “we need most of all to renew that love and 
empathy for nature that we lost when we began our affair with city life” 
(Lovelock, 2006:8). Furthermore, Lovelock believes we need holistic metaphors 
like “Gaia” in order to confront, understand and react to the challenge of climate 
change. We humans must understand our natural surroundings through living 
concepts and not through mechanistic metaphors like “spaceship earth” (ibid.), a 
perspective he has recently developed.
21 Lovelock makes some radical claims 
with interesting conclusions. Although he distances himself from the occult 
versions of Gaia-adoration, he now states that these new age groups are, in a 
way, more advanced than the natural scientists, when it comes to climate change 
(ibid.). Lovelock must be understood as an advocate of changing modern 
                                              
20  See i.e. Anker 2005:247 
21  According to Anker (2005) Lovelock was one of the main proponents in the 1970s of understanding the earth as a 
“spaceship”, in which technology, terminology and methodology developed for ecological colonization of space become tools for 
solving environmental problems on Earth. See Anker 2005:239 
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urbanites towards “green consciousness”, as he declares that, “our first duty if we 
are green should be to convince them that the real world is the living Earth and 
that they and their city lives are a part of it and wholly dependent on it for their 
existence. Our role is to teach and to set an example by our lives” (ibid: 142). On 
this level, Lovelock idealistically targets individual efforts – rather than social 
structures and institutions – when talking about climate measures.  
But at the same time, Lovelock does have a pragmatic outlook and addresses our 
current political economy. His story is inscribed in a Eurocentric frame, 
criticizing European governments and demanding that bureaucratic institutions 
facilitate market incentives to make nuclear energy available (ibid.). Lovelock 
also argues that although global climate change needs global agencies such as the 
IPCC and the UN to deal with the issue, the increasing seriousness of the 
situation means that independent nations will need to address disasters locally 
and in protectionist terms (ibid.:153).  
All in all, the Lovelock's doomsday story is somehow difficult to categorize. It is 
a radical and imaginative story, which asks for alternatives when responding to 
the climate challenge. However, these alternatives are not reactionary attempts at 
“going back to nature”. Lovelock believes in new technology and his insistence 
on humanity‟s “sustainable retreat” is clear:  
The sustainability brigade is insane to think we can save ourselves by going back to 
nature; our only chance of survival will come not from less technology, but more.
22 
3.3.4 The underlying value dimension 
Lovelock‟s story is interesting in its way of asking for new, creative ways to deal 
with global warming. The story is told within both an apocalyptic and an 
idealistic framework; Lovelock is most of all challenging our conformist 
                                              
22  http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2008/mar/01/scienceofclimatechange.climatechange 
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thinking. The doomsday story tells of a modern, urban civilization that has lost 
its elementary connections to the environment. Lovelock wants us to put Gaia 
first and start loving our natural surroundings. Simultaneously, we have to 
embrace science and technology with passion. And although Lovelock poses 
some quite provocative challenges to the human uses of technology, it is not 
because he sees such efforts as “the solution” to climate change. Rather, 
technological fixes and creative geo-engineering are human means to satisfy the 
needs of Gaia: “By itself this fix will do no more than buy us time to change our 
damaging way of life” (ibid: 232).  
The moral of the doomsday story seems not be about technological fixes, but 
about our human mental capacity. Lovelock is after all attacking the Western 
tradition of anthropocentrism, and pays homage to a rather strange version of 
green radicalism: 
This small band of deep ecologists seem to realize more than other green thinkers the 
magnitude of the change of mind needed to bring us back to peace with Gaia, the living 
Earth (ibid: 154).  
On the other hand, Lovelock‟s story might invite to moral apathy, as he says it is 
already too late to stop the looming climate crisis from occurring. Doomsday 
seems all but inevitable, and such a message could discourage people from taking 
any action at all, – or give rise to reckless hedonism. (But that is hopefully a 
completely different story.)  
3.4 THE “SKEPTICAL” STORY 
3.4.1 The author 
Bjørn Lomborg published Cool it in 2007. Lomborg is a political scientist by 
profession and has for many years worked within academic institutions, teaching 
statistics and political science. Lomborg is now an adjunct professor at the 
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Copenhagen Business School and director at the Copenhagen Consensus 
Centre,
23
  a Danish think tank that “tells governments and philanthropists around 
the world about the best ways to spend aid and development money”.24  
Lomborg has been engaged in the public debate about climate change for a long 
time. He has published books on the topic, not to mention his controversial The 
Skeptical Environmentalist (2001). Lomborg has strong arguments about how we 
should understand and respond to the climate challenge, and he is considered to 
be one of the most influential environmentalists by many international rankings. 
Lomborg can also be seen as a pioneer in the global dialogue on climate change, 
and as a strong voice trying to change the dialogue itself. Lomborg‟s latest book, 
Cool it, alludes in its title to two sides of the climate issue: We have to cool both 
the earth and the debate about our warming planet.  
3.4.2 Formulation of the problem  
The arguments of Lomborg‟s skeptical story are quite clear and simple. In Cool 
it, Lomborg agrees that climate change is real and man-made. He also accepts of 
the “scientific consensus” as given by the IPCC, and is not as doubtful as in The 
Skeptical Environmentalist. But still, Lomborg argues that the general statements 
about the consequences of climate change are greatly overstated. He claims that 
we have to balance the apocalyptic picture, especially by Al Gore and the general 
media. Lomborg sees the biggest problem to be the climate debate. He states that 
the public dialogue on climate change is focusing on exaggerated problems and 
wrong solutions. He argues further that those voices which are not supporting the 
most radical solutions to global warming – especially what he calls “extravagant 
CO2-cutting programs” (Lomborg, 2007: x) – are banned from the public 
discourse. Lomborg declares that by now, critical voices towards present state of 
                                              
23
  http://www.lomborg.com/about/biography/ 
24
  http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/ 
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climate talks and policies are summarily judged as reckless puppets of the oil 
industry.
25
 Lomborg wants to combat the bombastic rhetoric that characterizes 
the climate debate and clear the ground for a measured discussion about the best 
way forward. What the world needs most of all is a “rational dialogue” based on 
sensible arguments and scientific findings, instead of emotions and “CO2-
hysteria” (ibid.). With Lomborg's presentation of arguments about “why we need 
to tackle global warming smartly”, he gives an optimistic story about humanity‟s 
prospects and dedicates the book to “the future generations” (ibid.). 
The major attention Lomborg gives to the problems of climate change is that it is 
cheaper to accept and adjust to this challenge, than to try fighting it. Any global 
warming measure – as Lomborg understands it – must be seen in relation to other 
mechanisms, and here he talks in the fields of economic analysis. Lomborg 
argues that many of the suggested measures now being considered to stop global 
warming will cost hundreds of billion of dollars, and that such considerations are 
based on emotional rather than strictly scientific assumptions. We have to “do 
good”, not “feel good”; and “tackling climate change smartly” (ibid.) – through a 
jungle of cost-benefit analysis.  
Lomborg criticizes the policies implemented to combat climate change, 
especially the “expensive and inefficient” quota mechanisms of the Kyoto-
protocol and in EU-policies (ibid.). Thus, Lomborg argues for simpler, smarter 
and more efficient solutions, and he asks why the debate over climate change has 
stifled rational dialogue and stifled meaningful dissent. Lomborg tries to focus on 
long-term solutions and cost-competitive renewables, dealing with climate 
change as a merely economic challenge: 
That humanity has caused a substantial rise in atmospheric carbon-dioxide levels over 
the past centuries, thereby contributing to global warming, is beyond debate. What is 
                                              
25
  http://www.lomborg.com/cool_it/ 
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debatable, however, is whether hysteria and headlong spending on extravagant CO2-
cutting programs at an unprecedented price is the only possible response (ibid: 56). 
3.4.3 Suggested solutions 
Lomborg‟s clearest message is  that if “we” – understood as the rich Western 
countries – want to help “the world”, there are more important challenges than 
climate change to focus on. Poverty, malaria and Aids are among these 
challenges, which can be tackled in much more cost-efficient ways than the 
problems of climate change. Lomborg points out that we have to remember the 
real goal in this debate – which is not about stopping GHG emissions per se, but 
improving the quality of life and of the environment (ibid). He seems most 
engaged in the fate of the poor people, rather than focusing on nature and the 
environment as such. This is simply because he does not see climate change as 
posing a catastrophic threat. Lomborg believes we can manage to adapt to the 
changes if we spend our money wisely, and his logic is quite clear: If we want a 
better world, our best strategy is to become rich – all of us!  
When we look into the future, the UN expects that people in both developed and 
developing countries will become richer. In the industrialized world, people will see 
their income grow six fold, as seen during the last century. Income in the developing 
countries is expected to soar twelve fold. This is important when talking about climate 
change (ibid: 47). 
The ethos of industrialism seems to be strong in Lomborg‟s story, as he does not 
question any of the basic assumptions of this ideology. His various “rational” 
calculations and prospects portray a brighter future, where poverty and pollution 
might be eradicated. According to Lomborg, the world is without limits – with 
regard to both our economic growth and our use of natural resources. It is 
economy that matters, and Lomborg does not discuss the intrinsic value of nature 
or other non-quantifiable resources. At the same time, he seems to put high 
confidence in the veracity and power of statistical indicators of environmental 
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trends; he refuses to recognize complexity and uncertainty in ecological affairs 
(Dryzek, 2005). In Lomborg‟s skeptical story, the world will do better and better 
– if we start doing good. That means basically to calculate our expenditures more 
rationally, and make more sensible arguments about what  measures are 
necessary for the climate: 
I hope we will cool our conversation, rein in exaggerations, and start focusing on where 
we can do the most good. This does not mean doing nothing about climate change, but 
it does mean having an open dialogue about its effects and solutions, a conversation 
about what our priorities should be (Lomborg, 2007:163). 
The skeptical story seems to represent a rather “Promethean” discourse, where 
“nature” is treated as brute matter, and there are no limits to economic growth 
and prosperity (Dryzek, 2005). According to Dryzek, so-called “prometheans” 
have unlimited confidence in the ability of humans and their technologies to 
overcome any problems – including environmental ones (ibid: 59.). In this view, 
Lomborg seems first and foremost to believe in the human “technology” of 
rationality. But Lomborg speaks also of material expertise, as he is concerned 
with developing more low-carbon energy technologies (Lomborg, 2007:153). 
3.4.4 The underlying value dimension  
Lomborg‟s story provides a rather technical understanding of environmental 
processes and global events; climate change appears to be a problem that we 
should use our intelligence to resolve. Lomborg is very skeptical towards what he 
sees as a public preoccupation with exaggerated and emotional claims about our 
ecological future. He argues that “global warming is not the only issue, and 
having some scientists making scary scenarios and dramatic statements simply 
closes off the vital dialogue on social priorities” (ibid: 142). The skeptical story 
is thus not so much about a challenging environmental future, since in 
Lomborg‟s world, climate change is not the main issue of concern.He wants to 
make the world a better place, and his story is most of all about human needs. 
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Lomborg tells a story with empathy for humanity, as he repeatedly argues that 
we must improve the quality of life for poor people in the developing world, a 
manifestly strong moral claim. But Lomborg seems to have very few moral 
claims concerning our environmental surroundings, and his skeptical story is 
uncritical of our Western way of living. Natural resources, ecosystems and nature 
itself exist only for human exploitation, and we have to make use of these 
resources through rational means. Lomborg portrays the world as inhabited by 
competitive “Homo economicus”; markets, policies, prices and technologies are 
sovereign in his skeptical story. Lomborg‟s morality seems thus to stem from a 
cost-benefit analysis, and although there is no doubt that some aspects of the 
climate challenge are open to economic analysis, it is doubtful that all questions 
of interest have economic solutions. 
According to Lomborg, the real moral problem of the climate challenge is the 
debate on this issue, which takes our attention away from other issues that we 
can address so much more efficiently. Lomborg claims that although our efforts 
to establish “climate change policies” mean well, these issues are “almost 
expropriating the public agenda, trying to address the hardest problem, with the 
highest price tag and the least chance of success, it leaves little space, attention, 
and money for smarter and more realistic solutions (ibid:123)”. Lomborg wants 
to “do good”. But we must question whether the moralizing attitude in this 
quotation realistically gives rise to a new and better world, or if this message 
provides excuses to continue “business as usual”. Climate change seems neither 
to be about capturing the public imagination nor limiting our consumerist 
lifestyles to more sustainable levels. Rather, we must formulate rational and 
intelligent aid policies to help the developing world to flourish. It looks, 
moreover, as though the industrial world must go on, spreading its ideology to all 
parts of the world – so that everybody can produce and consume themselves into 
prosperity. 
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3.5 AND SO THE STORIES GO... 
According to the four elaborated stories, climate change is happening. But as 
demonstrated through my analysis, there is neither one accepted scientific 
perspective on the environmental problem, nor one political response to the 
challenge. The IPCC and its scientific story confirm a serious “truth” about 
climate change, where the challenge seems somehow calculable and controllable. 
But as the other stories reveal, global warming has no clear answers. The 
different storytellers are determining what climate change is about, and the way 
this challenge might affect and engage us. Thus, where the moral weight falls 
depends on the worldview at work. Gore wants us Western citizens to “wake-up” 
to our ecological drama, while Lovelock urges us to prepare for “sustainable 
retreat” and start loving nature, and Lomborg implores  more sensible dialogues 
on the climate issue.  
In their different outlooks, these four elaborated stories speak for themselves 
about what climate change is and how to respond do this challenge. At the same 
time, the storytellers I present are part of the larger global dialogue, which brings 
the climate issue in to the public sphere. Their stories refer to and advance their 
respective perspectives on the environment in various ways, and together they 
reveal an important message: “Knowledge” about the environment and our 
climate challenge is not static – there are many probable and possible 
perspectives upon it, with the various perspectives evolving in relation to each 
other. These four stories initiate a multi-layered debate of the global climate 
problem, which has the potential to renew environmental awareness at the local 
level. Climate change is hotly contested, but one thing is clear – the quality and 
ideological content of the stories of climate change do matter. In the next chapter 
I will therefore turn to the Norwegian media and present my analysis of how 
these elaborated global stories are reflected in the Norwegian texts on climate 
change. 
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4. CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE NORWEGIAN MEDIA 
The four global climate stories elaborated so far are all constituent parts of a 
broader picture: heightened attention to climate change issues. This trend has 
stimulated a renewed awareness of the environment in general, with ongoing 
dialogues and debates about global warming among the different storytellers. 
These communicative activities are also reflected in the Norwegian context, 
where extended amounts of information on the climate matter are exposed to the 
Norwegian public. An important aspect of these presentations and discussions are 
the stories told by the mass media – which by and large are seen as our modern 
society‟s primary storytellers (Hannigan, 2006).  
The media analysis in this study includes three different Norwegian newspapers:  
Aftenposten (AF), Dagens Næringsliv (DN) and Verdens Gang (VG). All three 
papers created a specific climate section during my chosen ten months of 
analysis, from September 2007 to June 2008. These newspapers can additionally 
be understood as representing different sectors and different political agendas of 
the Norwegian society – the widely distributed AF, the business oriented DN and 
the tabloid VG.
26
 My sample consists of 171 texts, with 137 of these are articles 
written by journalists, editors or associated columnists in the different 
newspapers; the remaining 34 texts are readers‟ contributions.27  
My Norwegian media analysis is divided into three chapters. This chapter will 
first provide a short presentation of the significant storytellers of climate change 
in the Norwegian media. In the second part of this chapter, I will focus on the 
extent to which and how the selected texts relay the four elaborated global stories 
advanced by the IPCC, Gore, Lovelock and Lomborg.  
                                              
26  AF used to be a “respectable”, conservative newspaper. It is still the most respectable daily, but it has shifted to the 
center left in the past 2 years. 
27  The first category compromises news coverage, reports, features, editors letters and regular columns (especially climate 
columns); while the second category compromises various types of op-ed comments. See appendix A for further specification on the 
different sections and authors.  
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4.1 THE NORWEGIAN STORYTELLERS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
While searching for specific climate sections and journalists in the selected 
media landscape, I identified certain significant Norwegian storytellers on the 
climate case who are to be identified: 
I have collected 78 texts from AF, of which 36 articles were written by the 
journalist Ole Mathismoen. Mathismoen is considered the foremost climate 
journalist in Norway
28
, and he has been working in AF as a political 
commentator since 1984. Mathismoen has no formal education on the scientific 
aspects of global warming but has for a very long time been engaged in issues of 
climate and the environment. He has covered environmental issues in AF since 
1987 and he has also written several books about these matters. Just before the 
climate section of AF, Het Klode (“Hot Planet”), was launched in December 
2007, Mathismoen published his latest book: KLIMA – hva skjer?(“Climate – 
what is happening?”).29 Mathismoen is engaged in both presenting the scientific 
facts about climate change and stimulating political responsibility for this 
challenge (Mathismoen, 2007). Although he is considered to be a knowledgeable 
climate journalist, he is also criticized for being too sympathetic towards the 
policies of the reigning Arbeiderpartiet.
30
 
I have collected 45 texts from DN, of which 19 articles were written by the 
political commentator Kjetil B. Alstadheim. Alstadheim is known for his sharp 
comments on Norwegian politics in general, and he is considered to be one of the 
most important political journalists in Norway.
31
 Alstadheim is the chairman of 
                                              
28  According to a report by the PR-agency BWPR, VG 23/12/07 
29  Klima – hva skjer? is considered to be an informative account of the processes of global warming, fronting the latest 
scientific findings from the IPCC. The book got a lot of attention in Norway and was nominated to the literary Brage-pris, in the 
category of specialist literature. 
30  For instance in the weekly newspaper Dag og Tid, where Mathismoen was criticized as being “Stoltenberg‟s poodle” – 
as a “trofast, stødig mikrofonstativ for statsministeren, og reportasjene hans ligner glansa reklameplakater”. See: 
http://www.dagogtid.no/nyhet.cmf?nyhetid=1381 (03.10.08)  
31  http://arkiv.na24.no/Nyhet/327239/Politikernes+favorittjournalist.html 
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the Norwegian press gallery, which is the official organization for journalists 
who want to have access to the Norwegian parliament (Storting). Alstadheim has 
no formal education in the science of climate change, but is highly engaged in the 
issues of global warming. He is regarded as the second most influential climate 
journalist in Norway after Mathismoen.  
My samples from DN consist also of 11 articles from its climate section, Klode i 
Krise (“Planet in Crisis”), which were written by Frode Frøyland. Frøyland is 
the US-correspondent of DN and has an education in finance, but is also engaged 
in environmental issues. During two intensive months – from September 2007 to 
November 2007 – Frøyland traveled to different climate-sensitive parts of the 
world and reported on what he considered to be the most pressing climate 
challenges. His various articles from the section Klode i Krise resulted in the 
book Ved vippepunktet (“At the tipping point”), in an attempt to “awaken more 
Norwegians from their climate unconsciousness”.32 
I have collected 48 texts from VG, of which 16 were from the newspaper‟s 
climate section Klimapanelet (“the Climate Panel”). Klimapanelet was initiated 
in October 2007 and is considered by VG to be “the expert‟s panel” on climate 
change. This section has four regular writers: Siri M. Kvalvig, Frederic Hauge, 
Knut H. Alfsen and Helge Drange. Kvalvig is a well-known meteorologist and 
the founder of the Storm Weather Centre.
33
 Kvalvig is also an engaged public 
speaker on global warming issues; in 2007 she participated in a national lecture 
tour about climate change called Himmel og Hav (“Sky and Ocean”). This lecture 
was initiated by the Norwegian Environmental Department as an attempt to raise 
public awareness on the climate challenge. Hauge is the founder and chairman of 
                                              
32  http://aftenbladet.no/lokalt/article639543.ece 
33 The Storm Weather Centre defines itself as one of the leading commercial meteorological institutes in Scandinavia: 
http://www2.storm.no/index.php 
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the environmental organization Bellona
34
, and he is also a prominent 
environmentalist – both in Norway and abroad.35 Hauge has no formal education 
in the science of climate change but became rather famous as an environmental 
renegade – although Hauge recently abandoned his revolt against the industry in 
favor of collaboration with the business sector. Alfsen is a senior advisor in 
CICERO
36
 and research director at the Norwegian Institute of Energy 
Technology (IFE). He has a doctorate in theoretical physics, and is co-author of 
various national and international reports on environmental issues. Alfsen was 
the leader of the secretariat of the national Lavutslippsutvalget
37
 and was also a 
contributor to the last report from the IPCC (AR4). Drange is the director of 
Nansensenteret and a climate researcher at Bjerknessenteret
38
. Drange has a 
doctorate in applied mathematics and climate modeling. He is also an author of 
various scientific articles on climate change and contributed to the last report 
from the IPCC (AR4). 
Looking at these different storytellers from the point of view of climate expertise, 
it is interesting to see that the tabloid VG provides the best educated 
commentators on the climate case. At the same time, all the three newspapers 
devote significant space and resources to cover the environmental challenge and 
apparently aspire to give quality coverage on the issue.  
I have also included different readers‟ contributions in my sample, though there 
are some prominent distinctions between the newspapers and their respective 
                                              
34  Bellona is now seen as an influential environmental organization, which tries to develop feasible solutions to the various 
ecological challenges – mainly in relation to energy and resource use.  
35  The Time-magazine  proclaims Hauge as one of the 45 environmental heroes of the world: 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1663317_1663320_1669923,00.html 
36  Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo, one of the leading research institutes on climate 
science in Norway. 
37  Lavutslippsutvalget was appointed by the Council of State in 2005, and had the mandate to report on how Norway can 
manage to cut national GHG-emissions by 50-80 percent by 2050.  
38  Nansensenteret and Bjerknessenteret are located in Bergen, and are also defined as being two of the leading research 
institutes on climate science in Norway. 
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debates. AF has the largest portion of readers‟ contributions and seems to 
encourage a lively forum for debate; I have 16 texts from this section. The VG 
also provides a noteworthy site for public engagement; I have included 10 texts 
from these contributors. DN gives space mainly to prominent figures from the 
governmental and business sectors; I have included 8 contributors from this 
paper. The various readers‟ contributions can be broadly classified into three 
categories: The climate change believers – by which I mean people who argue 
that anthropogenic climate change is happening and that we are responsible for a 
solution; the partial climate change deniers – by which I mean people who argue 
that climate change is happening, though it is not anthropogenic and there is less 
to do about it; and the total climate change deniers – by which I mean people 
who argue that there is no climate change at all. 
4.2 THE GLOBAL STORIES TALKING TO NORWAY          
In this section, I will present my interpretations of how the media sample reflects 
the four global climate change stories – the “scientific”, the “wake-up”, the 
“doomsday” and the “skeptical”. I will analyze these stories separately, in which 
I focus on how the selected texts mirror their respective approaches to the climate 
challenge. I will pay attention to both the problems and the solutions related in 
these stories, and elaborate how the sample reproduces the global narratives. I 
will also comment on the messages advanced by these voices in the media. My 
overall interpretation of the intertextual exchange between these global stories 
and the Norwegian cultural narratives in the media sample is presented in the last 
section of the next chapter, part 5.3. 
4.2.1 The “Scientific” Story in the Norwegian Media 
The earth at least 2° C warmer. Too late?  
A rise of 2 degrees in the global temperature will lead to extensive extermination of 
species, and millions of people will risk drought, famine and floods. According to the 
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IPCC, the probability for avoiding such an increase is already less than 10 percent 
(Front Page, AF 20/09/07).
39
                                                                                                                 
 
After the Norwegian Nobel Peace Committee decided in September 2007 to give 
that year‟s Peace Prize to the IPCC together with Al Gore in acknowledgment of 
their work on the climate challenge, global warming suddenly became a very 
newsworthy issue in Norway. The consensus from the IPCC maintains that 
climate change is to be understood as an established fact, and a lot of attention is 
given to the scientific predictions for the future of this environmental situation. 
The IPCC is explicitly referred to in 89 of my texts.
40
 
 
Implicitly, the so-called scientific, “objective” perspective on climate change is 
well represented in my collected newspapers‟ presentation on the issue – such as 
the above quoted headline, which covered the whole front page of AF, akin to a 
proposition in a scientific document. Especially AF and the dedicated “climate 
journalist” Mathismoen portray climate change in a thorough, technical way; the 
climate profile Het Klode has, as its stated aim, to inform the public about both 
the scientific and the political aspects of climate change (AF 04/12/07). The 
reporters and climate columnists in DN and VG give also a lot of attention to the 
different scientific scenarios from the IPCC, and the story of an inevitable rise of 
2º C in the global temperature is told in many of the texts. 
 
With respect to the problems of the scientific story, many texts present climate 
change as an explainable – though uncertain – ecological phenomenon with 
anthropogenic causes. Some articles elucidate the devastating processes of 
unbalanced CO2-cycles and the like, but there are no specific places or people 
mentioned in the presentation of environmental research data. A prominent 
                                              
39  I have translated the quotations into English. The original, Norwegian wordings are found in Appendix B. 
40 The IPCC/”FNs klimapanel” is referred to in 46 texts in AF, in 32 texts in DN and in 16 texts in VG. 
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symbol is the ongoing melting of ice in the remote areas of the Arctic. In an 
article called “Blue Arctic”, written by Drange in Klimapanelet, one can read:  
 
Both the possibilities and the challenges connected with an ice-less Arctic mean that the 
climate development in the north will be scrutinized carefully in the years to come. The 
fact that the international polar year – a large-scale research collaboration – was 
initiated precisely in 2007, means that our preconditions to pay attention to the climate 
development in the Arctic are among the best (VG 01/03/08).  
 
Articles like this are in some way promoting a technical view of climate change – 
trying to understand and produce “fact based knowledge” about the matter, 
without questioning the more fundamental reasons behind why this is happening 
and what the consequences are. Many articles point to the fact that it is too late to 
avoid “serious consequences” of the climate change, in the way that the “shock-
melting” [sic] of the Arctic is presented as an explainable process (VG 05/12/07, 
AF 16/06/08). Such texts try to describe the problems of climate change as 
neutral actualities – while avoiding politics and human interest. An example of 
this is found in the writings of the columnist Kvalvig in Klimapanelet. Kvalvig 
states that as a science commentator she has tried to not promote a political 
orientation, but rather to explain “the interplay in the climate system and the 
seriousness of the situation” (VG 12/04/08). 
 
Mathismoen in AF also seems to have a descriptive agenda about the “scientific 
truth” in his texts about the climate challenge, although his worries are quite 
obvious. In one article, Mathismoen asks “When will the earth get enough of 
us?” and claims that his environmental scenarios are stemming from:  
 
[T]he majority of scientists – from a multitude of disciplines [who] increasingly raise 
protestive warnings. Their reports, published weekly in scientific journals all over the 
world, are more than mere facts concerning observations and prognoses. There is a great 
unrest and anxiety to read between the lines (AF 26/10/07b).  
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On the solution side of the scientific story, numerous articles focus on general 
technological mitigation projects and international policies. Alstadheim in DN 
focuses predominantly on political solutions and market regulations to combat 
global warming. Also several articles from the other two newspapers focus solely 
on the community of politicians and businessmen when discussing solutions to 
the climate challenge. The symbolic world of quotas, costs, laws and regulations 
informs such stories, in an attempt to come to grip with the complicated 
environmental scenarios.  
 
The magic words of “mitigation” and “adaptation” are recognized – often as 
“regulering” and “tilpassning”. The selected texts mainly focus on the problems 
of mitigation measures. One very prominent story in this case, is on the 
governmental “moon landing” – which means CO2-management as carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) of gasworks. This policy intervention is proclaimed to 
be an efficient solution to combat Norwegian GHG emissions, though both 
contributors and reporters are questioning the realism of implementing such 
projects. Possible difficulties in these projects are often described as “technical 
problems”, as the very first article of the climate section Het Klode in AF. This 
article takes a critical look at what to do about Norway‟s oil and gas extraction. 
One can read that the natural gas field Snøhvit and its much discussed gasworks 
Melkøya
41
 are contributing to “enormous Norwegian CO2 emissions” (AF 
04/12/07). The article also states that the emissions from Melkøya “run wild” 
[sic], but this seems to be a matter of technology and politics, and not a matter of 
energy consumption as such:  
 
 
                                              
41  Melkøya is a gasworks on the coast of Hammerfest. The development of this gasworks overthrew the Bondevik2- 
government, and the present Stoltenberg2-government has as well met a lot of critique because of delayed implementation of CO2-
management. 
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With pomp and circumstance Snøhvit was formally opened on August 21 this year. A 
 recent Norwegian gas-adventure, with the world‟s most climate friendly technology 
was seriously set in motion. [But] (n)either technology nor CO2 emissions have 
developed as projected at Melkøya. [And] Snøhvit is going to be a climate nightmare 
neither politicians nor StatiolHydro had dared to imagine (ibid.).  
 
The technological solutions presented in the Norwegian newspapers mostly draw 
attention to the global carbon picture, through stories of exporting our CCS 
technology and buying carbon quotas in the international market. The progress-
friendly confidence from the IPCC is prevalent, as climate change seems first of 
all to be the matter of risk-prevention and cost-efficiency in economic terms. The 
propagator of this view, the economist Nicholas Stern, is often referred to. He 
figures in columns, interviews and general comments in all the three 
newspapers.
42
 Using the Stern estimates, such articles highlight and emphasize 
international trade of carbon quotas as an imperative way to solve the climate 
challenges.  
 
Although Norway has considerable levels of climate gas emissions, there are 
very few articles addressing the Norwegian energy use as such. But there are 
some texts that bring the scientific story of technological fixes down to the 
household level, like one article in Klimapanelet which offers information of 
how you theoretically can save electricity at home – and save money at the same 
time (VG 23/02/08). 
 
The message of the scientific story is clearly documented in the selected texts, 
representing a Norwegian interpretation of so called mitigation measures: 
Climate change is happening, and we have to focus on international politics, the 
                                              
42  i.e. VG 23/03/08, DN 07/05/08, AF 06/06/08 
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economic bottom line and technological innovations – or “moon landings”, as the 
Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg puts it. 
4.2.2 The “Wake-up” Story in the Norwegian Media 
The next time you get into your car, give a thought to the extremely fast melting ice in 
the north and to those dependent upon it: The Inuit paddling on hunt for food and the 
Norwegian driving to the office are inseparably connected. Global warming makes this 
more evident than ever. And in this lies optimism. We are forced to see what we too 
long have shut our eyes on (VG 24/11/07). 
 
Al Gore is explicitly referred to in 20 of my texts, and his message was well 
broadcasted during the already mentioned Peace Prize nomination.
43
 However, 
the “wake-up” call to action advanced by Gore is mirrored in my sample not only 
in relation to this nomination. His style and story can also be understood as 
implicit in the different newspapers‟ editorial choices, as several journalists and 
columnists are similar to Gore – traveling around the world and reporting what is 
going on with our natural environment, as climate missionaries. Mathismoen in 
AF is surely one of these, as he aspires to enlighten the ignorant or unaware 
public. Mathismoen formulates (t)his duty in an imagined retrospective glance, 
as he predicts the future and criticizes the present public ignorance on the climate 
case:   
 
Even as they saw what was happening, even when I traveled around the world and 
described what I saw, evidence on how the ice was melting in a mad rate around the 
North Pole, that the glaciers in the Himalayas were transformed to enormous, dangerous 
lakes, that the deadly drought in Australia was just replaced by even more devastating 
rain floods, that the enormous herds of wandering gnus and antelopes in Kenya were 
only a dry period away from total collapse. Even then they protested (AF 19/03/08). 
 
                                              
43  Al Gore is referred to in 11 texts in AF, in 5 texts in DN and in 4 texts in VG.  
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The problem side of the “wake-up” story is found in all the three newspapers, 
where melting ice, flooding water and lost polar bears figure as important 
symbols of what is happening with climate, industrialization and urbanization. 
This “scientific thriller” and the human ignorance of the risks involved is framed 
in a hopeful, you-can-do-it tune, most of all in VG, where such stories often are 
connected to possible ways of overcoming these challenges. This is not 
surprising, as VG‟s rather tabloid-esque character fits well with making you the 
hero.  
 
The solution side of the “wake-up” story is echoed in some texts – such as one 
article called “The Norwegian climate fear” (VG 29/12/07). The reporter of this 
article confirms 2007 to be the year of “global awakening” as much as of global 
warming, and the reporter argues that we Norwegians have also opened our eyes 
to the climate challenges (ibid.). But other writers find it difficult to portray such 
an awakening in optimistic terms. For example, Alstadheim in DN writes under 
the heading “Responsibility and powerlessness”: 
 
Even if the climate problem is global in nature, the cause of the problem is no further 
away than the next exhaust pipe. Few things make the powerless feeling more eminent 
than a melting ice of Greenland. The discomfort becomes, after all, not particularly less 
when we realize that each and every one of us can actually do something about it (DN 
01/09/07).  
 
On the other hand, there are some decent attempts – especially in VG – to 
capture the imagination of climate change ignorant Norwegians. In Klimapanelet, 
Kvalvig is sometimes writing like a charismatic Gore: When Kvalvig is not 
writing about the scientific processes behind climate change, she is writing about 
what you and I can do and how global warming might affect the Norwegian 
climate as such. In one article we are told to teach children to “recycle the 
garbage, walk to school, turn off the light and turn off the PC when it is not in 
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use” (VG 27/10/07) – as a reformatory strategy to foster better environmental 
values. Kvalvig tries also to balance scientific integrity with a wish to 
communicate hope and future optimism, by focusing on possible solutions and 
individual contributions to the climate challenge (VG 12/04/08). This seems like 
a difficult balancing act, as Kvalvig wants to be neither overtly party-political nor 
moralistic in her messages. Her diplomatic, appealing tone shines through when 
she in one article is predicting the future weather forecasts of Norway and the 
way they might have an effect on the Norwegian lifestyle. To put it simply, this 
article describes climate change as a matter of building higher quays on your 
summer cottage and not feeling sad because you have snow-less winters at your 
winter cottage:  
 
Neither the area of cottages in Sirdalen is the same as when we bought a cottage [hytte] 
there in 2005. Believe it. The country house at Sletten with a shoreline in Ryfylke has by 
comparison been a much better investment. We were foresighted in 2007. Already at 
that time we applied for an elevation of both the boathouse and the quay, and it was 
indeed a good choice (VG 19/01/08).  
 
The crisis of climate change is in some articles presented as an opportunity as 
well as a danger; these articles bear resemblance to the awareness Gore gives to 
his understanding of the Chinese symbol for “crisis”. Such an approach is 
especially prevalent in the different columns of, interviews with- and references 
to, Hauge from Bellona. Hauge argues that “we should not at all talk about 
climate measures as expenses, but as investments” (VG 15/12/07), and pays 
attention to a lot of different technological- and business opportunities. In a 
similarly optimistic manner, the captivating “wake-up” story of how the 
Norwegians can make a brighter world come through is depicted in a future 
forecast presented in VG. The scenario in this article – interpreted from different 
research and reports on the matter – tells that Norway during the next forty years 
has managed to:  
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[L]ower the consumption, lower the need for transport, lower the energy use. These 
efforts demanded rather drastic remedies, but Norwegians understood that it was not 
only necessary for the environment, but that it was also an exceptional economic 
opportunity – to be in the lead when the climate changed (VG 05/01/08).  
 
Mathismoen in AF predicts also the future in a hopeful way, where he, in one 
article, envisions how the Norwegian public awakens when:  
 
[When we all] understood that an enormous market for energy efficiency and all kinds 
of CO2-free solutions would emerge […] It turned into a running race to win, to earn as 
much money as possible on the upcoming eco-revolution – which both became a 
technological revolution and a moral revolution that changed people's perception on 
nature as an inexhaustible resource (AF19/03/08).  
 
The message of the “wake-up” story is present in the selected Norwegian texts in 
a slightly transformed version, as the nostalgia for nature and the moral message 
advanced by Gore are generally missing. Although a couple of texts – like the 
above quoted article – suggest that an imaginative revolution will contribute to a 
moral awakening of the masses and the embracing of nature-friendly values, 
most of the texts describe the changes you and I can make in economic terms. 
Saving the world should be profitable; the climate challenge is discussed mainly 
with regard to technological, political and economic solutions and opportunities. 
There is, in other words, an interesting lack of emotional or moral arguments that 
spring from the devastating drama that our environment is undergoing.   
4.2.3 The “Doomsday” Story in the Norwegian Media 
The fate of the earth will be decided in the next decades. Never before in the history of 
humanity has the ecological system which keep life going been as challenged as it is 
now (DN 16/11/07). 
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Although James Lovelock is explicitly referred to in only one of the selected 
texts, doomsday is described in many of these.
44
 Such texts use the tropes of 
“alarms”, “crisis”, “tipping points”, “run away mechanisms” and the revenge of 
natural forces – like the pessimistic story told by Lovelock. The three different 
climate-profiles in my respective newspapers all use rather gloomy and dramatic 
language, at least in their headings: “Apocalypse in Amazon” (DN 12/10/07), 
“Ticking bomb” (DN 19/10/07), “The end is near” (AF 21/09/07)! 
 
The use of war-metaphors is significant – especially in Klimapanelet, where we 
are to be “climate warriors” and use all our “climate weapons” in the “climate 
battle”.45 In one of these columns, Alfsen states that:  
 
We do not want to end up in a world where the climate runs wild and thus provides a 
breeding ground for an infinity of conflicts between the people inhabiting this planet  
(VG 26/01/07).  
 
Articles from Klode i Krise also point to aspects of war and misery. For instance, 
the article “The life disappeared with the drought”, where the conflict in Darfur 
is presented as a “terrible reminder that the danger of struggles and wars will 
increase with the global temperature rise” (DN 07/09/07). Another of these 
articles refers to a re-emerging of the Cold War in a warmer world, where “fight 
for resources, destruction in coastal areas, loss of land, climate refugees and 
fight for energy” results in global crisis and exacerbates border conflicts for 
reasons of security policy (DN 12/03/08). 
 
On the problem side of the doomsday story, there are a few voices in the 
Norwegian texts that point to the insufficiency of the scientific models from the 
                                              
44  James Lovelock is referred to in DN, 08/10/07 
45  I.e. VG 27/10/07a, 20/10/07, 15/12/07 
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IPCC and see the need for other scientific views. A couple of articles quote some 
scientific dissidents with less sympathy for linear models and conservative 
estimates such as the IPCC consensus. One well covered voice is the NASA-
scientist James Hansen – the man who talked against and criticized the G.W. 
Bush administration‟s handling of climate change information (some) years ago. 
In VG, Hansen is quoted in a news report presenting skepticism towards the 
IPCC consensus and claiming that “‟moderate‟ climate scientists get millions to 
conduct research – while the more „radical‟ often are left empty-handed” (VG 
21/10/07). Mathismoen in AF also refers to Hansen, and in the various Het Klode 
articles Mathismoen uses analogous language to both the doomsday story 
advanced by Lovelock and the tipping point forewarnings given by Hansen. One 
example is an article where Mathismoen declares his understanding of our 
climatic situation: “The world is facing huge, irreversible climate changes. We 
are approaching a tipping point, the climate threat is not an environmental 
problem, it is an existential threat” (AF 17/09/07).  
 
The radical voices of Lovelock, Hansen and others are especially prominent in 
the articles from Klode i Krise. In one of these, Hansen talks about sea levels 
rising six to seven meters and is convinced that the melting of ice on the poles 
can happen at an shocking rate. In this ecological collapse, we humans will be 
nothing more than a helpless audience (DN 01/09/07b). The texts from Klode i 
Krise focus additionally on climatic issues and problems in Asia. This focus is 
mainly due to Asia‟s huge population expansion. In one of the very few articles 
that dare to talk about population growth, Frøyland argues:  
 
There might be more than nine billion people on the planet in 2050, which is almost 
seven billion more than in 1950 and constitutes in itself a formidable climate problem  
(DN 22/10/07).   
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A suggested response to this challenge is that “instead of taking as a starting 
point what one presumes is politically possible, politicians should focus on 
nature‟s limit of tolerance” (ibid.) – with a kind of “nature first” mentality. But 
there are no clear uses of the Gaia-metaphor given by Lovelock, or any evident 
calls for the promotion of a so called “green consciousness”. These aspects of the 
doomsday story are also missing in the other part of my sample; although some 
texts describe the Earth in symbolic terms as a planet with a fever and as a sick 
patient, we humans are presented as masters of this situation. Alfsen in 
Klimapanelet is one of those that seem influenced by the thoughts from 
Lovelock, as he writes that “the earth has fever”. But Alfsen does not refer to this 
radical scientist: 
 
The earth has a fever. We cannot dream of miracles that are reducing fever. We need to 
make them ourselves. But what can we do? Can we capture CO2 from the air and 
subsequently store it in a secure way? What about blocking the sun? Cultivate algae? 
Something else? […] An obvious solution would be to live in line with the sustainable 
capacities of nature, to develop non-polluting and safe energy, and strongly reduce the 
pollution from coal, oil and gas. In the absence of such a utopia, it is often technological 
propositions that reign 
 
(VG 05/01/08).  
   
The solution side of the doomsday story is reflected in the Norwegian texts most 
of all with respect to technological innovations, where some articles bring about 
issues of geo-engineering. Such attempts are not presented as a preliminary 
strategy of “sustainable retreat”, but rather seen as sufficient and pragmatic 
measures to combat climate change. There are some references to nuclear energy, 
and although the public at large is described as being against such sources of 
energy, “[will] climate changes and increased oil prices necessitate more 
nuclear power plants” – according to a news report in AF (26/06/08). Other 
voices in the sample discuss energy in the same manner – without the 
environmental, holistic tone characteristic of Lovelock. One example is 
Mathismoen in AF, where he asks what is needed to be a “world champion of 
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climate” [sic]: An unused desert in the outskirts of Abu Dhabi (AF 21/01/08). In 
this lifeless landscape of sand and stones, the oil-wealthy Arabs are building the 
utopia – a technologically advanced, modern and efficient city; a mechanical 
version of the self-regulating Gaia.  
 
The most techno-friendly and creative voice in my sample is found in the 
different statements from Hauge. Hauge writes that we can combat climate 
change if we want to – we just have to make use of suitable and already available 
technology (VG 07/06/08). In Hauge‟s various statements, there seems to be no 
need for radical changes in human values and Hauge focuses less on nature as 
such, although he often speaks of the unknown potential in nature. In the piece 
“The algae can save us” in AF, Hauge is a “technological dissident” and argues 
for the cultivation of algae that will both produce energy and consume CO2. This 
so called “Bellona scenario” is confronted as a crazy idea, but Hague retaliates: 
 
[I am] aware that many will laugh at us. They did it also when we 15 years back 
suggested CO2 capture from gas works. Just wait, cultivation of algae will mark the 
climate debate to come (AF 03/06/08).  
 
The message of the doomsday story is in the selected Norwegian texts translated 
into technological concerns. The challenges posed – by a deteriorating 
environment, combined with increasing needs for energy and a growing human 
population – are met with solutions of technological innovation and 
strengthening security policy. Climate change and geo-engineering are discussed 
without concern for ecological holism or the uncertain fate of human civilization; 
there are no evident calls for an alternative kind of ecological subjectivity. 
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4.2.4 The “Skeptical” Story in the Norwegian media 
Even though Aftenposten has introduced a thematic profile with the rather tendentious 
title “Het Klode”, we as readers should manage to keep our minds cool also when 
climate issues are discussed (AF 16/02/08). 
 
Bjørn Lomborg is explicitly referred to in 4 of my texts, where 2 of these are 
from the debate section in AF.
46
 Accordingly, the skeptical story of Lomborg – 
who is questioning both the public debate around climate challenges and the 
suggested policy responses of CO2-quotas – is voiced mainly in the various 
readers‟ contributions. The debate section of AF is the most vibrant. In this 
section, skepticism towards our understanding of the climate problems becomes 
especially prevalent during the last five months of my time frame – from January 
to June 2008. The various texts written by journalists or associated columnists 
show less skepticism towards the problems of climate change. But there is some 
skepticism towards the Norwegian policy responses, in which the effects and 
costs of official engagement in the carbon marked are critically addressed.
47
   
 
On the problem side of the skeptical story, there are various texts that reflect the 
scientific distrust expressed by Lomborg. Some of the selected readers‟ 
contributions are questioning the scientific basis of the IPCC and the Norwegian 
news coverage of climate change in general – which allegedly has an inflated and 
pessimistic focus. In one readers‟ contribution in AF, the chairman of Norsk 
Biologiforening, Morten Jødal, claims: 
 
The climate debate has unfortunately entered a track in which an unfortunate amount of 
representatives of such parties compete over describing the road to the end of the world 
and our civilization. It is not that awful, and there are reasons to raise a warning finger 
                                              
46  Lomborg is referred to in 2 texts in AF and in 2 texts in DN. 
47  The critical voices towards the official Norwegian climate agenda are examined in Chapter 6. 
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towards those that create such pessimistic and negative pictures of the future (AF 
01/02/08).  
 
Like a couple of other contributors, Jøndal attacks the well used “wake-up” 
symbol of a desperate polar bear. The polar bears – according to the author – are 
increasing in numbers. Other contributors are similarly questioning the 
Norwegian climate debate, which they argue is exaggerating the negative 
consequences of climate change. Some of these so-called partial climate change 
deniers are rather focusing on what they see to be the positive effects from 
climate change; these texts are pointing to wrong “facts” related to the quantity 
of melting ice, temperature rise and the like. In a similar manner, VG states in 
one news report that “global warming has stopped” according to a professor in 
geosciences (VG 26/01/08). 
 
The skeptical story from Lomborg is usually reflected in my sample in a quite 
transformed version, as many of the readers‟ contributions are skeptical towards 
climate change as such. These voices are questioning the “anthropogenic cause” 
behind global warming and occasionally denying the whole climate challenge. 
There are lively debates between the so-called climate change deniers and 
climate change believers. Although some of the climate change deniers in the 
selected readers‟ contributions are experienced scientists, the majority appear to 
have a limited understanding of science. Many of these are total climate change 
deniers, and these people are often attacked and referred to as “populist 
dissidents” by scientific authorities in the same selection of contributions. And 
even though the ongoing debates seem to be about scientific disputes, these 
discussions have a strongly political flavor. People with sympathies for the 
Progressive party (FrP) figure as the most skeptical, and in one news report their 
chairman Siv Jensen is attacked by Hauge of Bellona as a front for “ignorant 
populism” (VG 05/04/08). However, ignorance and lack of scientific knowledge 
are not only evident in the statements of populist dissidents from FrP. In one 
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readers‟ contribution in AF called “Can we trust anyone”, written by the two 
scientists Reidar Müller (ph.D.) and Olav Orheim (ph.D.), these writers argue 
that several others than people from FrP “commit a sin in the climate issue” – 
also climate journalists, scientists and the environmental movement “should 
repent” (AF 12/04/08). Müller and Orheim ask for higher quality climate 
coverage in the Norwegian press, as well as a more united dialogue between the 
two climate change factions (ibid.).  
 
Many of the contributions in AF criticize the profile Het Klode and attack the 
writings by Mathismoen. In January 2008, the tense mood in AF‟s debate section 
influenced an editorial choice, following significant pressure from readers. These 
readers expressed grave concern about how the Norwegian media – and 
especially AF – gave so much undeserved attention to the rather apocalyptic 
climate stories. Mathismoen himself reflects on these climate skeptics in his 
imaginary retrospective glance and he is also trying to confront these skeptics: 
  
I remember that the mail box was filled with angry voices who argued that I did 
campaign journalism when we communicated what the scientists had discovered. The 
newspapers were overflowed with accusations of a conspiracy to stop the growth, to 
promote individual scientists and to spread fear (AF 19/03/08). 
[These skeptics are] a strange alliance […] they are populists, committed private 
persons with self-made theories, dark blue, reactionary political circles and various 
academics with very vague formal climate competence […] The problem and the sad 
part in this, is that it looks like a scientific debate, but actually it is not. The debate is 
based upon myths, untruths and twisted facts (AF 07/04/08).  
 
While the debate between climate change deniers and believers is apparent in VG 
and AF, DN provides no articles or readers‟ contributions which express 
skepticism towards anthropogenic climate change. Alstadheim sums up this 
“suppressed” skepticism in the following way:  
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Are you a bit uncertain about all this talk of climate change? You have all the reasons. 
The climate scientists are also uncertain. The problem is that the debate over climate 
research among scientists is different from the debate over climate research that takes 
place in the public. The public debate is characterized by so-called climate skeptics who 
introduce a doubt about facts that most climate scientists are agreed upon, namely that 
the earth is getting warmer and that one cannot explain this temperature increase 
without involving anthropogenic emissions of CO2 and other gases. The debate among 
climate scientists concerns the next steps in the climate research [that is, the probable 
consequences and how to fight these] (DN 04/06/08).  
 
There are fewer storytellers of the solution side of Lomborg‟s story in the 
selected texts, though some voices are questioning the so called CO2-hysteria and 
claim that we have to focus on other challenges and policies when responding to 
climate change. As global warming has become a highly disputed issue, one 
commentator in AF asks for “more rationality, and less faith and feelings” when 
debating climate actions (AF 05/01/08). In the same manner, people from the 
youth faction of the Conservative Party (UngeHøyre) request a more matter-of-
fact tone in the climate debate. In March 2008, UngeHøyre published the book 
Klimautfordringen kan mestres (“The Climate Challenge is Manageable”) and 
some of the authors of this book were interviewed by Mathismoen under the 
headline “The climate debate needs opponents” (AF 13/04/08). In this piece, 
people from UngeHøyre argue that the climate challenge is controllable and that 
we ought to think about both the environment and poverty abatement when 
discussing climate actions. These people claim also that climate change 
represents a moral challenge to the West – as a matter of doing good, in which 
their suggested “moral solutions” refer to economics and technology:  
 
Future generations will most likely be wealthier than us, and better prepared to bear the 
costs. The most important thing right now is that we must not put ourselves in a position 
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that will kill the economic growth or that the climate consequences will get so huge that 
they become a threat for the growth (ibid.).
48
  
 
Questions of how to sustain economic growth and thus contribute to better living 
standards in the developing countries are, in various texts, cast as the real 
challenges of climate change. In addition, the pollution from energy use in the 
poor parts of the world is portrayed as the biggest threat to the global 
environment. In this way, our national climate policies are seen as trivial 
compared to the need to focus on the challenges abroad. Such a message is for 
instance exposed in an article in AF which presents a research with some 
“surprising conclusions” [sic] as to where to cut emissions:  
 
Drastic cuts of emissions in the wealthiest countries in the world will hardly reduce the 
temperature rise of the earth if the emissions in the developing countries continue to 
increase. The only thing that helps is that the world‟s poorest use even less coal and 
gasoline (AF 29/05/08). 
 
The message of the skeptical story is reflected in the selected Norwegian texts in 
a rather “backward” version, especially in readers‟ letters. These voices still 
proclaim skepticism towards the anthropogenic causes behind climate change 
and occasionally deny the whole challenge. Such total climate change deniers are 
by and large seen in relation to the political profile of FrP, and I will discuss the 
extended media coverage of this climate agenda in chapter 6.  
 
There are also reflections in my sample from the arguments advanced by 
Lomborg, where a couple of voices try to talk on behalf of calculated numbers 
and argue that action must be taken against climate change in the developing 
                                              
48  The same arguments, from some of the other authors behind the same book, are to be found in the readers‟ contribution 
“Miljø må bli business” in  VG 17/04/08. 
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world. The “do good” message is communicated in these texts, emphasizing 
more rationality in our climate responses.   
4.2.5 Concluding remarks 
As illustrated through my media analysis, the four global climate change stories 
are all explicitly and implicitly present in the selected sample in which different 
texts reveal and emphasize different aspects of these global stories. The problems 
of climate change are often described in rather apocalyptic terms. But on the 
solution side to this environmental challenge, the “scientific” story of the IPCC – 
with its technical approximations – appears to be the most powerful. There are 
texts that stress the need for a more sensible and rational dialogue when 
discussing our responses to climate change – as argued by Lomborg. But there is 
relatively little space devoted to the need for attitude change required by the 
climate challenge, as advanced by Gore and Lovelock. Thus, the elaborated texts 
on climate change in the Norwegian media do not present global warming as a 
cultural challenge. At the same time, however, the portrayal of this 
environmental crisis is culturally mediated and alludes to Norwegian narratives, 
values and symbols. I will therefore turn attention to the Norwegian cultural 
context in the next chapter to see to what extent the native tradition influences 
the media‟s climate debate.   
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5. CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE NORWEGIAN CULTURAL CONTEXT  
The presented media coverage of climate change in Norway should not only be 
seen as reflecting the four elaborated global stories. The intertextual perspective 
adopted in this thesis implies that these Norwegian texts on the climate issue – 
and the climate change phenomenon as such – also are to be understood in the 
Norwegian context and in relation to broader narratives of the Norwegian 
identity. As already argued, we humans experience stories as a way of 
comprehending the world and making meaning in our lives. Our national identity 
can also be understood as constituted through some significant stories. In these 
stories we tell ourselves – and the world – who we think we are and, even more 
so, what we want to be. Such national narratives are contributing to making sense 
of the new happenings and actions that are confronting our “reality”. In this way, 
the stories of global warming merge with the pre-established Norwegian stories, 
as a necessary basis for new information.  
 
In this chapter, I will first provide a presentation of the Norwegian cultural 
context and describe two Norwegian narratives. In the second part of this 
chapter, I continue my media analysis and illustrate how these national stories are 
reflected in the media sample. In the last part of this chapter, I present my overall 
interpretation of the major portrayals of climate change in the Norwegian media 
– understood as the intertextual merging between the elaborated global climate 
stories and Norwegian cultural narratives. 
5.1 THE NORWEGIAN CULTURAL NARRATIVES 
I will in this chapter build on two prominent Norwegian narratives which are the 
modern basis of the Norwegian identity – the environmental story and the 
humanitarian story. These two national narratives are understood as dialogically 
woven into the past, and therefore part of Norwegian collective historical 
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memory, which influences the present (Witoszek, 1998; Leonard and Small, 
2003; NUPI, 2007). Such national conceptions can thus be found in the beliefs, 
practices and interactions between “everyday-people” (Gullestad, 1996). But at 
the same time, any national narrative or image is dependent upon being sustained 
and managed, which connects such cultural meaning systems to the fields of 
politics and power. Hence, these stories also have a strong presence in the 
ideological debates of the elite, who are trying to legitimize and “naturalize” such 
collective beliefs. The investigation of a nation‟s stories and semiotic systems 
will, of course, never be complete; the history of the Norwegian identity is 
multifaceted, contested and dynamic. But identifying some of the most 
prominent stories circulating can give a better understanding of a nation‟s 
opposition to or preference for a particular vision – be it in politics, business or 
private life. 
 
I will, in this part of the chapter, first give a short introduction to the historical 
roots and political status of the two narratives, before I elaborate on their present 
day significance. Finally, in this elaboration, I will show how these national 
narratives are closely connected to the current Norwegian affluence – telling the 
story of a Norwegian “fairy tale”.   
 
The environmental story and the humanitarian story can be understood 
historically by tracing the last two hundred years of national literature, which 
reveals much about Norwegians‟ attitudes towards themselves, the environment 
and the world as such. The period of Norwegian “National Romanticism” is 
analyzed to reveal a homage and cultivation of the rational “bonde”(peasant), 
rather than the romantic “noble savage” at one with Nature (Witoszek, 1997). In 
this context, Norway is said to have a national identity and patriotism whose 
referents are rooted in nature imagery and idealized peasant values (Witoszek, 
1998). These national narratives have been informed by what Witoszek calls the 
“tradition of Pastoral Enlightenment”. This tradition displays two prominent 
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characteristics. On the one hand, it refers to a Norwegian idealization of pastoral 
livelihood – praising the values of moderation and respect for the natural 
elements. On the other hand, it refers to the Norwegian priests and pastors who 
had a central part in codifying and disseminating “native” values, as an important 
part of the construction of the Norwegian nation. The “tradition of Pastoral 
Enlightenment” created a discourse characterized by pragmatism and a rational 
approach towards rural livelihood. And most significantly, this tradition created a 
narrative of Norway as an outpost of humanist culture, natural living and 
humanitarian values (ibid.).   
 
The two topical Norwegian stories are presently revealed in some of the recent 
publications on and investigations of Norwegian identity. Such national 
narratives are, for instance, exposed by the official workings of the Norwegian 
Foreign Department, through their engagement in “nation branding” and “public 
diplomacy”. These efforts deal with the Norwegian image – with what we 
Norwegians think Norway is and what we want the rest of the world to think of 
us. In the report Public Diplomacy – a strategy (Leonard and Small, 2003), 
initiated by the Foreign Department as an attempt to sustain and strengthen some 
powerful and important Norwegian narratives, one can read about four primary 
stories that seem significant. This report argues that any national identity project 
has to start with a rational debate among its inhabitants about which values and 
narratives they can relate to. In other words, which stories are rooted in the 
Norwegian collective memory? The four value-based narratives are defined as 
“living with nature”, “humanitarian superpower”, “equality” and 
“adventurousness” (ibid.), and confirm the status of Norway as a nature-friendly, 
humanitarian outpost.
49
  In the same manner, the final report from Makt- og 
                                              
49  These four stories were drawn out though research where the researchers conducted interviews with many of the current 
“storytellers” in Norway, including politicians from the main political parties, journalists, academics, cultural figures, popular 
culture entrepreneurs, businessmen, NGO directors, and representatives from the main public sector. Although this report was not 
fully adopted and followed by the UD (see Omdømmeutvalgets sluttrapport, 2006), I believe it still says a lot about our collective 
national identity , and I will thus draw on its insights in my analysis.  
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demokrati utredningen (”Power- and Democracy Report”) declares that “the 
picture of Norway as a moral and humanitarian superpower has become a new 
national symbol, on the same level as other symbols that shape the national 
identity of Norwegians” (NOU, 2003/19:51).  
5.1.1 The Environmental Story  
Norway is often understood to be a country where nature, rather than human 
settlement, dominates the landscape. For centuries, Norwegians have lived in 
small communities in harsh conditions – dependent on sensible use of their 
natural surroundings. Today, industrialization and centralization have turned 
Norway into a modern, high-tech country. Although Norway is one of the 
world‟s largest exporters of oil and gas, Norway itself is less polluted because 
most of the country‟s electric needs come from hydro power. The Norwegian 
wilderness is still famous for its striking beauty, as well as its strict 
environmental standards, compared to many other industrialized Western 
countries.  
 
As the previously cited strategy report puts it, Norway boasts a unique 
relationship with nature – exploiting its potential whilst pioneering ways of 
protecting the environment with carbon taxes, recycling and anti-pollution 
technology (Leonard and Small, 2003). This special relationship with nature can 
still be defined through the “tradition of Pastoral Enlightenment”, referring to a 
pragmatic approach to natural capital. Norwegians are today known as 
conserving and living with nature alongside responsible economic development 
and seemingly sensible resource use.   
 
The Norwegian environmental story is not only characterized by pragmatism. 
The story also represents an adventurous approach to the natural surroundings. 
Norwegians share a history full of explorers and adventurers who have braved 
and conquered nature – from the Arctic, via Easter Island, to the Antarctic. The 
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attraction to the wilderness is still prevalent in Norwegian society, and 
Norwegians are considered to be healthy and active people – known to prefer 
holidays in the mountains and weekend walks in the woods (Reed and 
Rothenberg, 1993).  
In recent history, Norway has produced some prominent environmentalists and 
political leaders, reinforcing and symbolizing the environmental story – both 
domestically and internationally. Gro Harlem Brundtland is known as “the green 
goddess” for her work on sustainable development and strong presence in 
international environmental policy debates (ibid.) and the previously mentioned 
Frederic Hauge is famous for his radical environmental activism. At the same 
time, Norway is known to be the homeland of the founding father of the 
environmental philosophical movement “deep ecology”, Arne Naess. Deep 
ecology is – to put it simply – questioning industrial development and the use of 
technology while alluding to the idea of the intrinsic value of nature. How 
“deeply” this philosophical position has influenced Norwegian society today, is 
another question. The present environmental profile of living with nature is 
maybe more in line with Brundtland‟s sustainable development than a Naessian 
kind of green radicalism – to use Dryzek's terms (2005). The Norwegian 
environmental story seems thus not to be going back to nature and simple living. 
Rather, Norway is becoming a cutting-edge player in international environmental 
policies and technologies – or as the “green goddess” puts it:  
The Environmental Profile is part of the balancing of things: that we are not going to be a 
polluting country, but a modern, forward-looking, environmentally friendly explorer of 
oil.
50
  
                                              
50  Gro Harlem Brundtland, in Leonard and Small, 2003:47 
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5.1.2 The Humanitarian Story  
Norway is known to be a “small country with a big heart”, which shares its 
economic profit with the poor and the needy. The idea of Norway as a nation of 
peace and aid can be seen as an important part of the humanitarian story, where 
Norwegians are meant to spread their values and morals in the world.  
Norway has a considerable state budget for aid, is active in peace-keeping and 
appears to be a strong contributor to the international community through the 
UN-system (NUPI, 2007). Norway is, furthermore, marketing its image as a 
“peaceful nation” through the annual Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony. 
Like the elaborated environmental profile, the current humanitarian agenda can 
also be understood as stemming from the “tradition of Pastoral Enlightenment” 
(Witoszek, 2009), and from the Norwegian roots of altruism and solidarity 
(NUPI, 2007). Today, the humanitarian profile is often related to the concept of a 
Norwegian “goodness regime”. This concept has recently been elaborated by 
many scholars, and can be understood as a story with significant normative 
power (Tvedt, 2003; NUPI, 2007; Witoszek, 2009). Tvedt defines the “goodness 
regime” in relation to recent decades of Norwegian aid policies, which are 
understood to be motivated and legitimized by conceptions and rhetoric about  
the outstanding morals and goodness Norwegians can use to “save the world” 
(Tvedt, 2003). The Norwegian duty is to do good in the world. This morally 
grounded aid-mission is further explained to provide important guidelines for 
what kinds of debate and critique are possible in the field of Norwegian foreign 
policies. The “goodness regime” is, moreover, described and criticized as 
characterized by virtuous ethics, the belief that what makes an action good is 
above all else its intentions (NUPI, 2007). In this way, debates over the 
Norwegian aid policies have been characterized as being preoccupied with the 
monetary size of the aid budget, while debates over the actual effects from these 
aid programs are silenced (ibid.; Witoszek, 2009).    
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5.1.3 The Norwegian Fairy Tale 
The two elaborated stories – the environmental one and the humanitarian one – 
are thus understood to be important features of the present Norwegian identity, 
adapted to current affairs, while containing essential elements from the cultural 
repository. Norway has, in recent years, turned out to be a kind of fairy tale 
country and hence created a new identity: from a poor peasant country to an 
international economic power, made possible by the enormous wealth of the oil 
fund Statens Pensjonsfond - Utland (SPU). Norway is often understood as the 
country of its folk-hero Askeladden – companionable and original, lazy but good 
– who gets the princess and half of the kingdom through kindness as well as 
cooperation with nature and the needy. A strong element of this fairy tale is, of 
course, the Oil, which by Norwegian luck and pragmatism has contributed to 
great national welfare. The Norwegian oil fund is now a very important part of 
the Norwegian political economy, but it is probably even more significant in 
Norwegian culture (Frønes, 2006:13). It influences how ideas and values are 
communicated, and how the world is envisioned. 
Within this modern fairy tale, both the environmental story and the humanitarian 
story play important parts and should be seen as closely connected. Today, 
Norwegians communicate visions and values of Norway as a green and good 
country by international standards. Norwegian environmentalism and 
humanitarianism are combined and exported in governmental aid programs 
called “Oil for Development”51, while Norwegians themselves are shareholders 
in the SPU and some of the “best developed” humans according to the United 
Nations‟ Human Development Index.52 Norwegians are living with great 
governmental welfare, and Norway is known for its democratic, corporatist state 
model – irrespective of political powers. The Norwegian Labour party 
                                              
51  See for instance St.mld.nr.13 (2008-2009) 
52  http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_NOR.html (HDI - UN 2007/08) 
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(Arbeiderpartiet) in office
53
 has a strong identity based on being an industrial 
master and a humanitarian force.   
Norway's current situation looks somewhat like a “resource utopia” – regarding 
both production and its consumption levels. Norwegians live on “black gold” and 
take this wealth for granted (Frønes, 2006). And the oil-wealthy government 
shares its surplus with its people and the world, through the Norwegian 
“missionary welfare state” (Witoszek, 2009).  
When Norwegians are confronting the stories of global warming, it is important 
to ask how the status of an oil power and the already established national 
narratives are related to the climate issue. I have, in this part, presented the 
environmental story and the humanitarian story as two important Norwegian 
narratives that contribute to the construction of the Norwegian concept of 
“reality”, and I will in the next part of this chapter examine how these two stories 
are reflected in the selected media texts on climate change.  
5.2 NORWAY TALKING TO THE WORLD  
In this part, I will analyze how the media sample reflects the two cultural 
narratives recognized as prominent in the Norwegian context: The environmental 
story and the humanitarian story. As with the examination of the global stories in 
the Norwegian media, these national stories will also be analyzed separately – 
though only in relation to their general value dimension and not explicitly in 
relation to a formulation of the problems and solutions to climate change. My 
overall interpretation of the intertextual merging between the global climate 
change stories and the Norwegian narratives in the media texts is presented in the 
last section of this chapter, part 5.3. 
                                              
53  Arbeiderpartiet is in a coalition government together with Sosialistisk Venstreparti and Senterpartiet. I will mainly refer 
to Prime Minister Stoltenberg and Arbeiderpartiet – which will be understood as the most influential political party in this coalition.  
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5.2.1 The Environmental Story in the Norwegian Media 
All and sundry would we feel well if we got out of the car and closer to nature, to sense 
the weather and feel the interdependence (VG 24/11/07).  
 
In the selected climate change articles, there are very few focusing on nature in 
Norway. Symbols of the natural world and “nature living” are used mostly with 
reference to remote or exotic places and allude to indigenous people – like the 
Inuit and other distant indigenous people. In Norway, climate change and its 
natural consequences are portrayed to be a matter of building higher quays – both 
at your private cottage and in communal development projects (VG 19/01/08, AF 
17/12/07). Climate change will also affect the Norwegian population of elks and 
hence the elk-hunting, according to  a national research program on Norwegian 
climate change consequences – with an annual budget of between 75 and 90 
million NOK (AF 15/05/08).   
The pragmatic, rational approach to the environment as figuring in the 
Enlightenment tradition is found in many texts, where nature is defined in terms 
of resources, economic capital and technological opportunities. Statements about 
the inherent value of nature are almost absent; references towards such aspects of 
the environment are commented upon through statements of irony more than of 
any nature romanticism. This ironic attitude is, for instance, revealed in an article 
by Alstadheim in DN, where Alstadheim comments on the prospects of snow-
less winters in the future and asks if some future generations of Norwegians 
would miss the snow if they had never have experienced snow (DN 09/02/09). 
The debate on polar bears and the possible extinction of this species is discussed 
in a similarly practical manner: the director of CICERO, Pål Prestrud, painfully 
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“admits” that most people will manage to survive without the existence of polar 
bears (AF 18/09/07).
54
  
As the newspapers discuss environmental crisis and their harmful consequences 
all over the world, they are also talking about what “we Norwegians” do: Grant 
money to research. An example of such presentations, is an article about the 
crisis of melting ice in the mountainous Nepal, where “1, 3 billion can lose their 
water” (AF 09/02/08). This article focuses on the need for additional 
investigation of these melting processes, as we need to understand such 
ecological developments. Prestrud from CICERO is an outstanding spokesman 
for the Norwegian research agenda. In one news report, Prestrud says that the 
mapping of climatic processes which Norway is initiating is very important. He 
emphasizes, moreover, that the consequences of climate change will be much 
more striking in poor areas – such as the Himalayas – than in rich countries, 
because: 
 
In these countries people are extremely dependent upon their primary resources and the 
surrounding natural environment to survive. In our part of the world, we will survive 
anyway. We can afford to be part of the globalized economy and to get hold of the 
products we need (AF 03/04/08).  
 
Like Presterud, Prime Minister Stoltenberg emphasizes the Norwegian research 
agenda in the climate case. In many articles, the traditional Norwegian spirit of 
pragmatism and adventurousness is symbolized through the efforts of 
Stoltenberg. Stoltenberg travels all over the world – to South-Africa, Antarctic, 
India, Nepal and back to Africa again – and explains his extensive “climate 
traveling” [sic] in the following terms:  
                                              
54  Under the headline ”Trenger vi drivisen”, Pål Presterud states: ”Dersom jeg skal være helt ærlig og en smule kynisk – 
selv om det er smertefullt: Folk flest vil bli lite påvirket av at isbjørnen og noen arter hoppekreps i drivisen forsvinner, bortsett fra 
at kloden vil få et fattigere artsmangfold og at urfolk i disse områdene får problemer med å opprettholde sitt tradisjonelle levesett.” 
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Many people believe climate change is something that will happen in a distant future. 
This is false, climate change happens now. I travel around to learn and increase my own 
understanding, but also to direct attention to what is going on (AF 09/02/08).  
 
In the majority of texts, nature is presented in traditional, Norwegian utilitarian 
terms as a resource to be studied, understood and used. The environment appears 
to be something “out there” to describe and – mostly – to use for human 
purposes. For instance, Drange in Klimapanelet writes about the nature of Arctic:  
 
An ice-free Arctic in the summer time is good news for long haul by boat between 
Europe and Asia. Access to large oil- and gas reserves along the Siberian coastline and 
mineral deposits in the Arctic Ocean will also become easier when the summer ice is 
gone. The situation is of course serious for seals, polar bears, birds, algae and fish that 
live on, inside or under the ocean ice (VG 01/03/08).  
 
The quoted presentation is representative of how the cultural attitudes towards 
nature dominate in the media sample. These texts reveal an attitude toward the 
environment as a scientific research area or as a pool of natural resources to be 
exploited. The environmental story of nature management and sensible resource 
use is reflected in many texts, especially in relation to the Norwegian oil 
industry. This industry is not seen as the primary reason behind global warming 
but rather described as the greenest and cleanest alternative in the world of dirty 
oil extractions. Norwegians still want to conquer nature and continue oil 
production through pioneering technology, though this might be more 
challenging in the future. Kvalvig in Klimapanelet  supports such a vision, as she 
comments on the need for – and difficult task of – weather forecasts in thirty 
years, where “the oil extraction outside Lofoten in Vestfjorden [will demand] 
very qualified weather- and current forecasts” (VG 19/01/08).  
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To sum up: The environmental story as reflected in the selected Norwegian texts 
is filtered through the native “nature tradition”. This tradition is based on 
rational, pragmatic rather than “romantic attitudes” to nature, as well as trust in 
science and progress.  
5.2.2 The Humanitarian Story in the Norwegian Media 
[It is] decisive that we living in the well-established and wealthy part of the world give 
all kinds of support to developing countries (VG 22/03/08).  
 
Norwegians still have a heart for the vulnerable and the needy, as one can read 
from many of the selected texts. The “tour de climate” of Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg is also described in this manner – as an attempt to find climate 
projects in the poor world that Norway can support (VG 28/12/07).                                        
 
Numerous articles portray climate change as affecting the environment and 
people “out there”, demanding that Norwegians focus on issues taking place 
abroad. The environmental story of nature management is combined with climate 
mitigation and missionary goodness, as the Norwegian government decides to 
invest a lot of money in protecting the Amazonian rainforest. This policy is 
extensively commented upon by Alstadheim in DN, and Alstadheim is seen by 
some as one of the prime movers behind this governmental action.
55
 In one of his 
commentaries, it is clear that:  
 
The chopping down of the rainforest is one of the world‟s biggest climate problems […] 
One of the advantages of climate measures in the rainforest is that such measures most 
probably are cheaper than most other climate measures. Another advantage is that this is 
a climate measure which does not demand development of new and expensive 
technologies. A third advantage is that there are positive additional effects, for instance 
preservation of the biodiversity (DN 12/11/07). 
                                              
55  Ref Lars Haltebrekken (leader of Naturvernforbundet), Natur og Ungdom‟s climate seminar October 2008 (I attended). 
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Alstadheim therefore supports the suggestion of granting 15 billion NOK to a 
rainforest initiative. He is also aware of the positive “additional effects” of nature 
conservation. But saving the rainforest seems to include a touch of the previously 
introduced Norwegian virtuous ethics, as “the problem is that no one really 
knows where to spend those 15 billion to save the rainforest” (ibid.). 
 
Norway has a lot of money and goodness to give to the world, and there are 
many spokesmen of this agenda in the different texts. The Norwegian 
humanitarian mission is especially supported by different international climate-
celebrities, for instance the previously mentioned economist Stern. Stern tells us 
that the developing world really would like to stop deforestation of their 
rainforests, but that “we” have to help “them” – by making this cost-effective 
(AF 06/06/08). In another article, Stern is quoted on the Norwegian climate 
agenda: 
 
We need global solutions to solve these global problems. And in this we need Norway 
to be a guide, which we also expect that the country is willing to do. Norway can play a 
decisive part, in the same way as it did in the peacekeeping processes. Norway is 
already a prominent donator and leads on in the work on CO2 cleaning (DN 03/09/07). 
 
Some of the texts describe the humanitarian Norway as having more than just 
goodness and money to give to the world. Norway is also portrayed as a world 
leading country when it comes to technology. And although the Norwegian oil 
technology – as superior as it may seem – is hardly an “environmental” business 
or a fundamentally “compassionate” enterprise, this technological expertise is 
presented as a one more “humanitarian” quality. Norway is, most of all, 
described as having a wealth of technological potentials, which are to be 
exported. Norway should, in other words, add its clean-tech expertise to the rest 
89 
 
of its so-called humanitarian projects. This story is confirmed by one 
commentator in AF, who states: 
 
Norway is on the world's top level when it comes to oil technology. As a nation we 
should be a mentor in solving the energy challenges that the world faces. We need not 
less, but even more moon landings. The future lies in prioritizing different forms of 
technology beyond oil and gas (AF 11/01/08). 
 
The humanitarian story is reflected in the selected Norwegian texts mainly in 
relation to Norwegian wealth and technology. Many articles inform us that 
Norway, as an affluent and advanced country, has a lot of money and expertise, 
and its mission is therefore to “do good” in the world. Norwegians think they 
know how to deal with the environment and, although some texts reveal disbelief 
about the future of fossil energy, Norway can anyway put its efforts into nature 
resources and technological advancements abroad.     
5.3 THE MAJOR STORY: NORWEGIAN GLORY 
As illustrated hitherto, many stories and voices are reflected in the selected 
Norwegian media texts; this give way to a complex picture of the climate 
challenge. As shown in chapter 4, strong elements from the four elaborated 
global climate stories are present; in addition to significant aspects of the two 
cultural Norwegian narratives. In this emerging plurality of voices, stories and 
worldviews, it would be too simplistic to argue that the Norwegian climate 
change approach can be reduced to one story. I will nevertheless point to a 
couple of noteworthy discursive tendencies, which together constitute the basis 
for the majority of Norwegian stories of climate change as interpreted from my 
selected media texts. These stories can be understood as the intertextual merger 
between the elaborated global climate stories and Norwegian cultural narratives. 
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As discussed in chapter 4, the media texts reveal on the one hand divergent and 
conflicting messages advanced, respectively, by the so-called climate change 
deniers and the climate change believers. This debate shows up mainly in the 
different readers‟ letters. The deniers find support in the skeptical story of 
Lomborg, while the believers advocate the scientific consensus from the IPCC, 
and the two factions seem to talk past one another – not with each other. 
According to the voices from the total climate change deniers, climate change is 
an exaggerated or fictitious challenge. In this way, the skeptical story which 
Lomborg represents is, in the Norwegian context, transformed into a rather 
“insulating” version. This Norwegian version denies climate change and hence 
merges minimally with the other elaborated stories, as it tells of something that is 
not and this perspective is accordingly not connected to any concept of reality – 
neither the climate change stories nor the Norwegian identity.   
On the other hand, climate change appears to be a very serious and urgent issue 
according to most of the articles written by journalists, associated columnists and 
paid climate experts. As illustrated in chapter 4, the different scientific scenarios 
from the IPCC build the basis for drawing a trustworthy picture of the ongoing 
climate problem and the future environmental challenges. These circumstances 
are also explained with reference to the apocalyptic climate stories of Gore and 
Lovelock. In effect, different degrees of gloominess in climate stories are 
emerging – from the devastating “doomsday” version to the more motivating 
“wake-up” one. But an absent element in all these stories is the message of how 
climate change might challenge the Norwegian environment and its people. The 
stories about the negative consequences for Norway are blatantly absent. In this 
way, the climate challenge stories advanced by both Gore and Lovelock are 
transformed significantly, as the “crisis” to which we have to wake-up and 
respond does not concern the Norwegian context as such.   
 
91 
 
According to my media analysis, the problems of climate change seem to be 
displaced in the natural- and developing world “out there”; the challenge is 
explained through an intricate mixture of scientific and technical claims. There 
are many comments about the relative uncertainty behind the established climatic 
“facts”, but less attention to the driving forces behind these environmental 
processes – as to why climate change is happening and hence its further ethical 
dimensions. The texts reveal a rational and enlightening mission, where climate 
change is explained and counteracted by Norwegian research and technology. 
Nature and environmental problems are symbolized with graphs and models, and 
graphically through pictures of melting ice and hopeless polar bears. The 
problems of climate change appear to be in the Arctic and other remote, exotic 
areas – and can only be understood through extended scientific research and 
examination. We are told that the climate crisis threatens the diversity of arctic 
plants, and that “this is depressing, worrying – yes even frightening information 
for everybody concerned about a balanced Arctic” (VG 08/06/08). Sure it is, but 
where is the story of a world in balance? The problems and challenges of climate 
change are of course to be found in the Arctic, but these areas are far away from 
our lives and often described as totally isolated from human civilization as such. 
In the selected media texts, climate change appears to be going on in nature 
without humans, or at least without the Norwegians.  
 
The solutions to climate change are portrayed in the media through pictures of 
prominent men in suits and high-tech oil platforms. Many texts emphasize the 
magic words of “mitigation” and “adaptation”. Global warming is, most of all, to 
be controlled and mitigated by technological means. The Norwegian solutions 
are to be found in industrial “moon landings” and other missions abroad – where 
Norway can contribute with money and technology. The national narratives of 
environmentalism and humanitarianism are disseminated in these texts, 
reinforcing the characteristic Norwegian missionary approach. Norway is 
presented through the voices of international authorities as a fantastic, 
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environmentally cutting edge country with a lot of scientific expertise and 
technology – which should be transferred to the rest of the world. The chairman 
of the IPCC assures us that “I know about the debate on whether you should cut 
emissions at home or abroad. I see no problems with going after projects 
abroad” (AF 09/12/07).  
 
The different media texts of adaptation are portrayed as if they only concern 
those vulnerable, “primitive” people out there – who Norwegians have to save. 
Norway is understood as a beautiful place while the world is understood as an 
unfair place, and the description of climate change follows this pattern. We are 
told that Norway will have marginal consequences from climate change while 
“Africa dries up” (AF 21/06/08); Africa is also described as “the innocent 
victim” (DN 11/09/07). In addition, many texts relate problems of scarce 
resources and displaced people in different parts of the world, while future 
scenarios about Norway are quite attractive. In the already quoted article in VG, 
which predicted how life would be in Norway in 40 years, we are told:  
 
Norway will be in the lead when the climate changes – because we understood the 
exceptional economic opportunity [...] the sparsely populated rural districts have now 
become effective carbon farms using environmental refugees as cheap labour (VG 
05/01/08). 
 
According to this future vision, Norwegians are still managing nature in an 
effective and inventive way, and additionally including some climate victims in 
this agenda. Although the article also points to the need for a different economic 
system, with taxes on consumption and more co-ownership, Norway still has an 
advantageous position in the world economy. More tourism, as well as climate-
refugee workers and leading technology, are seen to be the “economic” keys to 
this situation. Climate change and economic development go hand in hand in the 
majority of the texts; many voices point to the future optimistically with respect 
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to Norway's situation. In one article quoting Hauge from Bellona, he is 
interviewed about the mentioned “Bellona-scenario”56 and states:   
 
[It was] surprising to discover that we can become carbon negative without eliminating 
our economic growth. It was also surprising to discover how small a change in lifestyle 
can actually affect the emissions. The big choices must be taken by politicians and 
businesses (AF 03/06/08).  
 
The above quoted statement resonates with the conclusion which stems from a 
majority of the presented texts: Climate change has not – and will not really – 
affect the Norwegians. This environmental challenge can be met through 
technological developments and interventions in policy and business, mainly by 
international agreements. Such an approach is also confirmed by Alfsen in 
Klimapanelet. In his article ”Human or machine” (VG 22/03/08), we are told that 
“we” have to give support to the developing countries when combating climate 
change – though with no clear references to actual actions and regions. But the 
issues at stake do not seem to concern the values and visions of ordinary 
Norwegians. Like many articles in the sample, Alfsen points to what the 
Norwegians need most: Strong and brave politicians to lead us (ibid.). In the 
Norwegian context, climate change is – if anything – an issue of “greener” taxes.  
 
The responses to climate change appear to happen in a technical world of politics 
and business, where there is no nature. The environment is discussed most of all 
as a resource with economic potentials, which belong to independent states. The 
underlying values of the selected media coverage reflect a dominant discourse 
emphasizing technological “fixes” for the climate challenge over human behavior 
change. The conflicts between nature and economic progress are cast in practical 
terms, and there is a significant tendency to leave the fundamental challenge of 
                                              
56  A report from Bellona on climate change and new technologies, where Bellona suggest algae-cultivation as one strategy. 
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the growing domestic oil economy untouched. These texts reveal no urgent calls 
for change in the Norwegian patterns of production and consumption. Cost-
effectiveness and technological pragmatism, combined with a strong political 
leadership, seem to be part of an important discourse in these Norwegian climate 
stories. The major climate stories told in the media sample are thus to be found in 
the discursive landscapes of the optimistic “sustainable development” and the 
more pragmatic “problem solving” one – to use Dryzek's terms (2005). Norway 
wants to make the world “sustainable”, and the quest for sustainability seems to 
represent its institutionalized version of “ecological modernization” (ibid.). This 
version of the sustainability discourse addresses the restructuring of the capitalist 
political economy along more environmentally defensible lines, where 
governments, businesses, reform-oriented environmentalists and scientists 
together collaborate in setting standards and providing incentives to make 
industry “greener” (ibid: 167-171). The selected texts are to a high degree 
conveying the interests of these agents and the “techno-corporatist” approach to 
the climate challenge. This public discourse manifested in the media – 
characterized by scientific expertise and technological fixes addressing a global 
stage – thus diverts attention from issues related to value judgments and the way 
we live our lives. In the sample, climate change is most of all defined as a global 
challenge which needs global solutions. Within this perspective, Norway can 
play an important part – described through the distinctively Norwegian rational 
and missionary attributes. In accordance with the presented texts, the 
environmental problems emerge in the Arctic while the political problems are 
played out on a global stage. The international climate scenario is clear, with the 
US as the villain, China as the joker in the pack, Africa and indigenous peoples 
as the victims. Norway, along with, and often superior to, the EU is seen as the 
hero. In these stories, Norway figures as an environmental and humanitarian 
champion in a world of apocalyptic climate change.  
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The major climate stories interpreted from the selected Norwegian media 
coverage give the impression of a nation characterized by strong elements of 
cognitive dissonance. To support my claim, I refer to the most recent media study 
on climate change done in Norway, conducted by CERES21: This media study 
argues that the Norwegian media – representing Norway as such – are plagued by 
a collective psychological denial called “escapism” (Coulter and Midttun, 2009). 
According to my analysis, Norwegians escape from the climate challenge in two 
ways: On the one hand, there are the climate change deniers who argue that 
global warming is of minimal importance. According to these voices, the stories 
of climate change are exaggerated or fictitious and there is no “crisis”. On the 
other hand, there are the climate change believers speaking of serious 
environmental problems. But these challenges concern the rest of the world and 
any measures are thereby argued to be needed abroad.  
 
There are no stories in my media sample that are obviously or radically 
questioning the Norwegian political economy or our high-consumption lifestyle. 
Neither are there any clear stories about the intrinsic value of nature or ecological 
holism. According to the presented texts, we Norwegians can sustain our 
privileged lifestyle and we can do this with good conscience, as we already are 
concerned about the environment and the misery of the rest of world. Our 
national narratives, retold in the media, reassure us that we have a harmonious 
relationship with nature and that our mission is to do well in the world. Doing 
something for the climate is accordingly mainly for export, and Norwegians can 
enjoy “hyttekos” in the future as well. The clashing stories of climate change are 
thus “tamed” and mastered by the Norwegian narrative knowledge – by the 
stories of living with nature and the regime of goodness. There are few texts that 
reveal alternative perspectives on nature and development; moral reflections on 
how values, beliefs and lifestyles are connected to the environmental crisis are an 
area significantly absent. The major stories found in the media texts give less 
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food for thought about how Norwegians – you and me – are connected to the 
worldwide climate challenge.  
 
I have in this part of the chapter presented my overall findings and interpretations 
from the selected media texts, where I have identified the intertextual merging 
between the four global climate stories and the two Norwegian cultural 
narratives. Through these interpretations, I have drawn out a number of 
prominent discursive tendencies that together constitute the major climate stories 
in the Norwegian media. These stories are understood as culturally significant, 
providing legitimate knowledge about the climate challenge. The presented 
media analysis is done with less attention to the actual political agendas and 
interests at work. But the definition and dissemination of legitimate knowledge 
are also seen as a political activity, where the politicians elected by the people 
have the authority to define what the world is about. I will therefore turn to the 
Norwegian political angle and the presentations from the media on these matters 
in the next chapter. 
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6. MEDIA STORIES ABOUT NORWEGIAN CLIMATE POLICIES   
In this chapter, I will review and conduct a critical analysis of the way in which 
the selected texts relate to the various political climate agendas in Norway. The 
political voices broadcasted in the media are seen as authorative and influential, 
and this part of my media analysis is done as an attempt to contextualize the 
major climate stories recognized in the media sample. In line with the intertextual 
approach adapted in this thesis, these elaborations will also be seen in relation to 
the four different global climate stories as well as to the two Norwegian cultural 
narratives. 
6.1 THE POLITICAL VOICES 
In the first part of this chapter, I will focus on how the media sample transmits 
the Norwegian opposition‟s approach to the climate issue. As illustrated in 
chapter 4, the so-called total climate change deniers in Norway are often 
adherents to the political agenda of FrP. I will therefore discuss how the media 
communicate and confront these “nay-sayer voices”. In the second part of this 
chapter, I turn to the climate policies of the Stoltenberg-administration and 
illustrate how the media give space to these “honorable voices”. In the third part 
of this chapter, I will focus on the extent to which the media transmit “critical 
voices” towards the Norwegian climate policies, as well as to the Norwegian 
political economy and (ab)use of nature. Finally, I will investigate where the 
official Norwegian climate story is to be found in the intertextual landscape of 
the stories presented, and discuss whether this hegemonic political story provides 
an engaging vision for the Norwegian public.       
6.1.1 The Nay-Sayer Voices 
As elaborated in the last two chapters, the “scientific truth” behind climate 
change is sharply contested in Norway‟s two largest newspapers – AF and VG. 
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These heated discussions are consistent with the dividing lines between political 
parties, where voices from respectively the left and the right provide contrasting 
stories of both the challenges and responses to the climate issue.  
Skepticism towards climate change expressed in the selected texts, is particularly 
seen in relation to spokesmen of FrP. This tendency got its most striking 
expression in April 2008, when FrP invited an apparently unqualified climate 
scientist – a welder engineer – to the party‟s climate seminar. This event was 
commented in various newspapers, and FrP was accused of being an outcast 
(“alenegjenger”) in the debate between political parties on climate change in 
Norway (AF 01/04/08). The “outcast position” of FrP in the climate case is well 
illustrated in my media sample; various articles written by journalists or 
associated columnists refer to FrP as an irresponsible actor in the climate debate. 
(Seeing that FrP is the second largest political party according to many recent 
polls, this “outcast position” can be considered as rather extensive.) People 
doubtful of the scientific basis for climate change, are often attacked as Frp-
sympathizers – especially in the debate sections. The climate change deniers in 
the selected texts seem to implicitly take the skeptical story of Lomborg in 
defense of their claims. Through a couple of these voices, Lomborg is explicitly 
referred to as a rational person who manages to think clearly and balance the 
exaggerated climate picture – especially with reference to the anthropogenic 
causes to climate change. The scientific basis of climate change, these total 
climate change deniers say, is fabricated. Seeing that Lomborg himself accept 
anthropogenic climate change, Lomborg is a straw man in the heated and 
polarized debate in Norway over the “scientific truth” behind climate change.  
Voices from the political right conveyed in the selected texts seem, in general, 
skeptical to the official responses to the climate challenge, and especially to the 
humanitarian agenda of the Norwegian “missionary welfare state”. As illustrated 
in chapter 4, some voices from UngeHøyre ask for more rationality in the climate 
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debate, as if climate change were a religious “feel-good” vision. The rhetoric 
behind Norwegian climate policies is often based on moral arguments – about the 
outstanding international position of Norwegian technology and riches, where a 
“climatic goodness regime” provides important guidelines for what kinds of 
debate and critique are possible in the Norwegian climate debates. Arguments 
about freedom of speech are advanced in the heated debate on the climate 
challenge in the selected texts, where politicians from the right proclaim climate 
change to represent an “authoritarian vision”. The arguments advanced by 
Lomborg are also referred to when such voices criticize the alleged “totalitarian” 
presentation of the climate case in the Norwegian media. One commentator in 
AF describes the situation of a “climatic consensus” in this way:  
What are the Norwegian press doing when someone questions the biggest and most 
important issue of the world, are they confronting those with an open mind? […] The 
Norwegian press has collectively adopted an almost activist approach on the climate 
issue (AF 13/12/07c).  
The need for an open debate – also in the press – is very important, as it might be 
the provocations from the dissidenters that stimulate action. The reasons why the 
Norwegian media coverage of the climate case is criticized as biased and 
unbalanced are surely manifold. Climate change is complicated, both 
scientifically and political – not to mention morally. The chosen media 
institutions seem engaged in giving the public qualified coverage of the 
“scientific facts” behind global warming – as indicated in part 4.1. Within this 
perspective, both the partial and the total climate change deniers are criticized in 
my sample. Their voices are also to some extent silenced, though VG and also 
AF – due to pressure from their readers – devote space to these voices in their 
debate sections.
57
 The conflict between the total climate change deniers and 
                                              
57  During the first month when AF had introduced its climate profile Het Klode – in December 2007 – AF refused to 
publish articles or readers‟ contributions that expressed skepticism towards the challenges of climate change. See 
http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/kultur/1.4267814  
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believers in the presented texts seems to have reached an impasse. As the nay-
sayer voices are seen related to the agenda of FrP, the basic storyline of the 
science behind climate change is reduced to a merely political issue. These “nay-
sayers” are portrayed as the heretics of our time, but the exclusion of these voices 
from the public debate will not foster consensus on the “scientific truth” behind 
global warming. Clashes of different and dissident – though fact based – climate 
change views might bridge this gap, and hopefully transform the nay-sayer 
voices into supporters of a more environmentally sensitive agenda. 
6.1.2 The Honorable Voices 
A substantial part of the media sample disseminates the official Norwegian 
climate agenda; according to these texts, global warming is an urgent challenge. 
In one text, the Minister of Development and Environment, Erik Solheim, 
declares the last report from the IPCC (AR4) to be “the climate bible of the 
world” (AF 18/11/07). In another article, Solheim emphasizes the seriousness of 
the climate challenge: 
The IPCC has by now established a scientific consensus not present before. 
Environmental preachers like Al Gore, Lars Haltebrekken and Frederic Hauge can be 
ignored. But scientific evidence can not. By now we know that the drought in Australia 
and the cyclone in Bangladesh are connected with the climate (AF 13/12/07).  
To some extent, various journalists are working as mouthpieces for the 
Norwegian governmental agenda, as different cabinet ministers are followed and 
quoted in their personal stories of “awakening” to the climate challenge – as seen 
in the “climate pilgrim” such as Prime Minister Stoltenberg. According to these 
news sources, and stated in rough terms, the Norwegian government appears to 
have three answers to the climate challenge: Technology, quota trade and 
“dugnadsånd”58.  
                                              
58
  I.e. positive attitude to voluntary communal work. 
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The governmental agenda of climate technology seems to be focused on the 
 “moon landings” that were previously mentioned (CO2-cleaning of gas works). 
Many articles in the media sample comment on this mission, especially 
Mathismoen in AF. Mathismoen follows Prime Minister Stoltenberg to South-
Africa where they are visiting huge factories with CO2-emissions as large as the 
total emissions of Norway. Stoltenberg is quoted: “It is tough to see this. And it 
illustrates that it is impossible to succeed in the climate battle if we do not 
manage to capture CO2 from these huge sources of emissions” (AF 18/04/08). In 
this way Stoltenberg defends both his domestic and his foreign “moon landings”.  
 
A considerable part of the selected texts inform readers that Norwegian politics 
should make a global example and lead in the worldwide work against climate 
change. These texts focus on international treaties and technological solutions, 
supporting the narratives of Norway as an environmental and humanitarian 
cutting edge. Although Stoltenberg talks about “moon landings” at home, the 
mission that he finds to be truly honorable for the Norwegian government is the 
international quota trade and technological reforms abroad. Stoltenberg talks 
about this mission in an interview:   
 
The wealthy part of the world has the moral responsibility for the climate threat. It is us, 
with our emissions, that have created the problem. [But] (w)e will not manage to cut the 
world‟s emissions 50-80 percent like the IPCC claims we have to, without cutting 
emissions also in the third world. Not everything, but a large part of that bill, we have to 
pay. That is why climate measures abroad are important. It is not a matter of sneaking 
away, or to let the wealthy world be excused from doing something at home (AF 
02/11/07).  
The complex challenges of climate change are presented in moral terms: the 
industrial world is full of sins! But instead of providing a “Norwegian dream” – 
like the motivating story advanced by Gore – and focusing on domestic affairs 
and potential innovations within the Norwegian context, the solution of the 
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Government seems to lie in “indulgence mechanisms” abroad – like buying 
quotas and implementing technological projects. Norway‟s mission is to be found 
in other nation‟s affairs. Minister Solheim is also quoted, focusing on this global 
agenda:  
Norway will be important at two arenas. As one of the world‟s leading oil producers, we 
can manage to influence other countries with a large oil production, not the least when it 
comes to taking part in CO2-capture. And we play an important part in building 
confidence to the developing countries, the rainforest billions is one example (AF 
13/12/07). 
The most moral thing to do at home is to demonstrate dugnadsånd. But it is 
difficult to understand what this national dugnad is about, apart from accepting 
an increase in gasoline tax and implementing energy efficiency in your house 
(VG 23/02/08, 21/06/08). The Norwegian dugnadsånd seems most of all to be a 
governmental agenda in an international context, and the mentioned “green 
goddess” Gro Harlem Brundland is interviewed about this mission: According to 
her, we still need to raise awareness about the global environmental challenges 
and their global solutions, where “everybody” has to join this international 
dugnad (AF 12/12/07).    
According to numerous texts, the Norwegian government is doing a lot – 
researching in the Arctic, saving the Amazon, carrying out “moon landings” and 
developing big projects around the world. In short, the noble mission is that of 
the Government, and we – the public – are left to understand and support such 
huge ventures. It seems difficult for the public to feel included in the official 
Norwegian climate agenda: We most of all have to follow the environmental and 
humanitarian gambols of our Government abroad. 
6.1.3 The Critical Voices 
On the other hand, the Norwegian media are also working as watchdogs. There 
are clearly some investigative journalists and contributors in the selected texts 
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that express grave concern about the Norwegian climate politics. The critical 
voice is most striking in DN: This newspaper has several articles that show 
skepticism towards the technological missions of the Norwegian government and 
the co-operating business sector. For instance the article “Dirty bomb in green 
wood”, where Frøyland writes about the oil sand project of the governmental-
owned Statoil(Hydro) in Canada (DN 05/09/07b). This article critically discusses 
the environmental standards of Norwegian petroleum projects abroad. Yet the oil 
sand project and its negative environmental consequences are described in a 
rather formal way. The issues at stake are expressed with technological and 
economic tropes – not through any ecologically informed claims. According to 
the article, the morality of the Norwegian oil industry and its foreign 
undertakings appear to be a matter of sufficient technology, and the article 
contains a metaphorical association to the Norwegian “moon landings”:  
Since the oil sand of Statoil is located 500 meters underground, it is not possible to dig 
down to it. The company is therefore drilling wells and makes use of a steam injection 
technique […] from the green forests around, they are producing 200.000 barrels of oil, 
which corresponds to one sixth of the present Statoil production. Investments of almost 
NOK 90 billion in production and upgraded installations are needed to reach that aim 
[…] White smoke and a juicy CO2-bill rise from the factory chimneys set in the moon 
landscape (ibid.).  
The Norwegian politics of quota trade, especially the investments in the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), is also systematically investigated in DN. In 
the article “Quotas in a green grey area”, the first CDM-project of Norway – a 
hydroelectric power plant in China – is criticized (DN 15/03/08). This article 
argues how “Norway”, more or less meaning “Stoltenberg”, has strategically 
launched emission projects abroad, to avoid domestic cuts. Such foreign projects 
have uncertain outcomes; the Norwegian project in China is said to have no real 
CO2-effect (ibid.). The journalists claim in this article that the policies of the 
Norwegian government should be thoroughly reevaluated. The journalists argue 
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moreover that there is a pressing lack of opposition to the official Norwegian 
climate agenda, and that these issues really need to be discussed in an open, 
public debate.
59
 These journalists dared to raise a skeptical voice towards 
Norwegian CO2 policies, and were awarded with the Norwegian Scoop-prize.
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The above mentioned article reflects the skeptical story of “CO2-hysteria”, and 
attempts to critically examine the governmental “feel-good version” of 
environmentalism and humanitarianism. This mirrors the skepticism advanced by 
the voices from the opposition in general (see section 6.1.1). But there are few 
critical voices in the sample that stress the rising internal CO2-emissions of 
Norway, and hence question the Norwegian lifestyle and political economy. 
Stories of ignorance or demand of the change of consciousness – in line with 
respectively Gore‟s and Lovelock‟s visions – are not brought up and discussed 
thoroughly at the political level in the media. There are some scattered attempts 
to find in papers such as DN, which launches critical analyses of the Norwegian 
climate policies. However, on the whole global warming does not seem to be a 
radical challenge to the Norwegian industry or society. AF and VG reflect 
fragments of a more visionary ecological story, where a few voices 
fundamentally confronting the Norwegian political reality are given a platform 
for expression. One example is a reader's contribution from the philosopher Arne 
Johan Vetlesen:  
If we use nature‟s sustainable limit as a condition, we have to say: We cannot afford 
growth. But as a society we have displayed no will to see the earth‟s limits as a 
condition, they are unknown to most of us, just like nature is, reduced to exploitation for 
our purposes. Criticism of growth is politically incorrect far into the present 
[Sosialistisk Venstreparti] (AF 10/09/07).  
 
                                              
59   http://www.skup.no/Metoderapporter/2008 
60  The Scoop-prize is a prize for investigative journalism 
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In the wake of this comment – though seemingly coincidentally – the secretary of 
Arbeiderpartiet, Martin Kolberg, stated that there were limits to growth – even in 
the Norwegian economy. VG reports that Kolberg‟s conclusion is an obvious 
break with the ideology of the Western world, namely unlimited economic 
growth. The article further states that Kolberg urges Norway, as a small but 
wealthy country, to lead in the search for new societal values. Kolberg suggests 
no plan of action for his proposed green revolution, but argues nevertheless that 
such a large-scale transformation has to happen through democratic means (VG 
17/09/07). This initiative was embraced by some of the Norwegian 
environmental organizations, and Steinar Lem, of FIVH
61
, wanted to lift 
Kolberg's ideas (ibid.). But Kolberg‟s propositions were reduced to a puff of 
wind, and critical questions towards the Norwegian levels of production and 
consumption have not been pursued – in the media or in Norwegian climate 
policies. 
 
In January 2008, the national Klimaforliket was implemented. This was an 
agreement between all of the large political parties, except FrP, about the 
Norwegian climate policies. The aim of this compromise was to generate a broad 
political consensus on long-term climate policies. These suggested climate 
endeavors are commented upon in various articles. Klimaforliket proclaims that 
Norway should be “carbon-neutral” by 2030, and Mathismoen stated that this 
compromise would serve “to again bring Norway in the international frontline in 
certain respects” (AF 18/01/08). But Klimaforliket is as well understood as a 
rather spineless manifesto when it comes to questions of radical changes within 
the Norwegian political economy.
62
 Many commentators find it difficult to 
understand exactly how Norway can fulfill its goal of reduced GHG emissions. 
                                              
61
  Future In Our Hands – a radical environmental organization that works for fair distribution of resources globally. 
62  In Klimaforliket, the question of more technology vs. reduced living standard and lower economic activity as a national 
climate action is not treated, and most of the national undertakings in this compromise are evaluated as “tiltak som ikke kommer i 
direkte konflikt med andre politiske mål og som er lite egnet til å vekke motstand i befolkningen” (CICERO 2009:03). 
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One commentator in VG writes under the heading “Bad climate for good moral” 
that the only visible political answer to the suggested cut of emissions seems to 
be investments in international quotas:  
 
We have so much money from climate destructive oil that we can afford to buy 
ourselves out from the klimadugnad the rest of the world has to join (VG 12/03/08).  
 
Climate change is about money, according to the majority of texts. The cost of 
the national compromise is told to be almost nothing. Shared among all the 
households in Norway, Klimaforliket results in an increased expenditure of 
approximately 3500 NOK/year (AF 18/01/08). Although such statements give 
the impression that every Norwegian has to contribute in combating climate 
change, the contribution at stake is put only in economic terms. This cost-attitude 
is challenged sometimes, as in an editor‟s piece in AF. Under the headline 
“Sacrifice from everyone”, one can read that “In Norway it is easy to get the 
illusion that it is possible to buy oneself out from the problems. Unfortunately, it 
is not that easy” (AF 11/12/07). However, this statement concerns the 
responsibility of Norway as a nation which is engaged in international relations. 
There are very few articles that are critical of the Norwegian public and its 
engagement in the climate issue. So far the Norwegians have rebelled against an 
increased gasoline tax of 0, 10 NOK/liter (VG 01/07/08).  
 
According to many of the texts, the world seems to be going astray. But almost 
none of the texts are concerned with if, how, and why Norwegians as a nation 
should feel responsible for doing something domestically about the impending 
environmental collapse. This is maybe because such questions are very sensitive 
and difficult to comment “soundly” on – as they concern rather intricate political 
and moral issues in a modern, democratic context. The following experience of 
Kvalvig in Klimapanelet leads to such a justification: Although Kvalvig first of 
all was trying to communicate the problems of climate change in a scientific, 
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somehow objective way, she discovered quickly that it became trickier than 
expected to comment about the solution to the climate challenge without getting 
politically controversial. In one column, she writes: 
 
To carry out the changes for a more climate friendly society we need great structural 
changes, and probably force. The solutions to the climate crisis are full of conflicts. 
Fortunately we do have committed politicians in this country, but are they brave 
enough? (VG 12/04/08) 
Once again, the Norwegian public is left to the relative “braveness” of our 
politicians; how can we relate to this? The Norwegian government asks for 
dugnadsånd and avoids the dirty stuff related to oil extraction.
63
 While we are 
asked to recycle our garbage and encouraged to shift to economy bulbs at home, 
our government is implementing dubious projects in China and supporting 
polluting oil and gas extractions. It is difficult to encourage a critical response to 
the official climate agenda when public-minded media are not providing many 
investigative stories on these issues. 
6.2 THE HEGEMONIC STORY: NORWAY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND HUMANITARIAN CUTTING EDGE 
I have reviewed and discussed political attitude on climate change in Norway as 
represented in my sample. The press is seen as an important source of 
information for the public on the climate case, and the Norwegian media are 
considered to have a significant influence on the political decision-making 
process, including climate policies (Bratland, 2008). Climate policies are a 
crucial field, as these efforts involve rather decisive conditions and collective 
concerns. As argued in my thesis, we also need to raise public engagement if we 
are to meet the climate challenge in a sufficient way. Our energy use is the main 
                                              
63
  In the information magazine Klimaløftet distributed by the Norwegian Environmental Department, one can read about 
climate actions directed at ordinary citizens – mainly understood as consumers. Reading through its 40 pages, there is not a word 
about the Norwegian oil- and gas economy. http://www.klimaloftet.no/Klimaloftet/ 
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menace in this challenge, and both private lifestyles and cooperative enterprises 
have to become more environmentally friendly. With this in mind, it is 
interesting to see that in my media analysis, the most critical voices towards the 
official Norwegian climate policies are to be found in the business-oriented DN. 
However, this newspaper describes the climate challenge mostly as an economic 
opportunity for the business sector. Seen in general, there are few strong voices 
in the overall media picture that ask for radical changes with respect to the 
Norwegian political economy and lifestyles. In this landscape, the influential 
storytellers give way some prominent political stories which more or less 
legitimize the Norwegian status quo.  
On the whole, the Norwegian government‟s position, as disseminated by the 
media, acknowledge the necessity of a climate policy, but the climate change will 
mainly affect the “world out there”. Political leaders and the business sector 
agree on the fact that climate change is happening, but seem to disagree when it 
comes to solutions which would threaten the national oil industry. These 
powerful voices are well reflected in the media, reinforcing the mission of the 
industry-friendly Arbeiderpartiet. The very focus on and “belief” in 
technological solutions distract attention from discussions related to the extensive 
changes that are needed in our energy use habits. In addition, the Norwegian 
climate policies appear to have shifted towards global solutions. This agenda is 
sustained and legitimized by stories of Norway as an environmental and 
humanitarian cutting edge. Such presentations, characterized by a pragmatic 
approach to nature and the missionary aspect of Norwegian “goodness”, allow 
Norway to escape at home and focus on the rest of the world. The two cultural 
narratives “derail” in a paradoxical way the Norwegian climate agenda. 
Norwegian rationalism and pragmatism lead to an overoptimistic belief in the 
effects from technological solutions, and underestimate the force of cultural 
habits. Though, some are “blaming” other cultural traits of the Norwegian 
society: Jens Ultveit-Moe, businessman and recently dedicated environmentalist, 
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writes that Norwegian puritanism is the Government‟s biggest problem when 
discussing climate policies:     
The Stoltenberg Government follows the international tendency of avoiding 
considerable increased energy taxes and other unpopular measures, but rather focusing 
on quota trade and afforestation abroad. Politics is the art of possibilities, hence 
Stoltenberg‟s assessments are in this regard totally correct, even though Norwegian 
puritansim demands domestic sacrifices in order to save the environment (AF 
27/06/08). 
 
Politics are surely the art of possibilities, but in the climate case, politics can as 
well be seen as the art of responsibility and creativity. Global warming is a 
matter that concerns our fundamental morality – not only our conventional 
politics and economics. The current climate policies communicated in the media 
challenge neither the Norwegian utilitarian approach to nature nor the expanding 
Norwegian oil economy. Rather, these policies allow Norway to continue 
extracting and living high on “black gold”. This might, of course, be in the 
interest of the public, as oil contributes to the Norwegian welfare system. But at 
the same time, such undertakings contribute to increased global environmental 
risks – both in the present and the future. The elaborated national narratives 
somehow “green wash” the ultimate polluting reality of Norwegian oil and 
wealth.  
The official climate change stories interpreted from the media are complicated 
and the most important questions are about scientific inquiries, technical devices 
and international trade regimes. Although some of the presented texts show 
skepticism towards the government‟s action, these statements do not appear to 
stimulate a green public sphere on the climate matter. The most critical articles 
are found in the business-paper DN, and these presentations relate to the 
workings of industry. The climate challenge is mostly communicated through 
scientific and technological arguments; not through an ecologically informed 
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discourse that might challenge the monological administrative mentality and the 
prevailing discourse of industrialism with a new set of presuppositions and 
cultural images (Torgerson, 1999). The issues at stake do not seem to be easily 
understood by “ordinary” citizens. Moreover, the portrayals of the outstanding 
position of Norwegian technology and global engagement silence moral, social 
and, accordingly, political dimensions of the environmental challenge. 
Different researchers have pointed to Norwegian environmental politics and the 
challenges of public deliberation and involvement in these matters. One study 
criticizes how the previous environmental discourse in Norway of thinking 
globally, while acting locally – stemmed from the beginnings of international 
environmental efforts in the 1980s – in the Norwegian context became a burden 
for the private consumer (Straume, 2005). This study examines the 
depoliticization of environmental politics in Norway, which allegedly represents 
pseudo democracy and technocratic paternalism. The power of this system is 
reinforced through discursive and managerial techniques that disempower 
political subjects, where the result for the demos is guilt and loss of creative 
power (ibid: 203). Another study focuses on how the earlier environmental 
discourse of thinking globally, while acting locally, has recently transformed into 
a discourse of thinking globally and acting globally (Lindseth, 2006). This study 
states that from the perspective of democratic governance it seems evident that: 
The idea, that the public has a democratic responsibility to take on climate 
commitments at the local and national level, appears to have lost resonance 
relative to the idea that climate change is a global challenge that requires global 
solutions (ibid:48). 
 
The globally oriented discourse is also established in the selected texts, where 
that picture is sustained by stories of Norway as an environmental and 
humanitarian cutting edge. In the Norwegian context, people are encouraged to 
demonstrate dugnadsånd and behave as environmentally friendly consumers. 
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Within these presentations, the discourses of sustainable development and 
environmental problem solving (Dryzek, 2005) are prevalent. As illustrated 
through my analysis, many texts enhance the agenda of sustainable development 
by promising economic growth in association with environmental protection, and 
with an emphasis on the role of “strong and brave politicians” in solving the 
climate challenge. As indicated in last chapter, the major representation of 
sustainability found in the media falls into the category of “techno-corporatist 
ecological modernization” – whereby the process of policy making is 
monopolized by scientific, economic and political elites (ibid.). The corporatist 
Norwegian government manages ostensibly to reconcile economic growth with 
environmental interests while helping the developing world to prosper. This 
might just be a case of a rhetorical rescue operation for its capitalist economy 
confronted by ecological crisis (ibid: 174). However, this version of the climate 
“reality” is also reflected in my sample; the climate challenge seems neither to 
involve “the public” nor to represent a “cultural confrontation”. The hegemonic 
stories in the media provide no sustained critique of the possibility of constant 
economic growth and increasing consumption. These presentations avoid talking 
about the taboos concerning limits to growth and the Norwegian lifestyle. 
Climate change does not need to challenge the “Norwegian mind”. Rather, this 
environmental problem is an issue for the administrative mind, where the state 
exercises unquestioned authority for universal well-being and legitimate 
knowledge (ibid: 88). The global climate challenge is the story of the IPCC – 
calculable and controllable, and a problem for elite scientific and political 
institutions.    
 
The selected Norwegian texts, in other words, do not offer a politically informed 
story about green consciousness – required by Gore and Lovelock. Some voices 
criticize the efforts of the Norwegian government and challenge their powerful 
stories about climate change. But, in the end, these critical voices are few and 
their visions are overpowered by the widely transmitted hegemonic agenda. 
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Many texts in the sample present the honorable voices of the Norwegian 
Ministers who want to save the world, but the motivating, mobilizing story 
concerning the Norwegian public at large is still missing. The Norwegian 
government communicates lofty visions for the global good, but provides few 
creative – or responsible – visions of Norway beyond the age of fossil fuels. The 
stories of the inherent worth of nature and the moral will to change our own 
future are not told – in the texts or in the nation at large.  
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7. CONCLUSION: MYTHS AND FUTURES 
My aim in this thesis has been to use the Norwegian press as a proxy for global 
communication and dialogue on the climate issues. Climate change – as a global 
environmental problem – is dependent on media attention to move from just 
being a “condition” to be an issue that can generate social awareness (Hannigan, 
2006). The issues at stake are – as illustrated – highly complex and hotly 
contested, and translating and interpreting such issues into marketable stories 
essentially involves surprising considerations. Therefore, the media coverage of 
climate change often has a vivid style to it, in which climate change is framed as 
novel and important – dramatized in symbolic and visual terms (Trumbo and 
Shananhan, 2000). A recent study conducted on climate change coverage in the 
Norwegian press documents that many Norwegian journalists who write about 
subjects related to climate change make use of dramatization as a central strategy 
on these issues (Ryghaug, 2006). However, I have not focused on the internal 
logic of the “media culture”, but rather used media as a source of cultural 
production of climate change stories. The interpreted meanings of these stories 
have been discussed in relation to the presented global climate stories, as well as 
to the cultural and political context of Norway.  
 
The articles in my sample convey an interesting variety of opinions and 
perspectives on climate change – from the scientific gaze on the hard facts to the 
skeptical denial of the whole matter. As illustrated, the dominant stories are 
grounded in a globally centered discourse of sustainable development as 
ecological modernization – to use Dryzek's terms (2005). The aforementioned 
Norwegian narratives tell a story about Norway as environmentally friendly and 
humanitarian “cutting edge”. As demonstrated in my analysis, climate problems 
seem to appear as affecting nature without the Norwegians, while the climate 
solutions are to be found in policies without nature. The major stories interpreted 
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from the media question neither industrialism, nor the prevailing instrumentalist 
approach towards the environment. The critique of Norway‟s energy use is 
downplayed by accepting export of the climate measures abroad, and there are no 
clear calls for fundamental social change.  
 
The Norwegian case, as presented here, certainly provides food for thought with 
respect to the link between discourses and civil mobilization. The “wake-up” 
calls advanced by the media only seem to regard the world out there; there are 
few appeals for collective Norwegian action. The perceptions of risk and danger 
are constructed around geographically and temporally distant people and non-
human nature; these perceptions are not stimulating awareness about the risks 
connected to the imperatives of economic growth and technological rationality. 
We are still told to be living in a “risk-society” (Beck, 1992), but the definitions 
of risk and responsibility seem to be generated on the drawing boards of the 
scientific and political elite. According to Beck, new possibilities for social and 
political transformation arise from people‟s growing awareness that they are 
living in a society in which the habits of production and consumption may be 
undermining the conditions for its very future existence (Bulkeley, 2001). Within 
this perspective, public participation is important in order to explore and create 
new perspectives on society (Dryzek, 2005). Environmental risk awareness can 
further result in a realization of interconnectedness, where a “human 
consciousness of nature” is both wounded and awakened (Allan, 2000: 57). This 
is not the story found in my Norwegian media analysis. 
A recent study, done on Norwegians‟ awareness and perception of climate issues, 
shows that the general public considers the environmental risk to be non-
important (Sørensen et al., 2008). The lack of public concern and engagement are 
explained by the scientific controversies and abstract policies that are presented 
in the media, in addition to the political inactivity that the government 
demonstrates (ibid.). Another new study has analyzed public engagement on the 
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climate issue in the Norwegian blogosphere. This study shows that although 
various voices in the blogosphere criticize the official climate agenda and the 
Norwegian oil economy, these people are not providing any visionary alternative 
(Ytterstad, 2008). The most engaged appear to be gloomy and desperate, and 
appeals about common actions are strikingly absent (ibid.).                             
These studies relate to the findings of my own analysis, which point to the 
problems of escapism and apathy within Norwegian society – as if Norwegians 
were living in a “reality” where climate change does not exist. 
7.1 DEBUNKING MYTHS 
7.1.1 Climate Change Myths 
Actual scientific knowledge of climate change is, no doubt, contested and 
uncertain and we will never be able to learn the pure “truth” about our natural 
surroundings. But at the same time, the vast majority of climate scientists are 
convinced that the earth is facing rapid changes because of human energy use. 
The problems of climate change are in their basic sense the results of 
anthropogenic GHG emissions, and that is a reality we have to face. Therefore, 
the way media might “balance” the climate picture by giving as much attention to 
a handful of climate skeptics as to the vast majority of scientists who believe that 
global warming poses a real threat contributes to the construction of a “climate 
myth” (Schneider, 2005). Such media-propagated myths have little to do with 
reality, and should accordingly not guide us in our attempt to come to terms with 
our environmental challenges. The media surely have an obligation to give a fair 
presentation of competing points of view and build public trust on the climate 
issue. But any sensible public dialogue should deliberately outline the consensus 
before revealing the contention (ibid.). This is, however, a delicate task, since 
climate change is both a hotly contested issue and a subtle issue among scientists. 
 
When communicating climate change, it is important to separate facts from 
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values – to the extent this is possible – to prevent the factual basis from being 
totally politicized. But at the same time, climate change is not a dogmatic opinion 
– it is the end of the world as we know it! Therefore, it is also important to incite 
engagement and open dialogue, so that the plurality of plausible problems and 
promising potentials are brought out. Current media stories frequently polarize 
the different viewpoints into one extreme or the other – and rarely convey the 
entire range of possible prospects (ibid.). These opposing presentations can also 
be considered “mythical”, as climate change is molded into either a devastating 
reality or an invented fiction. We are living in complex and confusing times, and 
the “climate reality” should accordingly be presented as a range of possible 
futures.  
7.1.2 Norwegian Myths 
As argued through my analysis, the Norwegian media contribute to the 
Norwegian myth of living in a cornucopia. Norway exports its dirty stuff to the 
rest of the world, and Norwegians themselves remain far from any sort of 
ecological awakening. This relates not only to the populist “anti-greenery” 
profile of FrP, but also to the official climate agenda – which is legitimized by 
Norwegian narratives of environmentalism and humanitarianism.  
 
In May 2009, the Environmental Department held a press conference on climate 
change. Minister Solheim attended and pointed to the problems of escapism and 
fairy tale-living, as he urged “the world” to get out of the lethargy of Sleeping 
Beauty. Although the media are telling of gloomy future scenarios, Solheim saw 
the “need for a greater understanding of the climate crisis”. At the same time, he 
wanted journalists to adjust the focus from the climate problems to their 
solutions, and pay attention to the stories of success.
64
 But as my media analysis 
                                              
64  I attended this seminar. Information is also found at: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/md/aktuelt/nyheter/2009/--
verden-ma-ut-av-tornerosesovnen.html?id=560717 
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illustrates, there are many storytellers in the Norwegian media who make 
Norway itself into a story of success – an environmental hero and a humanitarian 
world-saver. As long as the Norwegian resource utopia maintains the facade, we 
may only dream of a crisis. 
 
Although I claim that the Norwegian narratives of environmentalism and 
humanitarianism contribute to the construction of a Norwegian national myth and 
therefore need to be demythologized, I do not argue that these narratives are to be 
totally dismissed. Such meaning making, collective narratives are “existential”, 
and constitute the Norwegian reality. Accordingly, it is not possible to eliminate 
this mythical dimension from Norwegian politics. To talk about “ideal” politics, 
disconnected from the Norwegian culture and our national identity, is thus a 
fantasy (NUPI, 2007). But in the climate case, the hegemonic Norwegian 
storytellers demonstrate self-delusion and escape from the imperatives of the 
current environmental reality. Care for the global environment and engagement 
in the international arena are, of course, “good” and respectable ideas. However, 
as I argue in this thesis, when responding to the climate challenge Norway must 
also “sweep before its own door”. For the time being, Norway‟s GHG emissions 
will not be eliminated. They will be offset with rather speculative and 
complicated measures. The challenge of climate change, and Norway's role in it, 
require imaginative solutions at home as well as abroad.  
 
My media analysis shows that there are critical storytellers who try to unmask the 
Norwegian discrepancy between affluence from an oil economy on the one hand, 
and maintaining a strong reputation on climate policy on the other. But the 
Norwegian myths of boundless abundance and “technological generosity” seem 
to be well established. Norwegians are accustomed to their “black gold”, and the 
Norwegian oil industry has managed to establish a respected reputation by 
appealing to our national goodness – as exporters of clean oil and good morality 
(Ihlen, 2007). StatiolHydro markets its international investments as “the oil 
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adventure continues abroad” and the Norwegian state supports the government-
owned oil companies through aid programs.  
7.2 THE NEED FOR A NEW STORY? 
As illustrated in this thesis, the struggles over the meaning of climate change are 
ubiquitous. The stories of climate change in the Norwegian media are revealed 
through discourse analysis, and inseparably connected with dominant power 
structures. The current Norwegian media coverage is, to a large extent, socially 
and politically counterproductive, because these stories distract people from an 
issue at the heart of the Norwegian society – the production and consumption of 
fossil fuels. A few voices in my sample encourage more radical responses to the 
climate challenge. They talk about the need to organize the world economy in 
fundamentally different ways, or to see nature with more sensitive eyes than our 
current, alienated view. Such speech is deeply thought, and some asks if climate 
has become religion. Lomborg is considered almost as evil
65
 ; and with respect to 
the complexity of the issue of climate change, one should treat his statistical 
prognosis with some skepticism. But at the same time, Lomborg talks about a 
decisive condition in the climate challenge: If we are to succeed, we have 
implement actions that actually work, not only actions that make us feel good.    
 
What kind of constructive “do-good” vision does Norway need when responding 
to the climate challenge? The trick to the climate challenge will not be done by 
 technology alone, but also in the emergence of relevant cultural issues that 
engage the general public in making the necessary social and political changes 
that are needed (Moser, 2007). A timely question is therefore if the present 
Norwegian passivity to the climate issue is as much due to the absence of an 
                                              
65  In 2004 the IPCC chairman, Rajendra Pachauri, compared Lomborg with the very Adolf Hitler, in which 
Lomborg was accused for having no respect for different human lifestyles and cultures. Pachauri‟s statement is still 
reffered to in the Norwegian climate debate. See i.e.: 
http://www.morgenbladet.no/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081003/OBOKER/85220690 
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imaginative vision that manages to mobilize the masses and that provides 
(political) agency, as to the lack of political will among people? Although the 
elaborated hegemonic climate stories in the Norwegian media are culturally 
significant – attested by two notable national narratives – they do not relate to the 
current context of Norwegian society. Moreover, these presentations do not 
advance any cultural critique. The environmental challenge is not presented in a 
way which relates it to our way of living, our social structure or our natural 
surroundings. The dialogues and stories of climate change found in the media are 
mostly about science and economics, and these current discourses seem not to 
encourage the development of a green public sphere. Neither do these 
presentations foster sufficient communication on the climate case, as these 
discourses may threaten our capacity to engage intelligently and creatively with 
the increasing signals of environmental stress and deterioration (Cox, 2007). In 
the Western industrialized world climate change is a problem of democracy; and 
democracy, if anything, is about authentic communication – also with the non-
human world (Dryzek, 2005:235). My analysis of the Norwegian climate stories 
shows the need for new, influential voices and other discursive narratives which 
can actively engage and empower the public, and contribute to the ecological 
side of Norwegian democracy. As the stories of Gore and Lovelock propose, we 
have to fully understand the seriousness of our environmental challenge and 
reconnect to our own natural foundations. These messages are lacking in my 
presented texts. 
 
What are, then, the stories that need to be communicated? Ultimately, we cannot 
totally erase our founding traditions and stories when adapting to a new “reality”. 
But at the same time, there is a lot of potential knowledge in the Norwegian 
narratives to advance a more environmentally benign future. For example, the 
Norwegian fairy tale of Askeladden – who succeed through his own 
resourcefulness and with nature‟s support – need not to continuously be adapted 
to the scenario of the oil and the developing world out there. The values of 
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moderation and respect for the natural elements also belong to our narrative 
knowledge. These insights have to be revived and told, to build the base for a 
new Norwegian paradigm which takes into account the environmental stories as 
presented by Gore, Lovelock and others. As indicated by my intertextual 
approach in this thesis, we humans can learn from each other and develop new 
awarenesses by engaging in dialogues with others‟ thought. This means, 
moreover, learning to relate to those who hold different views about the direction 
our society is taking, and pay attention to the concert of voices and dissenting 
stories about our position on earth. Nothing kills communication more quickly 
than an unwillingness to consider the views of the other side (Reed and 
Rothenberg, 1993).  
 
Today Norwegians seem stuck in an influential discourse coalition where the fate 
of the earth is left to the technology optimists. There are very few powerful 
voices that raise the topics of green radicalism and advance issues related to 
nature‟s limits of tolerance. To talk about limits is also a rhetorically difficult 
position, which seems to imply a frustrating confrontation not only with our 
present political economy, but with fundamental forces of human nature. Since 
time immemorial, we have been attracted to myths of boundless wealth and 
glory, in the same way as we are not drawn to the ascetic story of living as 
simply as possible (Witoszek, 2008). Therefore, any “green revolution” needs to 
be made attractive – and not be told in the language of doom and renunciation. 
We need fruitful dialogues about how Norway might look in the future beyond 
the age of fossil fuels; not only protests against industry. Our current national 
storytellers have to inspire creative and responsible thinking about our place in 
the world, and help us to comprehend and create the possibility of a better future. 
Stories are powerful, but not unchangeable. 
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APPENDIX A – MEDIA ARTICLES 
HEADING: PAPER: SECTION AND AUTHOR: DATE: 
Ansvar og avmakt Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B. Alstadheim 01.09.2007a 
Det nye Atlantis Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 01.09.2007b 
Varmt klima truer reinen VG Feature, Ø.N.Næss 01.09.2007 
Krever skarpere lut Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, A.Lindeberg 03.09.2007a 
Vi trenger Norge Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, M.Bertelsen 03.09.2007b 
"Bare køle på" Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 05.09.2007a 
Skitten bombe i grønn skog Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 05.09.2007b 
Livet forsvant med tørken Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 07.09.2007 
Det viktige klimavalget VG Debatt, S. Kvalvig - meteorolog og 
H.Holdhus – oceanograf 
07.09.2007 
Tredveårsperspektivet Aftenposten Debatt, A.J.Vetlesen - professor filosofi 10.09.2007 
Uskyldig offer Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim 11.09.2007 
Vi trenger en klimaminister Aftenposten Kommentar, O.Mathismoen 17.09.2007 
Ap-Kolberg vil stoppe veksten VG Nyhet, P.K.Ertzaas 17.09.2007 
Trenger vi drivisen? Aftenposten Kronikk, P.Presterud – direktør Cicero 18.09.2007 
Sot og varme smelter isen - Virkeligheten er verre 
enn rapportene 
 
Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 20.09.2007a 
FN-sjefen slår alarm Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 20.09.2007b 
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Klima på anbud Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim 20.09.2007 
Enden er nær Aftenposten Feature, F.Schandy 21.09.2007 
Grønt lys for kjerne-kraft Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 21.09.2007 
Kloden minst 2°C varmere Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 24.09.2007 
Verdens blåmandag VG Kommentar, G.Hjeltnes 24.09.2007 
Dyrere natur Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, J.Sachs 24.09.2007 
Vi har veldig dårlig tid Aftenposten Nyhet, J.Hultgren 25.09.2007 
Eskimokulturen smelter bort Aftenposten Nyhet. S.B.Bentzrød 26.09.2007a 
"Avgrunn mellom tiltak og klimamål" - FN-topp 
mener Norge ikke har forstått alvoret 
 
Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 26.09.2007b 
Irasjonell klimapolitikk Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Debatt/Innlegg, K.Eig - stipendiat 
geologi 
26.09.2007 
Alle må betale klimaprisen Aftenposten Leder 27.09.2007 
Grønne bøller i miljøkamp VG Kommentar, F.Jacobsen 30.09.2007 
Tar høyde for klima- endringer Aftenposten Nyhet, O.M.Rapp 02.10.2007 
Strategi og åpenhet Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Debatt/Innlegg, G.Eskeland - 
forskningsleder Cicero 
02.10.2007 
Klimaforskere: Motet mangler Aftenposten Nyhet, R.Gjerde  05.10.2007 
Grønlands utfordringer VG Feature, H.F.Høydal 06.10.2007a 
Du må bli enda tøffere, Jens VG  Klimapanelet, T.V.Johansen 06.10.2007b 
Klimaløftet er tjent inn 27. Januar Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 06.10.2007 
En verden i havsnød Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 08.10.2007 
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Grønn velferdsstat VG Debatt,  M.Kolberg - partisekretær AP 08.10.2007 
Dystre konklusjoner i ny miljørapport Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 10.10.2007 
Apokalypse i Amazonas Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 12.10.2007 
Å hindre krig Aftenposten Kommentar, O.Mathismoen 13.10.2007 
50 tøffe år for isbjørn Aftenposten Nyhet, O.M.Rapp 15.10.2007 
Tinende bombe Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 19.10.2007 
Vi må fange og lagre Co2 VG Klimapanelet, F.Hauge 20.10.2007 
FNs forsiktige panel VG Kommentar, H.Vikøyr 21.10.2007 
Klimahysteri: ja takk Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 22.10.2007 
Det farlige klimaforliket Aftenposten Kommentar, O.Mathismoen 24.10.2007 
Ekspertenes svar om klima Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, A.Lindeberg 24.10.2007 
Dødelig flaskevann Aftenposten Debatt, S.Lem - FIVH 25.10.2007 
Teknologi for klima Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Debatt/Innlegg, S.Lier-Hansen – 
Adm.Dir. Norsk Industri 
25.10.2007 
Disse kan forsvinne - Største utryddelsesbølge 
siden 
dinosaurene forsvant 
Aftenposten Nyhet, P.K.Aale 26.10.2007a 
Når får kloden nok av oss? Aftenposten Feature, O.Mathismoen 26.10.2007b 
Et løft for klimaet Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Debatt/Innlegg, J.G.Støre – 
utenriskminister og H.Madsen – 
konsernsjef Det norske veritas 
26.10.2007 
Oppdra dem til klima- krigere! VG Klimapanelet, S.Kvalvig 27.10.2007a 
Klimakrise gir sykdom VG Nyhet, P.O.Ødegård 27.10.2007b 
Klimamålene kan bli skjerpet Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 02.11.2007 
FN-forskernes dystre varsler VG Feature, T.U.Johansen 03.11.2007 
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Kaldt hode i het klimadebatt Aftenposten Innsikt, T.Nordeng 06.11.2007 
Arktis har nådd sitt «tipping point», sier 
amerikansk forsker 
 
Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 11.11.2007 
Penger på trær Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim 12.11.2007 
Klima-bevisene - FNs nye klimarapport VG Nyhet, H.Vikøyr 15.11.2007 
Verden kan reddes! VG Nyhet, H.Vikøyr 16.11.2007 
Klodens skjebne Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, T.Erikstad 16.11.2007 
Enda verre enn antatt - Klimaendringene skjer 
raskere enn det Klimapanelets sluttrapport går ut 
fra 
 
Aftenposten Nyhet, R.Gjerde 18.11.2007 
Tid for ansvarlighet VG Leder 18.11.2007 
Klimakrangel i jungelen Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 19.11.2007 
Asia kan bli satt tiår tilbake Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 21.11.2007 
Retten til å ha det kaldt VG Klimapanelet, S.Kvalvig 24.11.2007 
Ambisjoner og realiteter på Bali Aftenposten Leder 28.11.2007 
Svertet av CO2 Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 30.11.2007 
Ball på Bali VG Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen 01.12.2007 
Satser på snøballeffekten Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 01.12.2007 
Skjebnemøte på Bali Aftenposten Kommentar, O.Mathismoen 03.12.2007 
Dyrt å vente Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Debatt/Innlegg, E.Hambro - direktør 
Statens forurensningstilsyn 
03.12.2007 
Enorme norske CO2-utslipp Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 04.12.2007 
Meidene er ukritiske Aftenposten Debatt, O.Åm – forfatter av ”Kampen om 
klimaet” 
04.12.2007 
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Aner ikke rekkevidden av endringene i Arktis VG Nyhet, H.Vikøyr 05.12.2007 
Krevende politisk balansekunst på Bali - 
Klimaendringer rammer alle. 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 05.12.2007 
Golfstrømmen kan kjøle ned Norge - Nytt 
klimabevis 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 07.12.2007a 
Australia tørker ut Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 07.12.2007b 
"Så vanvittig urettferdig" - Saltvann dreper i 
Bangladesh Malaria eksploderer i Zambia 
 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 08.12.2007 
Sivilisasjoner har gått under før – Fredsprisvinner 
advarer mot å mislykkes på Bali 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 09.12.2007 
Krangel i klimabutikken Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 11.12.2007a 
Et nasjonalt klimaråd Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Debatt/Innlegg, P.Prestrud – Cicero, et 
al. 
11.12.2007b 
Klimatiltak vil kreve ofre av alle Aftenposten Leder 11.12.2007 
Seks bud for kloden Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 12.12.2007 
Ikke her uten Brundtland-kommisjonen Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 12.12.2007 
Flau Solheim på Bali - Liker utslippsrekorden i 
2008 dårlig 
 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 13.12.2007a 
Klamt om klima 
 
Aftenposten Debatt – kortinnlegg, N.W.Hagerup, 
student 
13.12.2007b 
Klima for konsensus Aftenposten Kommentar, P.K Bjørkeng 13.12.2007c 
Oppgjøret på Bali Aftenposten Ukeslutt, J.E.Stiglitz 14.12.2007 
Klima- kampen vil lønne seg VG Klimapanelet, F.Hauge 15.12.2007 
FNs klimapanel fører deg bak lyset VG Replikk, P.J.Langerud – pensjonert 
ingeniør og tidligere FrP-politiker 
16.12.2007a 
Og bakom synger skogene VG Debatt, A.Kroglund - WWF 16.12.2007b 
Klimaks i Køben Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim 17.12.2007 
Et barskere klima kan lamme Norge - Ingen vet 
hva det koster å sikre oss 
Aftenposten Nyhet, T.Strøm-Gundersen 17.12.2007 
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Endringene maskeres VG Nyhet, H.Vikøyr 18.12.2007 
Gores propaganda 
 
Aftenposten Replikk, K.Andresen - tekstforfatter 20.12.2007 
Månelanding eller buklanding VG Debatt, A.Hermstad – FIVH, et al. 20.12.2007 
Bruker 2008 til å dra på TOUR DE KLIMA - 
Jens skal på klimaturer til Antarktis, Himalaya, 
Kongo og Amazonas 
VG Nyhet, P.K.Ertzaas 28.12.2007 
Slik er den norske klimafrykten VG Nyhet 29.12.2007 
Veikart til København Aftenposten Debatt, E.Solheim – Miljø- og 
utviklingsminister 
31.12.2007 
Overser vi sannheten? Aftenposten Replikk, T.Osmundsen – redaktør 
MandagMorgen 
03.01.2008 
Klubb for klima Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 04.01.2008 
Påbud må til Aftenposten Kommentar, F.Ingulstad 05.01.2008 
Fem mirakelkurer for jorden VG Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen 05.01.2008a 
Slik blir klimasamfunnet Norge 2050 VG Feature, H.F.Høydal 05.01.2008b 
Refser panelet han var ekspert for – Klimaekspert 
tror ikke på menneskeskapt oppvarming av 
kloden 
 
VG Nyhet, J.Tjersland 08.01.2008 
Farvel til Jurassic Park Aftenposten Kommentar, A.O.Ask 11.01.2008 
CO2 blir handelspolitikk VG Klimapanelet, F.Hauge 12.01.2008 
Fra dvale til startgrop Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 18.01.2008 
Jeg, en værdame på 70 VG Klimapanelet, S.Kvalvig 19.01.2008 
Fem tonn isprøver i boks Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 19.01.2008 
Jordas laboratorium Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Debatt/Innlegg,  J.Stoltenberg - 
statsminister 
19.01.2008 
Splitter ny ørkenby - helt uten CO2 Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 21.01.2008 
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Gutten som roper ulv Aftenposten Debatt, L.Mjøen – forfatter og 
skuespiller 
24.01.2008 
Ulv på het klode  Aftenposten Leder 25.01.2008 
Om dommedags- profetier VG Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen 26.01.2008a 
Global oppvarming har stanset VG Nyhet, H.Vikøyr 26.01.2008b 
Klimadebatt i feil spor Aftenposten Kronikk, M. Jøndal – styreleder Norsk 
Biologiforening 
01.02.2008 
Lav pris på klima Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Debatt/Innlegg, V.D.Norman 02.02.2008 
India lover CO2-tiltak - Skal ikke bli verre enn 
Vesten 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 08.02.2008 
Sparkstøttingens dag Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim 09.02.2008 
Fremtiden hans smelter bort - Isbreene forsvinner 
i Nepal 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 09.02.2008 
Tiner rekordraskt VG Nyhet, A.v.d.Fehr 10.02.2008 
Bedre føre vær Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, B.Westlie 16.02.2008 
Hold hodet kaldt Aftenposten Debatt – kortinnlegg, B.Holtsmark -  
samfunnsøkonom 
16.02.2008 
Fra vann til sand Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Klode i krise, F.Frøyland 19.02.2008 
Syk av klima Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim 20.02.2008 
Når billig blir dyrt VG Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen 23.02.2008 
Blått Arktis VG Klimapanelet, H.Drange 01.03.2008 
Klimakrisen: er det over nå? Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 11.03.2008 
Nytt klima gir mer spenning Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 12.03.2008 
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Dårlig klima for god moral VG Kommentar, J.H.Hansen 12.03.2008 
Kvoter i grønn gråsone Dagens 
næringsliv 
Nyhet, I.Bjørklund og G.Skaalmo 15.03.2008 
Reddet! - Eller? Hva vil du helst lese i påsken 
2050? 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 19.03.2008 
Feilslått klimaskepsis Aftenposten Kronikk, C.Mauritzen – oceanograf  
Meterologisk institutt 
19.03.2008 
Vinteren er borte VG Nyhet, H.Vikøyr 22.03.2008 
Menneske eller maskin? VG Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen 22.03.2008 
Naturlige klimaendringer VG Debatt, T.Waaler - professor emeritus 
farmasi 
24.03.2008 
Klimapolitikkens alenegjenger Aftenposten Leder 01.04.2008 
Reinspikka populisme VG Nyhet, B.Haugan 05.04.2008 
Tidenes konspirasjon? Aftenposten Kommentar, O.Mathismoen 07.04.2008a 
Isfritt hav gir nytt håp - og nye farer Aftenposten Nyhet, M.Risa 07.04.2008b 
Klima er politikk VG Klimapanelet, S.Kvalvig 12.04.2008 
Kan vi stole på noen? Aftenposten Kronikk, R.Müller – dr.scient og 
O.Orheim – ph.D. 
 
12.04.2008 
«Klimadebatten trenger motstanderne» - 
Miljøforfattere advarer mot knebling 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 13.04.2008 
Miljø må bli business VG Debatt, E.Saga og R.E.Tveten – 
UngeHøyre/studenter NTNU 
17.04.2008 
Én fabrikk = hele Norge - Stoltenberg besøkte 
verdens verste CO-2-bombe 
Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 18.04.2008 
Skogvern for halv milliard - Pilotavtale for å 
redusere avskoging i Tanzania 
Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 22.04.2008 
Norske penger skal stoppe dette - Solheim vil inn 
i Kongo med regnskogmilliardene 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 27.04.2008 
Klimaoppskriften Dagens Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim 07.05.2008 
136 
 
Næringsliv 
Tvil og viten i klimasaken VG Debatt, D.O.Hessen – professor biologi 
og A.J.Vetlesen . professor filosofi 
09.05.2008 
Nesten ikke varmere Aftenposten Debatt, K.Stordahl. – dr. philos., et al 13.05.2008 
En villet CO2-økning Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 14.05.2008 
Klimarekorden Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 14.05.2008 
Klimaendring rammer elgen - Varsler 
konsekvenser for jakten 
Aftenposten Nyhet, O.Mathismoen 15.05.2008 
Når sikkerhet er viktigst VG Debatt, K.Storberget - justisminister 19.05.2008 
Vil ha ny verdensorden i klimakampen Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, I.G.Riisnæs 26.05.2008 
Misvisende om klima Aftenposten Kommentar, J.E.Kristiansson – UiO og 
H.Drange – Nansen-og Bjerknessenteret 
28.05.2008 
De fattigste må kutte mest Aftenposten Het kolde, G.Magnus 29.05.2008 
Algene kan redde oss - Bellona: Mulig 
klimaløsning 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 03.06.2008 
Tvil i drivhuset Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim 04.06.2008 
Verden trenger en klimakoalisjon Aftenposten Debatt, K.M.Bondevik – Club de 
Madrid, F.Hauge - Bellona, C.Berg – 
Hafslund ASA 
04.06.2008 
Klimaekspert: Dyrt å ikke handle - - Pessimismen 
kan bli selvoppfyllende Ler av klimaskeptikerne 
 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 06.06.2008 
Gull og grønne alger Dagens 
Næringsliv 
Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim 06.06.2008 
Det kan gå -hvis vi vil VG Klimapanelet 07.06.2008 
Ro, ro til Nordpolen VG Kommentar, T.U.Johansen 08.06.2008 
Klimakrise truer arktiske planter Aftenposten Nyhet, O.M.Rapp 15.06.2008 
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Iskald vinter hjalp ikke likevel - Mindre is i 
Arktis nå enn i fjor 
Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 16.06.2008 
Afrikas jordbruk vil tørke vekk Aftenposten Het kolde, A.Bakken 21.06.2008 
Miljøfiendtlig bensinpris VG Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen 21.06.2008 
Reddes av ny teknologi? Aftenposten Nyhet, A.Christensen 26.06.2008 
Foregangsland VG Replikk, K.Halvorsen - finansminister 26.06.2008 
Folk tror ikke på klimatrusselen Aftenposten Het klode, O.Mathismoen 27.06.2008 
Høye priser gir klimahåp Aftenposten Ukeslutt, J.Ultveit-Moe – konsernsjef 
Umoe 
27.06.2008 
 
 
 
 
AF:  78 texts – whereby:  36 texts from Mathismoen (21 texts from Het Klode) 
16 contributons 
DN: 45 texts – whereby: 19 texts from Alstadheim 
    11 texts from Klode i Krise 
      8 contributons 
VG: 48 texts – whereby:  15 texts from Klimapanelet 
    10 contributons 
TOTALLY: 171 texts 
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APPENDIX B – TRANSLATED MEDIA QUOTATIONS 
4.2.1 
Kloden minst 2 °C varmere. For sent?  
2 graders global temperaturøkning vil føre til omfattende artsutryddelser, og millioner 
av mennesker vil risikere tørke, sult og flom. Sannsynligheten for å unngå en slik 
oppvarming er ifølge FNs klimaeksperter allerede mindre enn 10 prosent (forside, AF 
20/09/07). 
 
Både mulighetene og utfordringene knyttet til et isfritt Arktis gjør at klimautviklingen i 
nord vil bli fulgt med særdeles årvåkne øyne i årene som kommer. At det internasjonale 
polåret – et storstilt forkningssamarbeid – startet opp i nettopp 2007 gjør at vi har de 
beste forutsetningene for å følge klimautviklingen i Arktis (VG 01/03/08).  
 
Den store majoriteten vitenskapsfolk – fra et utall fagdisipliner [som] roper et stadig 
høyere varsku. Rapportene deres, som ukentlig publiseres i vitenskapelige tidsskrifter 
verden rundt, er mere enn tørre fakta om observasjoner og prognoser. Det er sterk uro 
og frykt mellom linjene (AF 26/10/07b).  
 
Med pomp og prakt ble Snøhvit formelt åpnet 21. august i år. Et nytt norsk gasseventyr, 
med verdens mest klimavennlige teknologi var for alvor i gang. [Men] (h)verken 
teknikk eller CO2-utslipp har gått som planlagt på Melkøya. [Og] Snøhvit er i ferd med 
å bli et klimagassmareritt hverken politikerne eller StatoilHydro hadde drømt om” (AF 
04/12/07).  
 
4.2.2 
Neste gang du setter deg i bilen, send en liten tanke til den rekordraske smeltingen i 
nord og til de som er avhengige av den. Den padlende inuitten på jakt etter mat og den 
kjørende nordmannen på vei til kontoret er altså uløselig knyttet sammen. Global 
oppvarming gjør dette tydeligere enn noensinne for oss. Og i det ligger det en 
optimisme. Vi er nødt til å se det vi alt for lenge har lukket øynene for (VG 24/11/07). 
 
Selv da de så hva som skjedde, selv da jeg reiste rundt i verden og beskrev dette, beviste 
at isen smeltet i et vanvittig tempo rundt Nordpolen, at Himalayas breer ble omdannet 
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til enorme, livsfarlige innsjøer, at Australias drepende tørke bare ble avløst av noen få 
enda mer ødeleggende regnflommer, at Kenyas enorme flokker med vandrende gnuer 
og antiloper bare var en tørkeperoide unna totalt sammenbrudd. Selv da protesterte de 
(AF 19/03/08). 
 
Selv om klimaproblemet er globalt i sin natur, er årsaken til problemet ikke lenger unna 
enn nærmeste eksosrør. Få ting gir større følelse av avmakt enn en smeltende 
grønnlandsis. Ubehaget blir i grunnen ikke noe særlig mindre når vi innser at også hver 
enkelt av oss faktisk kan gjøre noe med det (DN 01/09/07).  
 
Hytteområdet i Sirdalen er heller ikke det samme som da vi kjøpte hytte der i 2005. 
Tenk det. Da har landstedet på Sletten med strandlinje inne i Ryfylke vært en mye bedre 
investering. Vi var forutseende i 2007. Vi søkte allerede da om å få hevet både naustet 
og bryggen og jammen var det bra at vi gjorde det (VG 19/01/08).  
 
[S]enke forbruket, senke transportbehovet, senke energibruken. Det krevde til dels 
drastiske løsninger, men nordmenn forsto ikke bare at det var nødvendig for miljøet, 
men også at det var en enestående økonomisk mulighet – å være i teten når klimaet 
endret seg (VG 05/01/08).  
 
[Vi alle] forsto at det kom til å vokse frem et enormt marked for energieffektivitet og for 
alle mulige CO2-frie løsninger [… ] Det ble et kappløp for å vinne, for å tjene mest 
mulig penger på den kommende økorevolusjonen – som både ble en teknologisk 
revolusjon og en moralsk revolusjon som endret menneskenes syn på naturen som en 
ikke-uttømmelig ressurs (AF 19/03/08).  
 
4.2.3 
Klodens skjebne kommer til å bli avgjort de nærmeste tiårene. Aldri før i menneskets 
historie har det økologiske systemet som holder livet i gang, blitt utfordret slik det er nå 
(DN 16/11/07). 
 
Vi ønsker ikke å ende opp i en verden der klimaet løper løpsk og gir grobunn for en 
uendelighet av konflikter mellom oss som er på denne kloden (VG 26/01/07).  
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I 2050 kan det være over ni milliarder mennesker på kloden. Det er nesten syv 
milliarder flere enn i 1950 og utgjør i seg selv et formidabelt klimaproblem (DN 
22/10/07).   
 
Jorden har feber. Vi kan ikke håpe på febernedsettende mirakler. Vi må utrette dem. 
Men hva kan vi så gjøre? Kan vi fange CO2 fra luften for deretter å lagre den på 
forsvarlig vis? Hva med å skygge for solen? Dyrke alger? Noe annet? […] En opplagt 
løsning er å leve i tråd med naturens bæreevne, utvikle ikke-forurensende og sikker 
energi, og kraftig redusere forurensningen fra kull, olje og gass. I mangel av en slik 
idealverden er det gjerne teknologiske forslag som rår 
 
(VG 05/01/08).  
 
[Jeg er] klar over at mange vil le av oss. Det gjorde de da vi for 15 år siden forslo CO2 
fangst fra gasskraftverk også. Bare vent, algedyrking kommer til å prege klimadebatten 
fremover (AF 03/06/08).  
 
4.2.4 
Selv om Aftenposten har lansert en tematisk serie med den noe tendensiøse tittelen “Het 
Klode”, burde vi som lesere klare å holde hodet kaldt også når klimaspørsmål diskuteres 
(AF 16/02/08). 
 
Klimadebatten har dessverre kommet inn på et spor hvor beklageligvis mange 
representanter for disse aktørene kappes om å beskrive veien mot klodens, og 
sivilisasjonens undergang. Så ille er det ikke, og det er grunn til å reise advarende 
pekefingre mot dem som skaper slike fremtidspessimistiske og negative bilder (AF  
01/02/08).  
 
Jeg husker mailboksen ble fylt av sinte stemmer som mente jeg drev 
kampanjejournalistikk da vi videreformidlet hva forskerne hadde funnet ut. Avisene 
flommet over med anklagelser om at dette var en konspirasjon for å stanse veksten, for 
å fremme enkeltforskere og for å spre frykt (AF 19/03/08).  
[Disse skeptikerne er] en underfundig allianse […] de er populister, engasjerte 
privatpersoner med egenutviklede teorier, mørkeblå, reaksjonære politiske miljøer og 
ymse akademikere med høyst uklar formell klimakompetanse […] Problemet og det 
triste er at det som ser ut som en vitenskapelig debatt, ikke egentlig er det. Den er basert 
på myter, usannheter og fordreininger (AF 07/04/08).  
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Er du litt usikker på dette med klimaendringer? Det er det all grunn til. Det er nemlig 
klimaforskerne også. Problemet er at debatten om klimaforskning blant forskere er en 
annen enn den debatten om klimaforskning som pågår i offentligheten. Den offentlige 
debatten preges av såkalte klimaskeptikere som sår tvil om det klimaforskerne er mest 
enige om, nemlig at kloden blir varmere og at oppvarmingen ikke kan forklares uten at 
menneskeskapte utslipp av CO2 og andre gasser tas med. Debatten blant klimaforskerne 
handler om de neste trinnene i klimaforskningen [that is, the probable consequences and 
how to combat these] (DN, 04/06/08).  
 
Drastiske utslippskutt i verdens rike land vil nesten ikke redusere oppvarmingen av 
kloden hvis utslippene i u-landene fortsatt øker. Det eneste som hjelper, et at verdens 
fattigste bruker enda mindre kull og bensin (AF 29/05/08). 
 
5.2.1 
Vi har alle og enhver godt av å komme oss ut av bilen og nærmere naturen, sanse været 
og føle på samhørigheten (VG 24/11/07).  
 
Mange tror klimaendringer er noe som ligger fjernt inn i fremtiden. Det er feil, det skjer 
nå. Jeg reiser rundt for å lære og øke min egen forståelse, men også for å rette 
oppmerksomheten mot det som skjer (AF 09/02/08).  
 
I disse landende er folk så ekstremt avhengig av primær ressursene og naturmiljøet 
rundt seg for å overleve. I vår del av verden vil vi overleve uansett, vi har råd til å være 
en del av den globaliserte økonomien og skaffe oss de produktene vi trenger (AF 
03/04/08).  
 
Et isfritt Arktis om sommeren er en god nyhet for langtransport med båt mellom Europa 
og Asia. Også tilgang til store olje – og gassreserver langs den sibirske kysten og 
mineralforekomster i polhavet blir lettere når sommerisen er borte. Situasjonen er 
selvsagt alvorlig for sel, isbjørn, fugl, alger og fisk som lever på, i eller under havisen 
(VG 01/03/08).  
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5.2.2 
[Det er] avgjørende at vi i den veletablerte og rike del av verden nå gir all mulig støtte til 
land under oppbygging (VG 22/03/08).  
 
Nedhøvlingen av regnskogen er et av verdens største klimaproblemer […] En av 
fordelene med klimatiltak i regnskogen er at de sannsynligvis er billigere enn de fleste 
andre klimatiltak. En annen er at dette er et klimatiltak som ikke krever utvikling av ny 
og kostbar teknologi. En tredje er at det er positive tileggseffekter, blant annet bevaring 
av mangfoldet i naturen (DN 12/11/07). 
 
Det trengs globale løsninger for å løse disse globale problemene. Her trenger vi Norge 
til å lede an som vi også forventer at landet vil gjøre. Norge kan spille en avgjørende 
rolle, på samme måte som det har gjort i fredsarbeidet. Norge er allerede en 
fremtredende givernasjon og leder an i arbeidet med CO2-rensing (DN 03/09/07). 
 
 
Norge er i verdenstoppen i oljeteknologi. Vi bør som nasjon bli ledende på å løse de 
energiutfordringene som verden står foran. Vi trenger ikke færre, men flere 
månelandinger. Morgendagen ligger i en satning på andre teknologiformer enn olje og 
gass (AF 11/01/08). 
5.3 
Norge vil være i teten når klimaet endrer seg – fordi vi forsto den enestående 
økonomiske muligheten […] I dag har de grisgrendte bygdene blitt effektive 
karbonfarmer med miljøflyktinger som billig arbeidskraft (VG 05/01/08). 
 
[Det var] overraskende å finne ut at vi kan bli karbonnegative uten at det rammer vår 
økonomiske vekst. Det overrasket også hvor lite en omlegging av livsstil egentlig betyr 
for utslippene. De store grepene må tas av politikere og bedrifter (AF 03/06/08).  
 
6.1.1 
Hva gjør norske medier når noen setter spørsmålstegn ved verdens største og viktigste 
sak, kommer de løpende med et åpent sinn? […] De norske mediene har i fellesskap 
lagt seg på en nesten aktivistisk linje i klimasaken (AF 13/12/07c).  
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6.1.2 
Nå har klimapanelet etablert en vitenskapelig enighet vi ikke hadde før. 
Miljøpredikanter som Al Gore, Lars Haltebrekken og Frederic Hauge kan overses. Men 
ikke vitenskapelige bevis. Nå vet vi at tørken i Australia og syklonen i Bangladesh 
kobles til klima (AF 13/12/07).  
Den rike verden har det moralske ansvar for klimatrusselen. Det er vi, som med våre 
utslipp, har skapt problemet. [Men] (v)i klarer ikke å kutte 50-80 prosent av verdens 
utslipp slik FNs klimapanel sier vi må, uten at det kuttes også i den tredje verden. Ikke 
alt, men svært mye av regningen for å få til det må vi betale. Derfor er klimatiltak ute 
viktig. Det er ikke en måte å snike seg unna på, eller frita den rike verden for å gjøre 
noe hjemme (AF 02/11/07).  
Norge vil være viktige på to arenaer. Som en av verdens ledende oljeprodusenter kan vi 
påvirke andre store oljeproduserende land, ikke minst når det gjelder satsing på CO2-
fangst. Og vi har en viktig rolle i tillitsbyggingen overfor u-landene, 
regnskogmilliardene er et eksempel (AF 13/12/07). 
6.1.3 
Siden Statoils oljesand ligger 500 meter under bakken, kan man ikke grave seg ned til 
den. Selskapet borer derfor brønner og tar i bruk en teknikk med dampinjisering […] 
Det hentes ut 200.000 fat olje fra de grønne skogene her. Det tilsvarer en sjettedel av 
dagens Statoil-produksjon. For å komme dit kreves investeringer på nærmere 90 
milliarder kroner i produksjons- og oppgraderingsanlegg […] Fra fabrikkpipene som er 
plassert i månelandskapet stiger hvit røyk og en saftig CO2-regning til værs (DN 
05/09/07b).  
 
Om vi legger naturens tålegrense til grunn, må vi si: Vi har ikke råd til vekst. Men som 
samfunn har vi ikke vist noen vilje til å legge klodens grenser til grunn; det er fremmed 
for de fleste av oss, slik naturen er det, redusert til utbytting for våre formål. 
Vekstkritikk er politisk ukorrekt langt inn i dagens SV (AF 10/09/07).  
 
Vi har så mye penger fra klimaødeleggende olje at vi kan kjøpe oss fri fra den 
klimadugnaden som resten av verden må være med på (VG 12/03/08). 
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For å kunne gjennomføre endringene mot et klimavennelig samfunn trenger vi store 
strukturendringer, og antakelig tvang. Å løse klimakrisen er konfliktfylt. Det private er 
politikk og klimatiltak er politikk. Heldigvis har vi engasjerte politikere her i landet, 
men er de modige nok? (VG 12/04/08) 
6.2 
Stoltenberg-regjeringen følger det internasjonale mønsteret ved å unngå vesentlig 
forhøyde energiskatter og andre upopulære tiltak, men gå for kvotehandel og 
skogreisning ute. Politikk er det muliges kunst, så Stoltenbergs vurdering er her riktig, 
selv om norsk puritanisme krever hjemlige ofre for at miljøet skal reddes (AF 
27/06/08). 
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APPENDIX C – MEDIA STATISTICS  
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